
CONTACT INFORMATION	113 Collegiate Loop, office 267 Department of Economics Florida State University Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180, USA	Tel.: +1 (850) 644-7209 Fax: +1 (850) 644-4535 dryvkin@fsu.edu http://myweb.fsu.edu/dryvkin
CURRENT POSITION	2018 to date Bernard F. Sliger Professor, Department of Economics, Florida State University	
PREVIOUS POSITIONS	2012–2018 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Florida State University 2006–2012 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Florida State University	
RESEARCH INTERESTS	Microeconomic theory, experimental and behavioral economics, economic psychology	
EDUCATION	Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education-Economics Institute (CERGE-EI) , Prague, Czech Republic Ph.D., Economics, 2006 M.A., Economics, 2004 Michigan State University , East Lansing, MI, USA Ph.D., Physics, 2006 Ural State University , Yekaterinburg, Russia M.Sc., Physics, 1999 B.Sc., Physics, 1997	
PUBLICATIONS	<ol style="list-style-type: none">Ortmann, A., Ryvkin, D., Wilkening, T., Zhang, J. Defaults and cognitive effort, <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i>, 212(August), 1–19, 2023.Ryvkin, D. To fight or to give up? Dynamic contests with a deadline, <i>Management Science</i>, 68(11), 7793–8514, 2022.Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: An experiment, <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 136(November), 117–141, 2022.Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests. <i>Review of Economic Design</i>, Special Issue on Contests, forthcomingPevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. The effect of options to reward and punish on behavior in bargaining, <i>Journal of Economics and Management Strategy</i>, 31(1), 171–192, 2022.Guo, X., Ryvkin, D. When is intergroup herding beneficial? <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i>, 120(November), 66–77, 2022.Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D., Smyth, A. Indefinitely repeated contests: An experimental study, <i>Experimental Economics</i>, 24, 1390–1419, 2021.Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. Tournament rewards and heavy tails. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i>, 190(November), 105116, 2020.Abbink, K., Ryvkin, D., Serra, A. Corrupt police. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, 123(September), 101–119, 2020.	

10. Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. How noise affects effort in tournaments. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 188(July), 105065, 2020.
11. Ryvkin, D., Drugov, M. The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments. *Theoretical Economics*, 15(4), 1587–1626, 2020.
12. Boosey, L., Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Information disclosure in contests with endogenous entry: An experiment. *Management Science*, 66(11), 5128–5150, 2020.
13. Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. Corruption and competition among bureaucrats: An experimental study. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 175(July), 439–451, 2020.
14. Boosey, L., Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Contests between groups of unknown size. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 113(January), 756–769, 2019.
15. Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. Is more competition always better? An experimental study of extortionary corruption, *Economic Inquiry*, 57(1), 50–72, 2019.
16. Brookins, P., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. Sorting and communication in weak-link group contests, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 152, 64–80, 2018.
17. Boosey, L., Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 105(September), 212–229, 2017.
18. So, T., Brown, P., Chaudhuri, A., Ryvkin, D., Cameron, L. Piece-rates and tournaments: Implications for learning in a cognitively challenging task. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 142, 11–23, 2017.
19. Ryvkin, D., Serra, D., Tremewan, J. I paid a bribe: Information sharing and extortionary corruption. *European Economic Review*, 94(May), 1–22, 2017.
20. Drugov, M., Ryvkin, D. Biased contests for symmetric players. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 103(May), 116–144, 2017 [This paper has been selected by the editors for the John Nash Memorial Special Issue].
21. Ryvkin, D., Semykina, A. An experimental study of democracy breakdown, income, and inequality. *Experimental Economics*, 20(2), 420–447, 2017.
22. Balafoutas, L., Dutcher, G., Lindner, F., Ryvkin, D. The optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents. *Economic Inquiry*, 55(1), 461–478, 2017.
23. Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. Equilibrium existence in group contests. *Economic Theory Bulletin*, 4(2), 265–276, 2016.
24. Goerg, S., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. Priming the charitable pump: An experimental investigation of two-stage raffles. *Economic Inquiry*, 54(1), 508–519, 2016.
25. Dutcher, G., Balafoutas, L., Lindner, F., Ryvkin, D., Sutter, M. Strive to be first and avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 94, 39–56, 2015.
26. Racheva-Sarabian, A., Ryvkin, D., Semykina, A. The default of special financing districts: Evidence from California. *Journal of Housing Economics*, 27, 37–48, 2015.
27. Brookins, P., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 112, 311–323, 2015.
28. Brookins, P., Lightle, J., Ryvkin, D. An experimental study of sorting in group contests. *Labour Economics*, 35, 16–25, 2015.

