Research

Working Papers

1. Maintaining Efficiency While Integrating Entrants From Lower-Performing Environments: An Experimental Study, with Roberto Weber. August 2009.
   
   
2. Incentive Effects of Inequality and Economic Development, with Hyejin Ku. August 2009.
   
   
3. The High/Low Divide: Self-Selection by Values in Auction Choice, with Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel. June 2009.
   
   
4. Self-Selection and Market Power in Risk Sharing Contracts, with Kislaya Prasad, January 2007.
   
   
5. Rent Seeking in Groups, with T.K. Ahn and Mark Isaac, June 2009.
   
   
6. Social Insurance and Income Redistribution in a Laboratory Experiment, with Justin Esarey and Charles Barrilleaux, April 2009.
   
   
7. What Motivates Political Preferences? Self-Interest, Ideology, and Fairness in a Laboratory Democracy, with Justin Esarey and Charles Barrilleaux, March 2006

Published Papers

1. An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning, Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 6 (2001): 1597-1628.
   
   
2. The Simultaneous, Ascending Auction: Dynamics of Price Adjustment in Experiments and in the U.K. 3G Auction, with Charles Plott. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2004): 353-383.
   
   
3. Bidder Preferences Among Auction Institutions, with Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel. Economic Inquiry, Vol 42 (2004): 223-236.
   
   
4. Preventing Collusion Between Firms in Auctions, In Auctioning Public Assets: Analysis and Alternatives, Edited by M.C.W. Janssen, Cambridge University Press, 2004, ISBN 0521830591.
   
   
5. Spectrum Auctions by the United States Federal Communications Commission, In Auctioning Public Assets: Analysis and Alternatives, Edited by M.C.W. Janssen, Cambridge University Press, 2004, ISBN 0521830591.
   
   
6. A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions, with Mark Isaac and Arthur Zillante. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 62, No.1 (2007): 144-164. Supplemental Tables
   
   
7. Evidence for Learning to Learn Behavior in Normal Form Games, Theory and Decision, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2004): 367-404. Supplemental Information
   
   
8. Entry Fees and Endogenous Entry in Electronic Auctions, with Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Electronic Markets, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2004): 170-177.
   
   
9. An Experimental Test of Alternative Models of Bidding in Ascending Auctions, with Mark Isaac and Arthur Zillante, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2005): 287-313.
   
   
10. Revenue from the Saints, the Showoffs, and the Predators: Comparisons of Auctions with Price-Preference Values, with Mark Isaac. Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 11, D.D. Davis and R. M. Isaac (Eds.), JAI (Elsevier Science): 2006: 1-30. Supplemental Tables
    
    
11. Second Chance Offers vs. Sequential Auctions: Theory and Behavior, with Bart Wilson, Economic Theory, Vol. 34. No. 1 (2008): 47-67.
    
    
12. Endogenous Group Formation, with T.K. Ahn and Mark Isaac, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol 10. No. 2 (2008) 171-194. Supplemental Materials
    
    
13. Continuous Ascending Vs. Pooled Multiple Unit Auctions, with Michael Iachini, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2007):64-85.
    
    
14. Individual Sense of Justice: An Experimental Analysis, with Edi Karni and Barry Sopher, Experimental Economics, Volume 11, No. 2 (2008): 174-189.
    
    
15. Robustness of Bidder Preferences Among Auction Institutions, with Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel,Economic Inquiry, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2008): 355-368.
    
    
16. Revenue Equivalence Revisited, with Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 64, No. 1 (2008): 171-192.
    
    
17. Coming and Going: Experiments on Endogenous Group Sizes for Excludable Public Goods, with T.K. Ahn and Mark Isaac. The Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 93, No. 1-2 (2009): 336-351.



18. Do Preferences for Charitable Giving Help Auctioneers?, with Mark Isaac and Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Accepted for publication at Experimental Economics