Department of Economics
267 Bellamy Building
Florida State University
Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180
Tel.: +1 (850) 644-7209
Florida State University
Department of Economics
Sciences Group page
(past and present):
Microeconomic theory, experimental economics, economic psychology
Recent working papers
Optimal tournaments (with M. Drugov) [link].
Winner-take-all tournaments (with M. Drugov) [link] [CEPR Discussion Paper No. 12067].
Don't hate the player, hate the game: Uncovering the foundations of cheating in contests (with G. Dutcher and Daniela Glätzle-Rützler) [link].
Contests between groups of unknown size (with L. Boosey and P. Brookins) [link].
Peer information and risk-taking under competitive and non-competitive pay schemes (with P. Brookins and J. Brown) [NBER working paper].
The industrial organization of corruption: Monopoly, competition and collusion (with D. Serra) [link].
Sorting and communication in heterogeneous weak-link group contests (with P. Brookins and J. Lightle) [link].
Is more competition always better? An experimental study of extortionary corruption (with D. Serra) [link]
Boosey, L., Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming [link] [Working Paper version].
So, T., Brown, P., Chaudhuri, A., Ryvkin, D., Cameron, L. Piece-rates and tournaments: Implications for learning in a cognitively challenging task. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming [link].
Ryvkin, D., Serra, A., Tremewan, J. I paid a bribe: Information sharing and extortionary corruption. European Economic Review, 94(May), 1-22, 2017 [link] [Working Paper version].
Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. Biased contests for symmetric players. Games and Economic Behavior, 103(May), 116-144, 2017 [link] [Working Paper verison] [This paper has been selected by the editors for the John Nash Memorial Special Issue].
Ryvkin, D., Semykina, A. An experimental study of democracy breakdown, income, and inequality. Experimental Economics, 20(2), 420-447, 2017 [link] [Working Paper version].
Balafoutas, L., Dutcher, E.G., Lindner, F., Ryvkin, D. The optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents. Economic Inquiry, 55(1), 461-478, 2017 [link] [Working Paper verison].
Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Equilibrium existence in group contests. Economic Theory Bulletin, 4(2), 265-276, 2016 [link] [Working Paper verison].
Goerg, S., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. Priming the charitable pump: An experimental investigation of two-stage raffles. Economic Inquiry, 54(1), 508-519, 2016 [link].
Dutcher, E.G., Balafoutas, L., Lindner, F., Ryvkin, D., Sutter, M. Strive to be first and avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives. Games and Economic Behavior, 94, 39-56, 2015 [link] [IZA Discussion Paper version].
Racheva-Sarabian, A., Ryvkin, D., Semykina, A. The default of special financing districts: Evidence from California. Journal of Housing Economics, 27, 37-48, 2015 [link].
Brookins, P., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 112, 311-323, 2015 [link].
Brookins, P., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. An experimental study of sorting in group contests. Labour Economics, 35, 16-25, 2015 [link].
Brookins, P., Lucas, A., Ryvkin, D. Reducing within-group overconfidence through group identity and between-group confidence judgments. Journal of Economic Psychology, 44, 1-12, 2014 [link].
Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information. Experimental Economics, 17(2), 245-261, 2014 [link].
Ryvkin, D. Heterogeneity of players and aggregate effort in contests. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 22(4), 728-743, 2013 [link].
Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. Experimental studies of games with dynamic public bads. In Analyzing Global Environmental Issues: Theoretical and Experimental Applications and Their Policy Implications, A. Rapoport and A. Dinar (eds.), pp. 89-102, Routledge 2013.
Ryvkin, D. Contests with doping, Journal of Sports Economics, 14(3), 253-275, 2013 [link].
Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. Environmental context and termination uncertainty in games with a dynamic public bad. Environment and Development Economics, 18(01), 27-49, 2013 [link].
Ryvkin, D., Krajč, M., Ortmann, A. Are the unskilled doomed to remain unaware? Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(5), 1012-1031, 2012 [link].
Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. How corruptible are you? Bribery under uncertainty, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 81(2), 466-477, 2012 [link].
Ryvkin, D. The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups, Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 564-572, 2011 [link].
Ryvkin, D. Fatigue in dynamic tournaments, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 20(4), 1011-1041, 2011 [link].
Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. Behavior in a dynamic environment with costs of climate change and heterogeneous technologies: an experiment. In Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 14 (edited by R.M. Isaac and D. Norton), Emerald, 115-150, 2011 [link].
Ryvkin, D. Contests with private costs: beyond two players, European Journal of Political Economy, 26(4), 558-567, 2010 [link].
Ryvkin, D. The selection efficiency of tournaments, European Journal of Operational Research, 206(3), 667-675, 2010 [link].
Holcombe, R.G., Ryvkin, D. Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making, Public Choice, 144(1-2), 37-51, 2010 [link].
Ryvkin, D. Tournaments of weakly heterogeneous players, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11(5), 819-855, 2009 [link].
Cojuharenco, I., Ryvkin, D. Peak-End Rule versus Average utility: how utility aggregation affects evaluations of experiences, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 52(5), 328-337, 2008 [link].
Ryvkin, D., Ortmann, A. The predictive power of three prominent tournament formats, Management Science, 54(3), 492-504, 2008 [link].
Ryvkin, D. Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players, Public Choice, 132(1-2), 49-64, 2007 [link].
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