29. Brookins, P., Lucas, A., Ryvkin, D. Reducing within-group overconfidence through group identity and between-group confidence judgments. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 44, 1-12, 2014.
30. Brookins, P., Ryvkin, D. An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information. *Experimental Economics*, 17(2), 245-261, 2014.
31. Ryvkin, D. Heterogeneity of players and aggregate effort in contests. *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, 22(4), 728-743, 2013.
32. Ryvkin, D. Contests with doping. *Journal of Sports Economics*, 14(3), 253-275, 2013.
33. Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. Environmental context and termination uncertainty in games with a dynamic public bad. *Environment and Development Economics*, 18(01), 27-49, 2013.
34. Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. Experimental studies of games with dynamic public bads. In *Analyzing Global Environmental Issues: Theoretical and Experimental Applications and Their Policy Implications*, edited by A. Rapoport and A. Dinar, pp. 89-102, Routledge, 2013.
35. Ryvkin, D., Krajč, M., Ortmann, A. Are the unskilled doomed to remain unaware? *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 33(5), 1012-1031, 2012.
36. Ryvkin, D., Serra, D. How corruptible are you? Bribery under uncertainty. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 81(2), 466-477, 2012.
37. Ryvkin, D. The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 73(2), 564-572, 2011.
38. Ryvkin, D. Fatigue in dynamic tournaments. *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, 20(4), 1011-1041, 2011.
39. Pevnitskaya, S., Ryvkin, D. Behavior in a dynamic environment with costs of climate change and heterogeneous technologies: an experiment. In *Research in Experimental Economics*, Vol. 14 (edited by R.M. Isaac and D. Norton), Emerald, 115-150, 2011.
40. Ryvkin, D. Contests with private costs: beyond two players. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 26(4), 558-567, 2010.
41. Ryvkin, D. The selection efficiency of tournaments. *European Journal of Operational Research*, 206(3), 667-675, 2010.
42. Holcombe, R.G., Ryvkin, D. Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making. *Public Choice*, 144(1-2), 37-51, 2010.
43. Ryvkin, D. Tournaments of weakly heterogeneous players. *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, 11(5), 819-855, 2009.
44. Cojuharenco, I., Ryvkin, D. Peak-End Rule versus Average utility: how utility aggregation affects evaluations of experiences. *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 2(5), 328-337, 2008.
45. Ryvkin, D., Ortmann, A. The predictive power of three prominent tournament formats. *Management Science*, 54(3), 492-504, 2008.
46. Ryvkin, D. Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players. *Public Choice*, 132(1-2), 49-64, 2007.

