Are Minority and Women Candidates Penalized by Party Politics? Race, Gender, and Access to Party Support

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Abstract

Racial/ethnic minorities and women continue to be underrepresented in public office in the United States. Here we evaluate the role of general election political party support for women and minorities in structuring these inequalities, as a key part of general election success is support from party networks. With detailed data on party support and the demographics of congressional candidates, we use two difference-in-differences strategies to leverage within-district and within-candidate change over time. Thus, we are able to separate the effect of race/ethnicity and gender from other factors we demonstrate to be associated with party support. We find that, all else equal, Democratic or Republican minority nominees do not receive less support than their white counterparts. We also find that white women receive more party support from Democrats than Democratic men or minority women in the general election and that this support is more responsive to changes in electoral competitiveness. These findings suggest that party elites may provide additional support to candidates from underrepresented groups in the general election in an attempt to broaden their appeal to voters.

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1 Introduction

Despite significant increases in racial and gender diversity in recent years, the number of minorities and women in elected office continues to be less than their share of the U.S. population. Only 24% of the 116th Congress are women, and 22% are Black, Latino, Asian American, or American Indian (Bialik 2019; CAWP 2019). In comparison, the United States is 51% female and 39% non-White. Simply put, members of Congress (and most other elected bodies in the United States) do not reflect the gender or racial/ethnic identities of those they represent.

These longstanding disparities that persist after accounting for age, citizenship, voter registration, or even voter turnout, fueling a literature that initially emphasized voter bias as a key explanation. While experimental work repeatedly found evidence of systematic voter discrimination against minorities (Sigelman and Sigelman 1982; Terkildsen 1993) and women (Hershey 1980; Sigelman and Sigelman 1982), observational work relying on election results instead suggests minimal negative effects of race and gender on voter actions at the polls (Becker and Heaton 1967; Bejarano 2013; Dolan 2004; Highton 2004; Tate 2003), at least after accounting for party (Citrin, Green and Sears 1990; Dolan 2014; Tesler and Sears 2010).

More recent research has sought to explain underrepresentation as a product of elite-driven stages of the electoral process where parties play a key role. Women and African-Americans consider running for office at lower rates than white men (Fox and Lawless 2005) and local partisan candidate recruitment networks are often biased in favor of men and whites (Crowder-Meyer 2013; Dynes et al. 2019; Niven 2006; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Shah, Scott and Juenke 2019; Doherty, Dowling and Miller 2018). As a result, women are less likely to challenge co-partisans in the primary (Dittmar et al. 2017), and racial/ethnic minority candidates are less likely to enter primaries when co-ethnic support is insufficient to carry them to victory (Branton 2009). The most recent research in this area examines instances where minorities and women do enter primaries, and finds co-partisan

party elite support to be both available (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018; Hassell and Visalvanich 2019; Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth 2018, but see Ocampo and Ray 2019) and important (Hassell and Visalvanich 2019; Ocampo 2018) to electoral success for minority and women candidates.

We extend this previous research by examining partisan elite behavior at the final stage of the electoral process. Once a candidate wins her party's nomination, support from the party may be expected as the candidate is now the only person who can deliver victory for the party in the district. As explained in greater detail below, however, party support varies and plays a powerful role in shaping general election outcomes (Baker 2014; Desmarais, La Raja and Kowal 2015; Kolodny and Dwyre 2017), meaning that a deeper understanding of gender and minority representation demands careful attention to general election party politics.

Our analysis examines whether parties act to hinder (or bolster) the candidacies of minority and women party nominees in the general election. To do so, we use data identifying the race and gender of over 1,000 major-party congressional candidates who won their party's nomination between 2006 and 2014, along with three measures of party support measuring the resources party networks commit to nominees in the general election. To account for the different environments in which minority and women candidates seek office, we use a difference-in-differences approach that tracks shifts in party support when the race or gender of the party's nominee changes from one election to the next. We also examine the sensitivity of party support to changes in electoral competitiveness with a second difference-in-differences design examining shifts in support for the same nominee before and after redistricting. Our empirical strategy thus allows us to determine, *ceteris paribus*, how party support in the general election varies as a function of the race and gender of a party's nominee.

Overall, we find little evidence that minority or women candidates receive less support from party elites in general elections. Across both parties, we see no consistent

evidence that minority nominees or women nominees are unable to gain co-partisan elite support. Instead, party elites appear to boost the candidacies of minority and women nominees relative to whites and men under certain circumstances: most notably, the Democratic Party donor network provides more support to Democratic women candidates, in particular White women, compared to their male counterparts. Furthermore, Democratic party networks are more responsive to changes in district competitiveness for women candidates, providing additional party support above and beyond the increase that normally comes when a race is more competitive.

These findings, a product of real-world election behavior by party elites, provide support for previous survey research suggesting the Democratic Party provides extra support to white women versus men (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018). Furthermore, Republican elite support may contribute to recent successes by minority Republicans in heavily-White and conservative districts where co-partisan voter bias might be strongest (Doherty, Dowling and Miller 2018). In short, the evidence presented here demonstrates that a lack of party support for minorities and women at the general election stage is not the cause of underrepresentation of minorities and women. If anything, parties appear to be more supportive of minority and women nominees than they are of their white and male counterparts, opening up new research questions probing the origin and substance of this support.

2 Parties and Underrepresentation

While representation is ultimately dependent on who runs for office and citizens' decisions about who to vote for, parties play an integral role in facilitating a candidate's path to elected office (Desmarais, La Raja and Kowal 2015; Fox and Lawless 2010; Hassell 2018; Ocampo 2018). Party support may be especially critical for racial/ethnic minority and women candidates who may face discrimination by voters at the ballot box (Broockman and Soltas 2018; Gimenez et al. 2017; Hershey 1980; Ocampo 2018; Terkild-

sen 1993).

Remedying past underrepresentation may also be a strategy pursued by parties to broaden their appeal in a more symbolic manner. Over the past few decades, and most recently in the GOP's 2013 post-election report, Republican Party leadership has repeatedly indicated interest in strengthening their appeal to minority voters through the promotion of minority Republicans (Republican National Committee 2013; Wright Rigueur 2015). Yet, some have questioned whether or not the GOP has actually ever actively engaged in these efforts (e.g. Los Angeles Times Editorial Board 2016).[1] Recent news coverage of candidate recruitment has highlighted the relative strength of the Democratic Party at recruiting women (Goldmacher 2013) but also their shortcomings in supporting minorities (Herndon 2018), aligning with recent findings that suggest parties view minority candidates as less electable than whites (Doherty, Dowling and Miller 2018).

