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		Dmitry Ryvkin Bernard F. Sliger Professor Department of Economics 267 Bellamy Building Florida State University Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180 Tel.: +1 (850) 644-7209 E-mail: dryvkin@fsu.edu Web-page: http://myweb.fsu.edu/dryvkin
CV [pdf] Florida State University Department of Economics XS/FS Group My co-authors Klaus Abbink Loukas Balafoutas Luke Boosey Philip Brookins Jennifer Brown Ananish Chaudhuri Irina Cojuharenco Mikhail Drugov Glenn Dutcher Daniela Glätzle-Rützler Sebastian Goerg Xiaoli Guo Randall Holcombe Teddy Kim R. Vijay Krishna Marian Krajč John Lightle Florian Lindner Adriana Lucas Regine Oexl Andreas Ortmann Svetlana Pevnitskaya Anna Racheva-Sarabian Tim Salmon Anastasia Semykina Danila Serra Andrew Smyth Matthias Sutter James Tremewan Alexander Usvitskiy Tom Wilkening Jingjing Zhang Jun Zhang		Research interests Microeconomic theory, experimental and behavioral economics, economic psychology Recent working papers Preventing search with wicked defaults (with Andreas Ortmann, Tom Wilkening and Jingjing Zhang) [link] Tournaments with reserve performance (with Mikhail Drugov and Jun Zhang) [link] Choosing your own luck: Strategic risk-taking and effort in contests (with R. Vijay Krishna and Teddy Kim) [link] Competition for loyal customers (with Alexander Usvitskiy) [link] [link] Optimal prizes in tournaments under nonseparable preferences (with Mikhail Drugov; this paper supercedes ``Optimal prizes in tournaments with risk-averse agents,'' which only considered the separable case) [link] Entry in group contests (with Luke Boosey and Philip Brookins) [link] Don't hate the player, hate the game: Uncovering the foundations of cheating in contests (with Glenn Dutcher and Daniela Glätzle-Rützler) [link] Peer information and risk-taking under competitive and non-competitive pay schemes (with Philip Brookins and Jennifer Brown) [NBER working paper] (R&R Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization) Contests with sequential moves: An experimental study (with Arthur Nelson) [link] (R&R Journal of the Economic Science Association) Do competitive bonuses ruin cooperation in heterogeneous teams? (with Glenn Dutcher, Regine Oexl and Tim Salmon) [link] (R&R Journal of Economics and Managment Strategy) Publications Ortmann, A., Ryvkin, D., Wilkening, T., Zhang, J. Defaults and cognitive effort, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 212, 1-19, 2023 [link] [Working paper version] Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: An experiment, Games and Economic Behavior, 136(November), 117-141, 2022 [link] [Working paper version] Ryvkin, D. To fight or to give up? Dynamic contests with a deadline, Management Science, 68(11), 7793-8514, 2022 [link] [Working paper version] Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests, Review of Economic Design, Special Issue on Contests, forthcoming [link] [Working paper version] Guo, X., Ryvkin, D. When is intergroup herding beneficial? Mathematical Social Sciences, 120(November), 66-77, 2022 [link] Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. The effect of options to reward and punish on behavior in bargaining, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 31(1), 171-192, 2022 [link] [Working paper version] Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D., Smyth, A. Indefinitely repeated contests: An experimental study, Experimental Economics, 24, 1390-1419, 2021 [link] [Working paper version] Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. Tournament rewards and heavy tails. Journal of Economic Theory, 190(November), 105116, 2020 [link] [Working paper version] Abbink, K., Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. Corrupt police. Games and Economic Behavior, 123 (September), 101-119, 2020 [link] [Working paper version] Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. How noise affects effort in tournaments. Journal of Economic Theory, 188 (July), 105065, 2020 [link] [CEPR Discussion Paper] Ryvkin, D., Drugov, M. The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments. Theoretical Economics, 15(4), 1587-1626, 2020 [link] Boosey, L., Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Information disclosure in contests with endogenous entry: An experiment. Management Science, 66(11), 5128-5150, 2020 [link] [Working paper version] Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. Corruption and competition among bureaucrats: An experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 175(July), 439-451, 2020 [link] [Working Paper version] Boosey, L., Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Contests between groups of unknown size. Games and Economic Behavior, 113(January), 756-769, 2019 [link] [Working paper version] Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. Is more competition always better? An experimental study of extortionary corruption. Economic Inquiry, 57(1), 50-72, 2019 [link] [Working paper version] Brookins, P., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. Sorting and communication in weak-link group contests. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 152(August), 64-80, 2018 [link] [Working Paper version] Boosey, L., Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 105(September), 212-229, 2017 [link] [Working Paper version] So, T., Brown, P., Chaudhuri, A., Ryvkin, D., Cameron, L. Piece-rates and tournaments: Implications for learning in a cognitively challenging task. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 142(October), 11-23, 2017 [link] Ryvkin, D., Serra, A., Tremewan, J. I paid a bribe: Information sharing and extortionary corruption. European Economic Review, 94(May), 1-22, 2017 [link] [Working Paper version] Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. Biased contests for symmetric players. Games and Economic Behavior, 103(May), 116-144, 2017 [link] [This paper has been selected by the editors for the John Nash Memorial Special Issue] Ryvkin, D., Semykina, A. An experimental study of democracy breakdown, income, and inequality. Experimental Economics, 20(2), 420-447, 2017 [link] [Working Paper version] Balafoutas, L., Dutcher, E.G., Lindner, F., Ryvkin, D. The optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents. Economic Inquiry, 55(1), 461-478, 2017 [link] [Working Paper verison] Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Equilibrium existence in group contests. Economic Theory Bulletin, 4(2), 265-276, 2016 [link] [Working Paper verison] Goerg, S., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. Priming the charitable pump: An experimental investigation of two-stage raffles. Economic Inquiry, 54(1), 508-519, 2016 [link] Dutcher, E.G., Balafoutas, L., Lindner, F., Ryvkin, D., Sutter, M. Strive to be first and avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives. Games and Economic Behavior, 94, 39-56, 2015 [link] [IZA Discussion Paper version] Racheva-Sarabian, A., Ryvkin, D., Semykina, A. The default of special financing districts: Evidence from California. Journal of Housing Economics, 27, 37-48, 2015 [link] Brookins, P., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 112, 311-323, 2015 [link] Brookins, P., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. An experimental study of sorting in group contests. Labour Economics, 35, 16-25, 2015 [link] Brookins, P., Lucas, A., Ryvkin, D. Reducing within-group overconfidence through group identity and between-group confidence judgments. Journal of Economic Psychology, 44, 1-12, 2014 [link] Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information. Experimental Economics, 17(2), 245-261, 2014 [link] Ryvkin, D. Heterogeneity of players and aggregate effort in contests. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 22(4), 728-743, 2013 [link] Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. Experimental studies of games with dynamic public bads. In Analyzing Global Environmental Issues: Theoretical and Experimental Applications and Their Policy Implications, A. Rapoport and A. Dinar (eds.), pp. 89-102, Routledge 2013. Ryvkin, D. Contests with doping, Journal of Sports Economics, 14(3), 253-275, 2013 [link] Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. Environmental context and termination uncertainty in games with a dynamic public bad. Environment and Development Economics, 18(01), 27-49, 2013 [link] Ryvkin, D., Krajč, M., Ortmann, A. Are the unskilled doomed to remain unaware? Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(5), 1012-1031, 2012 [link] Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. How corruptible are you? Bribery under uncertainty, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 81(2), 466-477, 2012 [link] Ryvkin, D. The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups, Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 564-572, 2011 [link] Ryvkin, D. Fatigue in dynamic tournaments, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 20(4), 1011-1041, 2011 [link] Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. Behavior in a dynamic environment with costs of climate change and heterogeneous technologies: an experiment. In Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 14 (edited by R.M. Isaac and D. Norton), Emerald, 115-150, 2011 [link] Ryvkin, D. Contests with private costs: beyond two players, European Journal of Political Economy, 26(4), 558-567, 2010 [link] Ryvkin, D. The selection efficiency of tournaments, European Journal of Operational Research, 206(3), 667-675, 2010 [link] Holcombe, R.G., Ryvkin, D. Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making, Public Choice, 144(1-2), 37-51, 2010 [link] Ryvkin, D. Tournaments of weakly heterogeneous players, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11(5), 819-855, 2009 [link] Cojuharenco, I., Ryvkin, D. Peak-End Rule versus Average utility: how utility aggregation affects evaluations of experiences, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 52(5), 328-337, 2008 [link] Ryvkin, D., Ortmann, A. The predictive power of three prominent tournament formats, Management Science, 54(3), 492-504, 2008 [link] Ryvkin, D. Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players, Public Choice, 132(1-2), 49-64, 2007 [link]