- WORKING PAPERS
- Tournaments with reserve performance, with M. Drugov and Jun Zhang
 - Preventing search with wicked defaults, with A. Ortmann, T. Wilkening and Jingjing Zhang
 - Competition for loyal customers, with A. Usvitskiy
 - Optimal prizes in tournaments with nonseparable preferences, with M. Drugov
 - Entry in group contests, with L. Boosey and P. Brookins
 - Peer information and risk-taking under competitive and noncompetitive pay schemes, with P. Brookins and J. Brown
 - Do contests bring out the worst in us or the worst among us? with G. Dutcher and D. Rützler
 - Locus of control in reward and punishment decisions, with S. Pevnitskaya
 - Contests with sequential moves: An experimental study, with A. Nelson
 - Does competition lead to more effort or more sabotage in team production with heterogeneous agents?, with G. Dutcher, R. Oexl and T. Salmon
- PROJECTS IN PROGRESS
- Choosing your own luck: Strategic risk-taking and effort in contests (with V. Krishna and T. Kim)
 - Wicked defaults and competition among suppliers (with A. Ortmann, T. Wilkening, J. Zhang)
 - Who self-selects into committees? (with A. Cao and D. Serra)
 - Democracy, populism, and dynamic loss avoidance (with R. Perinchery and A. Semykina)
 - Dynamic team production (with P. Brookins and S. Goerg)
 - Self-promotion and gender (with D. Serra)
 - k -pay auctions (with P. Brookins and Claudia Cerrone)
 - Leading by example in group contests (with P. Brookins and J. Lightle)
 - Tournament architecture
- GRANTS
- Australian Research Council (ARC), 2019-2022, AU\$174,000, with Andreas Ortmann (UNSW), Tom Wilkening (Melbourne) and Jingjing Zhang (UTS). Project title: “Wicked defaults: how to overcome the dark side of choice architecture.”
 - Institute for Energy Systems, Economics and Sustainability (IESES), 2009-2010, \$43,217, with Svetlana Pevnitskaya (FSU). Project title: “An experimental investigation of economic incentives of policies, institutions and R&D in environmental conservation, sustainability and renewable energy.”
- EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERSHIP
- PRESENTATIONS
- 2023: University of South Carolina, University of Sydney (scheduled), University of Zurich (scheduled)
- 2022: Chapman University, University of Technology Sydney, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Contests: Theory and Evidence (University of Reading), Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (NUS, virtual), SAET Conference (ANU, virtual), ESA North American Meeting (Santa Barbara, scheduled)
- 2021: North American Summer Meeting of Econometric Society (virtual), China Meeting of Econometric Society (virtual), Global Seminar on Contests and Conflict (virtual), Contests: Theory and Evidence (virtual)
- 2020: Utah Experimental Economics Conference (virtual)
- 2019: University of Technology Sydney, Harvard LISH, Ohio University, Ohio State

University, HKUST, Workshop on Contests and Tournaments (Guangzhou)

2018: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods (Bonn), Southern Economic Association Meetings (Washington DC), Workshop on Market Design (ZEW, Mannheim), Midwest Economic Theory Meetings (Drexel)

2017: Virginia Commonwealth University, Southern Economic Association Meetings (Tampa), Economic Science Association Meetings (VCU)

2016: Contests: theory and evidence (Norwich)

2015: University of New South Wales, University of Technology Sydney, Economic Science Association Meetings (Dallas), NYU-CESS Experimental Political Science Conference (NYU)

2014: Economic Science Association Meetings (Fort Lauderdale)

2013: Southern Methodist University, Conference on tournaments, contests and relative performance evaluation (Fresno)

2012: Economic Science Association Meetings (Tucson)

2011: Midwest Economic Theory Meetings (St. Louis), Conference on tournaments, contests and relative performance evaluation (Raleigh)

2010: Florida State University (Math Department), Australia and New Zealand Workshop on Experimental Economics (Sydney), Economic Science Association Meetings (Tucson)

2009: Economic Science Association Meetings (Tucson)

2008: Texas A&M University, CERGE-EI

2007: Midwest Economic Theory Meetings (Minneapolis), Southern Economic Association Meetings (New Orleans), Economic Science Association Meetings (Rome)

2006: Econometric Society European Meetings (Vienna), Midwest Economic Theory Meetings (MSU, East Lansing), First Ph.D. Presentation Meeting (LSE)

2005: Wissenschaftszentrum (Berlin)

TEACHING

Undergraduate

- Intermediate microeconomics
- Introductory econometrics
- Analysis of economic data
- Games and decisions
- Economics of sports

Graduate

- Microeconomic theory (core), part 1
- Mathematical economics
- Topics in microeconomic theory: Tournaments, contests, and relative performance pay schemes

STUDENT ADVISING

Undergraduate honors thesis

Christopher Marfisi (FSU Economics, chair; defended 2010)
Nathan Smootha (FSU Economics, chair; defended 2011)
Orlando Remak (FSU Economics, chair; defended 2011)
Yevgeniy Ryasnianskiy (FSU Computer Science, University representative; defended 2016)