We seek to better understand how parties shape the representation of minorities and women through their support of minority and women candidates in the general election. Recent research has focused on party recruitment of minorities and women (Fox and Lawless 2014; Niven 2006; Shah, Scott and Juenke 2019) and party support of minorities and women in the primary election (Hassell and Visalvanich 2019; Ocampo 2018), but we are aware of no recent work examining how race and gender might influence the decision of parties to extend more or less support to candidates in the *general election*. Sincere or not, by the general election stage party efforts to aid underrepresented candidates are met with the electoral priority of parties: winning office. Simply put, if the desire to diversify the parties is not accompanied by party support post-nomination, these efforts will not impact levels of underrepresentation.

[1] McCoy (2016) indicates that "some operatives have long spoken privately that the [2013] report was never more than an attempt to hoodwink donors and the media."

2.1 Party Support and General Election Success

Before addressing the potential for differential party elite support by candidate gender and race, we first note the role that party networks play in the success or failure of candidates in the general election. While a candidate's success in a general election or lack thereof has largely been considered candidate-centered (Jacobson and Kernell 1981), or driven by the partisan composition of the district (Jacobson 2015), recent work indicates that party support has a strong effect on general election outcomes (Desmarais, La Raja and Kowal 2015) in part because party support allows candidates to tap into a larger network of support (Baker 2014; Kolodny and Dwyre 2017).

Conceptualizing parties as a diverse network of interests and groups with national party organizations at the center (Bawn et al. 2012; Cohen et al. 2008; Hassell 2018; Koger, Masket and Noel 2009; Kolodny and Dwyre 2017), the party Hill committees (the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee) are the central coordinators of the larger partisan campaign (Hassell 2016; Koger, Masket and Noel 2009), operating as coordinators of donations from party elites to preferred candidates (Dwyre et al. 2006). Party support leads to both support from others in the party network (Baker 2014), and also access to related campaign resources commonly found within the party network that improve candidate prospects. Parties direct media attention and experienced campaign staff to preferred candidates (Hassell 2018). They also share information and electoral tactics across the party network, and control political resources that are difficult to acquire elsewhere (Grossmann and Dominguez 2009; Koger, Masket and Noel 2009; Nyhan and Montgomery 2015). As a result, candidates who receive support from the party network benefit from these scarce resources and run more efficient and effective campaigns (Desmarais, La Raja and Kowal 2015; Hassell 2016).

2.2 Party Support of Racial/Ethnic Minorities and Women

Parties can thus play a key role in the underrepresentation of minorities and women through granting, or restricting, access to the resources found in party networks. While we might expect party elites to prioritize winning above everything else, including the race and gender of a candidate, some evidence suggests that this may not be the case. Theilmann and Wilhite (1986) found that during the 1980s Black candidates raised less money from party organizations and political action committees than their white counterparts. Today, minority Democrats have continued to criticize the party for a perceived lack of financial support outside of minority-majority districts (Herndon 2018). Latino candidates are also more reliant on local fundraising networks that are less connected to party networks (Ocampo and Ray 2019), and are more reliant on non-party support at the primary stage (Ocampo 2018).

Analyses of campaign receipts by Burrell (1985; 1996) from the 1970s and 1980s already indicated that women U.S. House candidates were not disadvantaged in total finance receipts or PAC support. However, at the state legislative level, we see signs that this may be due to compensating efforts of well-organized donor networks. First, men donate more to men in general elections (Barber, Butler and Preece 2016). In congressional *primary* elections, however, Democratic women are more likely to receive donations than Democratic men, a pattern not found for Republicans (Kitchens and Swers 2016). This aligns with survey-based understandings of women's representation policy demanders as being more fully entrenched in the Democratic Party (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018), and speaks to the influence of organizations like EMILY's list in boosting campaign fundraising for Democratic women candidates (Hannagan, Pimlott and Littvay 2010; Pimlott 2010). Similar PACs on the Republican side are not as prominent because of differences in demand for gender parity in representation by Republican women (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018).

At the general election stage, limited party elite support should conflict with parties'

proximate goal of winning office. However, party elites continue to be predominately white and male, and party elites tend to prefer to support candidates who are similar to themselves (Hassell 2018).

Indeed, recent work has suggested that women may be discriminated against in general elections by party elites. Leveraging close primaries, Bucchianeri (2018) demonstrates that Republican women nominees receive fewer donations than Republican men nominees in the subsequent general election contest, reducing women's success rate. While not explicitly testing party support, this finding suggests that party elites may be practicing taste-based discrimination, a form of prejudice where negative outcomes are incurred (in this case, losing a general election) in order to prioritize a symbolic or psychological victory via discrimination (Becker and Heaton 1967; Broockman and Soltas 2018). In fact, taste-based discrimination seems more likely than statistical discrimination rooted in actual perceptions of candidate viability, as minority candidates often win office with substantial co-partisan non-minority support once clearing the nomination stage (Fraga 2014; Juenke 2014; Juenke and Shah 2016; Shah 2014), women perform just as well as men at the general election ballot box (Dolan 2004, but see Bucchianeri 2018), and women *outperform* men in a variety of electorally advantageous congressional activities once reaching office (Anzia and Berry 2011) .

Beyond taste-based discrimination, dynamics of where candidates seek office may also shape party elite support for minority and women nominees. Recent elections have featured a growing number of minority candidates seeking office in heavily White districts (Fraga 2016; Grose 2011; Karpowitz et al. 2017), in particular, minority Republicans (Fraga 2014). Such candidates may require additional party support in the general election stage, support that would be provided regardless of aims to diversity. Historically, however, minority and women candidates are more likely to run in districts that need *less* elite support at the general election stage. Despite recent increases in minority candidates seeking office in heavily-White districts, the best determinant of minority

candidacy remains the size of the co-racial population within the district (Juenke 2014; Shah 2014) where general election outcomes are rarely in doubt. Yet women are forced to work harder to raise the money necessary to fend off challengers even after reaching office (Lawless and Pearson 2008; Pearson and McGhee 2013), suggesting that all else equal minority candidates and women facing the same circumstances as whites and men could get less party support.

Thus, previous research has suggested that party elites may be essential in helping minority and women candidates in the general election, and also that parties may be more likely to withhold support for candidates from underrepresented groups. In short, despite the ever increasing volume of knowledge about the role that the party network plays in the electoral success of congressional candidates, we have little understanding of whether party donors actually help or hinder minority and women candidates. This is especially true in the post-primary stage, where parties have *already* decided who their nominee will be.

