Key points of chapters 15 and 16
 
 
Topic "Activists" "Non-Activists"
Source of instability "Shocks" -- economy inherently unstable Bad policy often the source
Speed of self-correction Slow, therefore high cost Acceptable, if not hindered by bad policy
Timing of discretionary action Difficult but possible to get right More often wrong than right -- discretion is ineffective as stabilization tool
Impact of rules Preventing reaction to events would increase instability Rules --> stable policy --> stable economy
How? Use leading indicators, forecasting models, etc to set policy Set simple rules, such as Ms growth, Money GNP growth, or inflation target

Effects of Public Debt
 
Internally held Externally held
NO extra resources -- transfer of purchasing power from one group to another Provides extra real resources now (imports can exceed exports), so potentially more capital investment now. 
Service has no real cost to society as a whole -- again a transfer from one group to another -- except (1) deadweight loss of taxes; (2) any effects on capital formation Service has a real cost to society -- real resources must be transferred to foreigners outside the society. 

 

Effects of Public Debt on Capital Formation
 
"Traditional View" "New Classical View"
Bonds are viewed as wealth by holders, so Consumption rises; borrowing increases i, r, so I goes down (crowding out). Partly offset by foreign finance inflows, but that has a real future cost. Future taxes to service them offset value of bonds ["Ricardian Equivalence"]; any tax reduction is saved to finance future tax payments, no effect on i, r, no effect on Cons or I. 
Empirical evidence? 

Mixed -- subject to interpretation difficulties -- should data be nominal or real? What should be base period? Majority probably favors "traditional view"