Directed individual study

Philip Brookins
Christy Piper
Christopher Brown

Ph.D. thesis

Sean Collins (FSU Economics, member; defended 2010)
Wei-Shiun Chang (FSU Economics, member; defended 2011)
Glenn Dutcher (FSU Economics, member; defended 2011)
Andrew Smyth (FSU Economics, member; defended 2014)
Muhammad Shamaileh (FSU Political Science, University representative; defended 2015)
Tugba Yildirim (FSU Biomathematics, University representative; defended 2015)
Philip Brookins (FSU Economics, chair; defended 2016)
Alexander Usvitskiy (FSU Economics, member; defended 2020)
Christopher Brown (FSU Economics, member; defended 2020)
Arthur Nelson (FSU Economics, chair; defended 2021)
Joe Ballard (FSU Economics, member)
Edward White (FSU Mathematics, University representative; defended 2023)
Austin Anderson (FSU Mathematics, University representative; defended 2023)
Rivin Perinchery (FSU Economics, member)

SERVICE

Department of Economics

- XS/FS Laboratory Director (2018-present)
- Policy Committee (2021-22)
- Executive Committee (2009-10, 13-14)
- Quantitative Methods Workshop organizer (2009-10)
- Graduate Committee (2019-present)
- Ph.D. Microeconomics Core Exam Committee (2006-present)
- Ph.D. placement coordinator (2012-2021)
- Recruitment Committees in experimental and theory (2007-08, 08-09, 12-13, 14-15, 15-16, 17-18, 18-19, 21-22, 22-23)

College of Social Sciences and Public Policy

- Promotion and Tenure Committee (2015-16)

Florida State University

- Undergraduate Policy Committee (Fall 2012)
- PFF and TA Faculty Advisory Committee (2013-present)
- Faculty Senate (substitute, 2016)
- Table Tennis Club (RSO), faculty advisor (2008-present)

AWARDS

College of Social Sciences and Public Policy mid-career research award, 2021

REFEREEING

Grant agencies: Austrian Science Fund, Israel Science Foundation, National Science Foundation, SSHRC, TESS.

Journals: AEJ: Microeconomics, American Economic Review, Business and Politics, Computers and Operations Research, Eastern Economic Journal, Econometrica, Economic Inquiry, Economic Journal, Economic Record, Economic Systems, Economic Theory, Economics and Politics, Economics of Governance, European Economic Review, Experimental Economics, Games, Games and Economic Behavior, Homo Oeconomicus, IIE Transactions, International Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, International Journal of Industrial Organization, International Review of Law and Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Economic Psychology, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Sports Economics, Journal of Quantitative Analysis of Sports, Journal of the ACM, Journal of the European Economic Association, Management Science, Oxford Economic Papers, PLOS ONE, PNAS, Public Choice, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Design, Review of Economic Studies, Review of Industrial Organization, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Social Choice and Welfare, Southern Economic Journal, Theoretical Economics, Theoretical Economics Letters

OTHER
PUBLICATIONS

Ryvkin, D., Dykman, M.I. Resonant symmetry lifting in a parametrically modulated oscillator. *Physical Review E*, 74, 061118, 2006.

Ryvkin, D., Dykman, M.I. Noise-induced escape of periodically modulated systems: From weak to strong modulation. *Physical Review E*, 72, 011110, 2005.

Dykman, M.I., Ryvkin, D. Activated escape of periodically modulated systems. *Physical Review Letters*, 94, 070602, 2005.

Ryvkin, D., Dykman, M.I., Golding, B. Scaling and crossovers in activated escape near a bifurcation point. *Physical Review E*, 69, 061102, 2004.

Dykman, M.I., Golding, B., Ryvkin, D. Critical exponent crossovers in escape near a bifurcation point. *Physical Review Letters*, 92, 080602, 2004.

Beresnev, S.A., Ryvkin, D., Pasechnik, A.S. Deposition of aerosol particles on surface: the model of gas-kinetic interaction and results for thermophoretic deposition. *Atmospheric and Oceanic Optics*, 15(05-06), 480-486, 2002.

Ryvkin, D., Beresnev, S.A. Estimation of Brownian diffusion in thermophoretic sedimentation of aerosol onto a surface. *Atmospheric and Oceanic Optics*, 13(06-07), 638-639, 2000.

Ryvkin, D. Direct Monte-Carlo simulation in aerosol microphysics: Condensation of a spherical droplet in Lorentz' vapor-gas mixture. In *Metastable States and Phase Transitions*, Vol. 1, pp. 202-211, Ural State University, 1997 (in Russian).