3 Data and Methods

To better understand the relationship between party elite support, race/ethnicity, and gender we examine general election candidates who sought office between 2006 and 2014. For each candidate we code their race/ethnicity and gender using information from archived candidate websites, media reports, and other online information sources. Table 1 displays the race and gender of general election candidates over the five election cycles. While a majority of minority candidates are Democrats, there are still a significant number of minority Republicans. There are also large numbers of women candidates in both parties.

[Table 1 about here.]

Identifying party support in the general election is challenging because nominees are

already the party's candidate for the district. However, while publicly supporting all nominees, the actors in the party network vary the support and resources they provide. To measure the strength of party network support in general elections, we use three different measures. Each is designed to capture an aspect of the resources that the party directs towards particular candidates.

The first is a count of the number of party connected donors. These donors donated money to both the candidate and the party's Congressional Campaign Committee after the primary election was complete.[2] One of the main roles of national party committees is to direct donors to candidates. Beginning in the 1980s, parties began to run into the problem of raising more money than they could legally transfer to candidates. Rather than raise more money for themselves and then distribute it through direct contributions or coordinated expenditures, the party Hill committees began to act as bundlers, getting donors who had given previously to the party committee to write checks to a party favored candidate and then "bundling" those checks to those candidates (Herrnson 1988: 71-73; Kolodny 1998: 151; Dwyre et al. 2006).

This measure of party support captures the role of party organizations as coordinators of the larger party network and the resources that this network can provide.[3] While explicitly measuring the number of shared donors with the party's Hill Committee, this measure also reflects other support from the party network such as campaign staff and electoral infrastructure that parties provide to their favored candidates (Hassell 2018; Montgomery and Nyhan 2017). The number of party connected donors quantifies party

[2]Individuals who gave to both parties' Hill committees are included for two reasons. First, the number of individual donors who give to both the DCCC and the NRCC is very low, constituting on average less than 0.5% of party donors in general elections. Second, eliminating these donors from the indicator of party support would systematically underestimate support for some candidates in ways that could be correlated with race or gender. Party Hill committees not only connect ideological and principled party adherents to preferred candidates, but also work to connect access oriented donors who may contribute to candidates from both parties (Herrnson 1988, 2009; Kolodny 1998).

[3]We use a measure of shared donors with the party after the primary rather than using the entire election cycle because parties may choose favorites in congressional primaries that may or may not be the same as the general election nominee (Hassell 2018). We also ran models that looked only at party support in the two months following the primary, and find no differences from the results presented here.

support in line with qualitative accounts of the party organization at the center of a coordinated effort to support preferred candidates (Hassell 2016; Herrnson 1988, 2009; Kolodny and Dwyre 2017; Hassell 2018).[4] As mentioned previously, integration into the party donor network cues party elites about the candidates they should support and has a strong influence on candidate success in the general election (Desmarais, La Raja and Kowal 2015). While other research has looked at the willingness of donors overall (Burrell 1985, 1996), or of a particular gender to give to women candidates (Barber, Butler and Preece 2016; Thomsen and Swers 2017), here we examine explicitly the ability of minority and women candidates to gain access to party networks of support and the resources that party networks provide during the general election.

We also examine two additional measures of party support beyond the number of party connected donors. While there is some indication that the number of party connected donors who give to a candidate is an indicator of more than just financial support (Hassell 2018; Montgomery and Nyhan 2017), donations from a party connected donor could vary significantly in the amount. As a result, our second measure of party support is a continuous measure of the amount of money each candidate raised from party connected donors in the general election. This might shed some additional light on the level of support from the party network. Lastly, in line with previous studies of party support for particular candidates, we also look at the direct contributions that parties give to candidates in the general election (Theilmann and Wilhite 1986). While perhaps missing signals sent behind the scenes, measuring direct financial commitments contributed to candidates by the party Hill committees provides a clear and salient measure of the *public* support that the party is interested in providing to its general election candidate in a district.

Table 2 shows overall levels of party support for White men, White women, minority men, and minority women. We find that white women candidates enjoy more support

[4]Previous research has shown that this measure strongly matches journalistic accounts of party support for a particular candidate as well (Hassell 2016, 2018).

on average from party elites than their male colleagues. This is especially true for white women Democrats. On the Republican side, we also see a slight increase in party support in the form of the number of donations from party connected donors of minority male candidates relative to White men running for office, but no substantive differences in the amount raised from those sources and a slight decrease in the amount the party committee contributed directly to minority candidates.

As noted above, these simple comparisons may misrepresent the decisions of party elites to support certain types of candidates by failing to take into account how district-level factors impact resource allocation. District competition is the main driver of party support, as donations to both incumbents and challengers become more common as district competition increases (Jacobson and Kernell 1981; Jacobson 2010, 2015). Such a relationship may influence the observed relationship between party support and candidate traits. We know that minority candidates are more likely to run in heavily minority districts which are largely uncompetitive in the general election where party support is not critical (Juenke 2014; Shah 2014). Likewise, gendered campaign dynamics in competitive elections may also make women less likely to appear in competitive, high donation contests (Kanthak and Woon 2015). Thus, these preliminary results may not accurately indicate the effect of candidate race or gender on party elite support.

[Table 2 about here.]

Instead of relying on bivariate correlations to understand parties' relationships with minority and women candidates, we use two identification strategies with the goal of uncovering the causal relationship between race and party support. In the first, we examine party support to candidates in districts over time, leveraging the relative consistency of competitiveness in those districts to examine the effect of changing the race and gender of the candidate running in that district. We only compare districts within the same districting cycle, such that they had no change in their district boundaries from year to year. These districts remain similar in their competitiveness from year to year and do

not have any boundary changes that might precipitate other changes in district level factors. This allows us to calculate the difference-in-difference effects of changing the race or gender of the candidate while holding district characteristics constant.[5] In the second, we leverage congressional redistricting as a way to estimate differential effects of changes in competitiveness in the district on party support depending on candidate gender, race, or ethnicity. This allows us to identify how parties react to changes in competitiveness for candidates of different races and genders. Because of gender aversion to electoral competition (Kanthak and Woon 2015), we might expect more support from parties to women candidates relative to men in more competitive districts to alleviate concerns about competition. Differences in party support in competitive races might also help explain differences between voter aversion towards minorities and women in experimental work and the success that these candidates appear to enjoy in observational work.

In both models, we include a set of controls to account for other factors that are known to affect party support. We include measures of district competitiveness, incumbency, and candidate quality. To measure district competitiveness we rely on Cook Political Report's Partisan Voting Index (Cook PVI) which indicates how the district voted relative to the nation as a whole in the last two presidential elections. By taking the absolute value of this measure we can get a measure of how extreme a district is in comparison to other congressional districts and how competitive that district is likely to be. To measure candidate quality, we use a dummy variable indicating whether a candidate has held previous office (Jacobson and Kernell 1981). In our models, we also include a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate was an incumbent, and we cluster standard errors by party-district (or candidate, depending on the level of analysis) to account for serial autocorrelation that may arise in difference-in-differences models (Bertrand, Duflo

[5]The key assumption here is that the trends in the dependent variable are consistent over time and would remain so without the change in candidate race and gender. We find strong support for these assumptions. Comparing the difference in donors between 2006 and 2008 for districts that would later have a change in candidate type in 2010 we find no pre-change difference for districts that would later shift candidate gender in 2010 (p=0.27) or candidate minority status in 2010 (p=0.40).

and Mullainathan 2004).

4 District-level Results

We start with examining the effects of a change in race of the nominee on party support within the same district. Table 3 shows the results of a difference-in-difference model predicting the level of party support when the race or gender of the party's general election candidate changes. This allows us to estimate the effect of race and gender while holding district attributes constant.[6]

[Table 3 about here.]

Table 3 shows that, overall, parties do not appear to discriminate against minority and women candidates in the general election. When we observe districts where there was a change in the nominee coinciding with a change in race, we find that party connected donors do not shy away from supporting the minority nominee.[7]

We also find little evidence that parties are discriminatory towards women candidates in the general election. In fact, in two out of three models in Table 3 parties are more supportive of women candidates than they are of men candidates. We find strong evidence that when a party nominates a woman instead of a man in the same district, there is an

[6]Another possible explanation is that the outcome (the level of party support) in one year influenced the the party's choice of a nominee (and the race and gender of that candidate) in subsequent years. Given previous findings that suggest that party support for certain types of candidates in the primary appears to not be strategically related to the district (Hassell and Visalvanich 2019), this seems unlikely. However, to test this possibility we run a Granger-causality test. A variable (x) is said to Granger-cause another (y) if lagged variables of x predict y but lagged variables of y do not predict x when both lagged variables are included in both models. We find that party donors do not Granger-cause changes in the gender or minority status of the candidate suggesting that the levels of party support in the previous election cycle does not drive the nomination of minority or women candidates in subsequent elections.

[7]One concern is that these results might be driven by support of incumbents, as the party Hill committees were originally formed as incumbent defense committees (Herrnson 1988; Kolodny 1998). Indeed, as shown in Table A1 in the online appendix, the effect of excluding incumbents is to eliminate the effects for Democrats on direct party contributions to women and some evidence that Democrats discriminate against minorities. However, the effects on the overall party network (the number of party donors and the amount those donors give) are strikingly similar although the effect on the amount of party donor contributions to women does not quite reach significance ($p<0.13$).

increase in support from the party. Overall, therefore, our findings indicate that parties are not less supportive of minority and women candidates in the general election. In contrast, consistent with evidence that parties help minority and women candidates overcome voter discrimination, we find that parties are more supportive of women candidates in the general election than their male counterparts.

4.1 Differences by Party

The results in the first column in Table 3 obscure important differences between the parties. To separate out these effects we run separate models by party. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 shows the effects of changes in the race and gender of nominees on party support for Democrats and Republicans separately for all three outcomes.

For Republican candidates, we find that minority candidates receive significantly more donations from party connected donors. When the race of the Republican running in the general election changes from white to minority in the following election, the candidate receives significantly more support from party connected donors compared to the previous election cycle ($p<0.05$). Minority candidates receive, on average, almost 10 more donations from Republican party connected donors than a white candidate running in the previous cycle. While that support does not translate to more money raised from those sources or more direct contributions from the party organization, minority Republicans do not receive significantly less support using either of those alternative measures.

For Democrats, we do not find any consistent evidence of increased support for minority candidates across any of the measures of party support in the general election like we do for Republicans. While we do see some evidence of reduced support for minority candidates from direct party contributions, those results are not robust across measures of party support.

Women Democratic candidates, however, do appear consistently to be the beneficiaries of more support from the party in the general election. The nomination of a woman

instead of a man results in a significant uptick in party support. This change increases party donors over the course of the general election campaign by almost 13 additional donors in the party network, roughly $6,400 in donations from party connected donors, and an increase in almost $300 dollars in direct contributions from the party. Democratic Party elites clearly appear to be more supportive of nominees who are women than men. While when women run, women win, our findings suggest that Democratic women candidates are the beneficiaries of extra effort on the part of the party and the party elites connected to the party.

[Table 4 about here.]

The higher levels of Democratic party support for women in the general election are driven by white women candidates rather than minority women candidates. Table 4 separates out the effect for white women candidates and minority women candidates among Democrats and Republicans. We find that while support from the Democratic Party during the general election, measured in the number of shared donors, the amount raised from those donors, or in the amount raised directly from the party committee, is significantly greater for White women nominees than for their White men counterparts, there is no similar effect for minority women candidates.

This shows that the race and gender of a candidate impact party support during the general election. These effects do not, however, indicate systematic discrimination against minorities and women in the general election. In fact, we find some suggestive evidence that the Republican Party and the elites that surround that party are actually more supportive of minority Republican candidates running in the general election while minority Democrats receive less support from the party. However, these effects are only present in one model respectively. We also find that Democrats are more supportive of white women candidates than they are of their white and minority men counterparts in the general election.

5 Candidate-level Results

In addition to looking at district-level effects of a shift in the characteristics of a nominee, we also examine whether parties treat women and minority candidates differently as the competitiveness of their district changes.[8] This allows us to test the sensitivity of party support, and to confirm through a second identification strategy how parties support different types of candidates who are running for office. Parties should invest more resources in a race as district competitiveness increases; we investigate how race and gender might alter the party's response.

To do this, we examine party support for candidates who ran in multiple elections during the time period. We then leverage the 2012 redistricting as an externally-imposed shock to the competitiveness of the district in which these candidates were running to test whether there were differences in the changes of support to minority and women candidates compared to white and male candidates as the district partisanship changed. To measure competitiveness we use a change in the Cook PVI of a district associated with redistricting, rescaling the variable such that an increase means that the district shifted in favor of the candidate's party.[9]

We can expect changes in redistricting to have different effects on party support depending on the original partisan lean of the districts. For districts that originally lean toward the candidate's party, changes in redistricting that increase a party's support in a district should *decrease* the level of party support as party connected donors and party organizations redirect resources to other districts that are more competitive. For districts that originally lean toward the opposition candidate's party, changes in redistricting that increase a party's viability in the district should *increase* the level of party spending and

[8]The assumption here is that pre-redistricting trends of party support are not different for districts that saw changes in competition. Again, we have strong reason to believe this is true, as there are no significant differences in the changes in party support from year to year among districts that saw a change in competitiveness as a result of redistricting compared to districts that did not experience a change in competitiveness ($p<0.48$ in party favored districts).

[9]The Cook PVI scores that we use draw on the the same presidential election results for pre and post-redistricting districts.

party elite support as these districts become more competitive. Because of these different expected effects of increases in party strength for districts that favor the candidate's party and those that favor the opposing candidate's party, we estimate one model for the effects of a change in district competitiveness for each of these two types of districts.

Table 5 shows the effects of changes in district competitiveness. The first two models estimate the effects of increases in partisan lean in districts that originally favored the candidate's party. The second two models estimate the effects of increases in district competitiveness in districts that originally favored the other major party. As the first two columns in Table 5 show, as expected, in districts that originally favored the candidate's party, increases in party favorability decreases party investment in the election.[10] For districts that originally favored a nominee's opponent, redistricting that increased the viability of the nominee's party in that district appears to increases the number of party connected donors and the amount that they contribute in the general election. Contrary to expectations, however, direct public public by the party slightly decreased as a result of changes that raised the party's competitiveness in the district.

[Table 5 about here.]

Table 5 also shows that many of these effects are significantly different for minority and women candidates. We find that increasing the partisan bent of a district has disparate effects for whites than for minorities and for women than for men. In districts that originally favored a candidate's party we find that party elite support of women in the general election is consistently more responsive to district competitiveness across all measures. As a district that favorable to the party becomes more competitive, party support in the general election increases more for women than it does for men. Party elites are more than twice as responsive to the competitiveness of districts in which women are

[10]The significant coefficients on the Minority and Woman dummy variables constitute cross-district estimates and lend more credence to the idea that minorities and women are nominated in different types of districts.

running than they are to districts where men are running. Thus, when a previously party-favorable seat becomes more competitive, parties invest more in women candidates than men candidates in the general election. We do not, however, see any differences in effects for women candidates in those districts that previously favored the opposing candidate.

For minority candidates, however, we see a different pattern. Rather than finding that party support decreases as party favorability increases in districts that already favored the candidate's party, we find that support from party elites *increases* as the district changes to become more favorable to that candidate's party. A one-point increase in the Cook Political Report's PVI of the district which makes the district safer for the candidate's party *decreases* party support in the general election by about two donors for White candidates but *increases* the number of party connected donors by about 1.3 to minority candidates. Minority candidates get a boost in support from party connected donors in the general election when their districts become safer.

This same effect is also seen in districts that originally did not favor the candidate's party. While increases in district favorability increase the level of party support in the general election generally, the effect for minority candidates is much greater. In short, redistricting that increases the party's viability in the district increases party support for minority candidates regardless of the original partisan lean of the district. As a district becomes more viable or safer for a party, party elites are more likely to support minority candidates.

5.1 Differences by Party

As before, these aggregate models may hid important party differences. Table 6 breaks down results by party to identify how parties react differently to minority and women candidates. Because of the small number of repeat candidates in districts that favor the opposition party, we focus on the results for candidates that ran multiple times in districts that favored the party.

Column 1 in Table 6 shows that among Republicans we find patterns consistent with the overall results for minority candidates, but no differences based on nominee gender. We are hesitant to draw conclusions from this sub-analysis because the number of repeat minority Republican candidates whose district changed in competitiveness is small. The effects are largely driven, in this instance, by one outlier whose district became more competitive and who received substantially less support from the party.[11] We can say conclusively, however, that the Republican Party network is not less sensitive to the competitiveness-driven need for more support when a Republican woman is running.

[Table 6 about here.]

For Democrats we observe results consistent with the overall findings for both women and minority candidates. As a district moves from being competitive to being strongly Democratic, rather than decreasing support for minority candidates, Democratic elites support minority candidates in the general election even more. As a seat becomes safer for the party, party support in the general election for minority candidates increases.

[Table 7 about here.]

Differentiating between White women candidates and minority women candidates again indicates the importance of examining the intersection of race and gender. In Table 7 we find that in districts that originally favor Democrats, redistricting that decreases the Democratic lean of the district boosts support for white women candidates while not having a substantively different effect on minority women candidates. Compared to white men, Democratic Party elites are more responsive to the district competitiveness of white women candidates but are not more responsive to district competition where minority women candidates are running.

Figure 1 shows the effects of changes in district competitiveness modeled from Table 7. As shown, relative to men, a change in the competitiveness of the district has a significant

[11] Republican Bill Flores, TX-17.

and substantively large effect on the support from the party of a White women candidate. On the whole, a shift in the competitiveness of a district from D+5 to a toss-up district increases the number of party connected donors who give to white women candidates by 22 more than the increase that white men receive, increases the amount raised from those donors by over $15,000 relative to white men, and increases the average direct party contribution by $500. However, Figure 1 indicates that the there is no significant difference in support for minority men or women relative to white men.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Our candidate-level results are largely consistent with our previous district-level analyses. We find that parties are not discriminatory against women and minority candidates in the general election, providing support when district competition demands it. We also find that the Democratic Party is more responsive to changes in seat security for women candidates than they are for men. As a seat becomes more competitive as a result of redistricting, party elites increase their support of women candidates in the general election more than they do for men.

Complicating a simple story, however, we find that parties continue to support minority candidates even when increases in the lean of the district make the seat more safe. One explanation is that parties more generally are interested in promoting successful minorities and rally around those individuals likely to win. Consistent with findings noted in the literature review, Republican Party elites may recognize that minority Republicans might struggle to win the votes of conservative white Republicans, boosting support of these candidates to continue to control these districts. However, the paucity of minority Republican candidates does not allow us to make firm conclusions here.

6 Conclusion

Given the key role played by political parties influencing general election outcomes, it stands to reason that a lack of support from party elites in the general election could influence the longstanding underrepresentation of minorities and women in Congress. Although previous research using survey methods has suggested that party support could be a crucial factor in helping Democratic women to find electoral success, this work had not systematically examined whether these stated opinions translated into action in the general election (a result which is by no means a sure thing given the social norms surrounding these groups (Berinsky 2004)), there has been no comprehensive examination of the magnitude of party elite support for minorities in general elections.

We provide a clear vision of party elite actions in support of underrepresented candidates in the general election. Using two difference-in-differences techniques that leverage district-level and candidate-level change over time, we find no evidence of bias against women or minority nominees, by either party. The mostly-male, mostly-White "old boy's network" is influential in determining candidate emergence, and may play a more substantial role in earlier stages of the electoral process (Branton 2009; Niven 2006), but does not appear to withhold support once candidates pass the nomination stage. Our findings thus build on the work of Burrell (1985, 1996), providing causal evidence that party connected donors and party elites do not constrain funding for women candidates in the general election.

With these results, we are left with important questions that reverses much of the extant research agenda: Why does the Republican Party boost the prospects of minority candidates in the general election, despite historically low levels of minority support for Republican candidates? Why does the Democratic Party provide additional support to White women in the general election as their elections become more competitive? While unable to test explicitly the reasons for these differences, we hypothesize that these effects may manifest for several reasons.

Tackling the first question first, one explanation appears in a prominent recommendation from the 2013 Republican post-election report: "If we want ethnic minority voters to support Republicans, we have to engage them, and show our sincerity" (Republican National Committee 2013). It could be that Republicans see this as an opportunity to make a candidate more salient in a party that struggles to attract minority votes. Just as the GOP's report outlined, party elites appear to want to outreach to minorities by promoting minorities within their own ranks. The GOP's goal to "improve on promoting [minority] staff and candidates within the Party [by]...promoting [minority] staff and candidates within the Party" (Republican National Committee 2013) may be reflected by the official party organization and party elites in supporting minority candidates even more as their districts become increasingly more Republican. Moreover, this effort may be necessary to mitigate racially resentful conservative voters who might be disinclined to support minority conservatives; a concern seemingly shared by local party chairs (Doherty, Dowling and Miller 2018).

A second explanation may be more fruitful: in what Fraga and Leal call "symbolic mainstreaming," Republicans use minority support as a tool to win over moderate *White* voters (Fraga and Leal 2004). Processes of electoral capture (Frymer 1999) resemble this phenomenon. In the absence of legitimate minority voter support, minority candidacy may be the preferred method of signaling to moderate voters that the party is not just full of "stuffy old men." (Republican National Committee 2013: 6).

The Democratic Party may pursue a similar strategy with White women candidates. A majority of White women voters supported the Republican candidate for President in 16 of the last 18 elections, with the two exceptions being the landslide re-election of popular incumbents. Might the differential support for women candidates by Democrats help the party appeal to Republican-leaning White women voters? Future research should explore this possibility. One source of this support could be party-connected groups supporting women, such as EMILY's list, with the downstream result of further integrating these can-

didates into party donor networks (Hannagan, Pimlott and Littvay 2010; Pimlott 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2010). Democratic donors also appear disposed to donate to same-gender candidates, with women Democratic donors especially likely to support liberal Democratic women; the same patterns do not manifest for Republican donors and candidates (Thomsen and Swers 2017). Recent research exploring elite opinions concords with the notion that Democrats support women candidates due to a more firmly established desire to boost women's representation by coalition members (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018). A desire for descriptive representation by Democratic women also aligns with substantive representation goals in a manner far more obvious than for Republican women. However, as we find that White women get a boost in support specific to *competitive* contests, future research should combine existing elite surveys with our observational results and examine *where* elite support has the greatest impact.

A final set of possibilities may have to do with electoral aversion: Women may need heightened persuasion to run as compared with men, especially in competitive elections (Kanthak and Woon 2015), and thus enhanced party support (at least for Democrats) is a follow-through on such efforts. Electoral aversion may also increase the quality of both minority and women candidates who *do* seek office, such that those making it to the nomination stage are exceptional candidates, with better networks than white and male nominees built to counter the bias that may exist in the pre-nomination stage. Pearson and McGhee (2013), for instance, find that women are more qualified candidates than men, and after accounting for these characteristics, are actually less likely to win office across parties.[12] What we do find, however, shows that parties, at least under certain circumstances, are *more* supportive of underrepresented co-partisans in the general election and thus (at least at the general election stage of the electoral process) are not the driver of the substantial disparities in representation that we continue to witness.

[12]It is important to note that we do not find that differentials in nominee quality by race or gender manifest in a way that would indicate our results are due to parties merely responding to female candidates who are more qualified. Women candidates are not significantly more likely to have held previous office. These findings are discussed in more detail in the Online Appendix Section A2.

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Table 1: Candidate Race by Party

	Democratic Party	**Republican Party**
White	1,450	1,633
Black	242	50
Latino	128	60
Asian	54	17
Native American	3	10
Other	1	2
Men	1,399	1,573
Women	479	199

Note: Includes two-party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives from 2006-2014.

Table 2: Average Party Support for General Election Candidates

	# of Party Donors		
	Overall	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
White Men	17.4	13.7	22.2
White Women	35.7	21.0	43.1
Minority Men	17.4	18.7	16.9
Minority Women	21.0	18.2	21.6
	Party Donor Contributions		
	Overall	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
White Men	16,857	14,990	19,311
White Women	25,999	16,703	30,716
Minority Men	14,159	14,428	14,056
Minority Women	15,856	12,046	16,591
	Direct Party Contributions		
	Overall	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
White Men	675.66	801.14	510.64
White Women	827.84	862.71	810.15
Minority Men	419.83	683.90	317.13
Minority Women	206.86	225.85	203.20

Note: Includes two-party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives from 2006-2014. Party support is measured using the number of donors a candidate shares with his or her party Hill committee (the DCCC or the NRCC) in the first section, the amount donated by party connected donors in the second section, and direct contributions from the candidate's party Hill committee to the candidate's campaign in the third section.

Table 3: Difference-in-Differences, District-Level

	# of Party Donors		
	Overall	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
Δ Minority	4.22	9.98*	-2.51
	(4.22)	(5.02)	(6.36)
Δ Woman	10.40**	5.46	12.64**
	(2.72)	(4.03)	(3.59)
Observations	1,972	933	1,039
R-squared	0.46	0.36	0.54
RMSE	31.84	31.04	32.14
	Party Donor Contributions		
	Overall	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
Δ Minority	1326.21	-836.88	-835.87
	(3435.66)	(6925.90)	(4932.96)
Δ Woman	-2134.67	-16456.40	6376.86*
	(7015.94)	(18017.38)	(2661.38)
Observations	1,972	933	1,039
R-squared	0.14	0.06	0.40
RMSE	60208	78387	35719
	Direct Party Contributions		
	Overall	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
Δ Minority	-198.44	246.92	-436.32*
	(162.77)	(269.93)	(187.99)
Δ Woman	240.73*	300.51	297.50*
	(120.30)	(239.34)	(121.79)
Observations	1,972	933	1,039
R-squared	0.45	0.53	0.41
RMSE	1673	1892	1286

Note: Because of the need for lagged variables to run the difference-in-difference model and the presence of redistricting, each of the models includes only the years 2008, 2010, and 2014. The reference year is 2008. Models also include controls for district competitiveness, candidate experience, incumbency, and a lagged dependent variable. Standard errors clustered by party-district in parentheses. **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

Table 4: Difference-in-Differences, District-Level, Gender and Race Intersection

	# of Party Donors	
	Democrats	*Republicans*
Δ Minority Man	1.78	12.77*
	(5.69)	(4.17)
Δ Minority Woman	1.03	-13.99
	(11.12)	(11.26)
Δ White Woman	16.05**	7.12
	(4.48)	(4.42)
Observations	1,039	933
R-squared	0.54	0.36
RMSE	32.02	31.04
	Party Donor Contributions	
	Democrats	*Republicans*
Δ Minority Man	1202.58	-2663.07
	(4847.41)	(9710.90)
Δ Minority Woman	900.14	-15337.05
	(8761.91)	(13276.63)
Δ White Woman	8057.94*	-18158.88
	(3383.08)	(20561.07)
Observations	1,039	933
R-squared	0.40	0.06
RMSE	35719	78439
	Direct Party Contributions	
	Democrats	*Republicans*
Δ Minority Man	-312.03	366.72
	(210.85)	(312.80)
Δ Minority Woman	-42.30	-678.64
	(336.17)	(611.12)
Δ White Woman	385.12**	370.15
	(140.83)	(255.19)
Observations	1,039	933
R-squared	0.41	0.53
RMSE	1285.5	1893.1

Note: The excluded category is districts that have a white male candidate. Because of the need for lagged variables to run the difference-in-difference model and the presence of redistricting, each of the models includes only the years 2008, 2010, and 2014. The excluded year is 2008. Models also include controls for district competitiveness, candidate experience, incumbency, and a lagged dependent variable. Standard errors clustered by party-district in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table 5: Difference-in-Differences by District Type, Candidate-Level

	# of Party Donors			
	District Favored Candidate		*District Favored Opponent*	
Δ Party Favorability in District	-1.91**	-1.90**	4.68†	3.61
	(0.45)	(0.33)	(2.45)	(2.35)
Woman		5.18		5.85
		(3.22)		(7.41)
Woman * Δ Party Favorability		-2.71*		-7.94
		(1.24)		(15.07)
Minority		-5.85*		-0.94
		(2.41)		(11.34)
Minority * Δ Party Favorability		3.25**		52.56*
		(1.17)		(26.16)
Observations	1,309	1,309	331	331
R-squared	0.29	0.31	0.39	0.45
RMSE	29.67	29.40	43.06	41.00
	Party Donor Contributions			
	District Favored Candidate		*District Favored Opponent*	
Δ Party Favorability in District	-1334.49**	-1430.81**	2681.66†	2080.99
	(301.02)	(294.87)	(1459.95)	(1404.10)
Woman		3196.12		4794.10
		(2187.00)		(5502.45)
Woman * Δ Party Favorability		-1437.74†		-4727.00
		(797.28)		(9439.27)
Minority		-5112.45**		730.18
		(1904.33)		(6535.05)
Minority * Δ Party Favorability		2215.57**		30697.40*
		(580.73)		(15039.39)
Observations	1,309	1,309	331	331
R-squared	0.29	0.30	0.47	0.50
RMSE	30127	30022	30755	29802
	Direct Party Contributions			
	District Favored Candidate		*District Favored Opponent*	
Δ Party Favorability in District	-84.69**	-90.62**	-204.04**	-221.25**
	(23.51)	(27.77)	(69.50)	(70.95)
Woman		113.44		635.27†
		(104.65)		(353.61)
Woman * Δ Party Favorability		-92.36†		91.11
		(52.47)		(434.01)
Minority		306.08**		-590.42*
		(66.74)		(289.80)
Minority * Δ Party Favorability		134.55**		703.93
		(31.38)		(543.23)
Observations	1,309	1,309	331	332
R-squared	0.57	0.57	0.42	0.44
RMSE	1354.3	1345.0	1839.4	1825.1

Note: Model also includes lagged dependent variable. Standard errors clustered by candidate in parentheses. **p<0.01, *p<0.05. †p<0.1

Table 6: Difference-in-Differences by Party, Party-Favored Districts, Candidate-Level

	# of Party Donors	
	Republicans	*Democrats*
Δ Party Favorability in District	-1.89**	-2.030**
	(0.45)	(0.49)
Woman	7.05	3.19
	(7.82)	(2.75)
Woman * Δ Party Favorability	-1.59	-2.74†
	(1.53)	(1.50)
Minority	-14.88**	-7.04*
	(4.06)	(3.29)
Minority * Δ Party Favorability	10.57**	2.66**
	(3.09)	(1.02)
Observations	663	646
R-squared	0.21	0.46
RMSE	33.34	24.44
	Party Donor Contributions	
	Republicans	*Democrats*
Δ Party Favorability in District	-1402.91**	-1479.71**
	(392.99)	(424.53)
Woman	4209.04	878.38
	(4782.64)	(2570.36)
Woman * Δ Party Favorability	-754.11	-1497.54
	(1294.27)	(925.51)
Minority	-8703.51**	8046.31**
	(2681.52)	(2.067)
Minority * Δ Party Favorability	3960.57**	2059.86**
	(905.07)	(652.90)
Observations	663	646
R-squared	0.35	0.29
RMSE	19702	37699
	Direct Party Contributions	
	Republicans	*Democrats*
Δ Party Favorability in District	-88.80*	-100.03**
	(42.41)	(34.67)
Woman	118.51	47.37
	(190.41)	(106.48)
Woman * Δ Party Favorability	-80.61	-87.85
	(121.17)	(55.84)
Minority	-157.20	-304.46**
	(59.28)	(2.067)
Minority * Δ Party Favorability	118.54*	134.30**
	(59.28)	(36.64)
Observations	663	646
R-squared	0.65	0.38
RMSE	1486.6	1132.6

Note: Model also includes lagged dependent variable. Standard errors clustered by candidate in parentheses. **p<0.01, *p<0.05. †p<0.1

Table 7: Difference-in-Differences, Candidate-Level, Democrats Only

	Democrat Favored Districts		
	# of Party Donors	**Party Donor Contributions**	**Direct Party Contributions**
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ Party Favorability in District	-1.51**	-723.90	-130.03**
	(0.446)	(703.96)	(40.41)
White Woman	9.76*	4905.76	215.43
	(3.87)	(3667.13)	(147.19)
White Woman * Δ Party Favorability	-4.51**	-3164.85*	-101.87
	(1.171)	(1347.35)	(88.11))
Minority Woman	-6.02	-2325.72	-85.58
	(3.75)	(2210.22)	(90.37)
Minority Woman * Δ Party Favorability	0.81	1397.36	-11.41
	(1.11)	(876.48)	(37.28)
Minority Man	-2.02	-2940.58	-76.47
	(3.22)	(3013.37)	(76.68)
Minority Man * Δ Party Favorability	0.60	226.13	126.33*
	(0.98)	(829.74)	(52.98)
DV (*t*-1)	-0.47**	-369.82**	-8.02**
	(0.09)	(63.20)	(1.72)
Constant	7.57**	7363.40**	165.34**
	(2.34)	(2217.24)	(59.38)
Observations	646	646	646
R-squared	0.48	0.16	0.12
RMSE	24.05	41171	1348.7

Note: Standard errors clustered by candidate in parentheses. ** = p<0.01, * = p<0.05., †p<0.1

Figure 1: Effect of Increasing District Competitiveness on Party Support for Democratic Candidates Relative to White Democratic Men Candidates



Note: The effect shown is the effect of reducing Democrats advantage in the district by 5 on the Cook PVI scale. Confidence intervals are 85% confidence intervals which indicate statistically significant differences at the 0.05 level when the confidence intervals do not overlap.

Online Appendix for "Are Minority and Women Candidates Penalized by Party Politics? Race, Gender, and Access to Party Support"

(Not intended for print publication)

A1 Results Excluding Incumbents

In Table A1 we report a replication of Table 3 in the text with incumbents excluded. We do so because it is possible that party support of incumbent members of Congress is fundamentally different from party support of challengers. Party Hill committees were originally formed as incumbent defense committees (Herrnson 1988), and as such the approach of the networks of party elites surrounding these committees to defending incumbents might be substantially different than their approach to supporting non-incumbents. In short, we want to be sure that the results that we find in the text are not merely the result of party support of incumbents from certain race and gender groups. As the results in Table A1 show, this is not the case. When we exclude incumbents from the models, the results are the same. In fact, we find even more robust evidence of Democratic party support of women candidates and Republican party support of minority candidates.

[Table 8 about here.]

A2 Minority and Women Candidate Emergence from Primaries

One possibility for our findings that Democratic women receive more support from party elites is that they are better quality candidates. Women are less likely to emerge as a candidate unless they feel they are significantly better qualified, whereas men tend to overestimate their qualifications (Lawless and Fox 2005). Experimental evidence seems

to confirm the electoral process and mens' overstatement of qualifications drives this pattern in a lab setting (Kanthak and Woon 2015). Observational work indicates that women incumbents are more qualified than men as well (Milyo and Schosberg 2000). No similar analyses have been conducted on the quality of minority candidates as compared to whites, but given the barriers to minority representation we noted in the text, similar patterns may manifest for minority Republicans.

To examine this possibility, we examine differences in the average quality of candidates. Table A2 presents the percentage of candidates that have past political experience by race, gender, and partisan group. Although the models in the text control for candidate quality, these tables show that Minority Republicans are significantly *less* likely to have held past political office. However, these differences do not explain the higher support of Women Democratic candidates, as there is no significant difference in the percentages of Democratic women and Democratic men who have previous elected experience.

[Table 9 about here.]

The data, if anything suggests that parties are acting to support candidates with less experience. One possible explanation is that parties (specifically the Republican Party) are acting strategically to help these candidates with less political experience. Minority Republicans are less likely to have held past political office and are less likely to have faced a quality challenger in the primary. However, this same rationale does not hold for increased party support of Democratic women. The exact reasons for differences in party support for minorities and women could be symbolic, strategic, or a combination of both, and more research is needed to better understand the motivations behind the findings this research has uncovered.

References

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Kanthak, Kristin and Jonathan Woon. 2015. "Women Don't Run? Election Aversion and Candidate Entry." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3):595–612.

Lawless, Jennifer L. and Richard L. Fox. 2005. *It Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Milyo, Jeffrey and Samantha Schosberg. 2000. "Gender Bias and Selection Bias in House Elections." *Public Choice* 105:41–59.

Table A1: Difference-in-Differences, District-Level, No Incumbents

	# of Party Donors		
	Overall	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
Δ Minority	8.508†	9.31†	7.26
	(5.42)	(5.44)	(8.72)
Δ Woman	10.85**	3.06	12.603*
	3.41)	(2.96)	(4.89)
Observations	843	430	413
R-squared	0.51	0.63	0.52
RMSE	33.02	24.24	37.57
	Party Donor Contributions		
	Overall	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
Δ Minority	790.77	-5632.24	6925.65
	(5935.25)	(9797.65)	(6680.85)
Δ Woman	88.34	-10743.55	5400.35
	(4241.34)	(9831.61)	(3508.25)
Observations	843	430	413
R-squared	0.09	0.06	0.55
RMSE	84049	110000	27707
	Direct Party Contributions		
	Overall	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
Δ Minority	-320.68 †	32.16	-455.38*
	(178.51)	(267.03)	(195.50)
Δ Woman	102.18	523.46 †	87.84
	(168.44)	(293.18)	(170.00)
Observations	843	430	413
R-squared	0.36	0.42	0.42
RMSE	2028.80	2309.40	1460.1

Note: Because of the need for lagged variables to run the difference-in-difference model and the presence of redistricting, the model includes only the years 2008, 2010, and 2014. The excluded year is 2008. Standard errors clustered by district and party in parentheses. **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

Table A2: Percentage of Candidates with Previous Office Experience

	% Quality Candidates	*Republicans*	*Democrats*
White Men	66.6%	70.2%	61.9%
White Women	63.0%	68.0%	60.5%
Minority Men	68.0%	33.9%	81.3%
Minority Women	76.7%	37.0%	84.3%

Note: Includes two-party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives from 2006-2014. Does not include quality candidates who dropped out of the primary prior to the primary date. Candidate quality is measured using a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate had held previous office.