John R. Hamman

Associate Professor of Economics

Department of Economics

Florida State University

113 Collegiate Loop

Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180

Office: BEL 272
Phone: (850) 645-9290
Fax: (850) 644-4535
jhamman [at] fsu [dot] edu


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Research

Published and Forthcoming Articles:

“Dependency Status and Demand for Social Insurance: evidence from experiments and surveys,” 2015
with John Ahlquist and Bradley Jones
forthcoming in Political Science Research and Methods
working paper version

“Delegated bargaining in a competitive agent market: an experimental study,” 2016
with Amy Choy, Ronald King and Roberto Weber
Journal of the Economic Science Association, Vol. 2, No. 1: 22-35.
working paper version

“Intermediaries in Corruption,” 2014
with Mikhail Drugov and Danila Serra
Experimental Economics, Vol. 17, Issue 1: 78-99. 
working paper version

“An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods,” 2011
with Roberto Weber and Jonathan Woon,
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 4: 738-752. 
working paper version

“Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship,” 2010
with George Loewenstein and Roberto Weber,
American Economic Review
, Vol. 100, No. 4: pp. 1826-1846. 
working paper version

“Solving Coordination Failure with All-or-None Group Level Incentives,” 2007
with Scott Rick and Roberto Weber,
Experimental Economics
, Vol. 10, No. 3: pp. 285-303. 
working paper version


Work in Progress:

“Making the Tough Choices: Delegation and Team Selection in Organizations,” 2016
with Miguel Martinez
online appendix

“Market Interaction and Pro-social Behavior,” 2015
with Sean Collins and John Lightle, Revise and Resubmit

“Fool Me Once: An Experiment on Credibility and Leadership,”
with
David Cooper and Roberto Weber

“On the Stability of Coordination in Dynamic Groups,”
with Ernesto Reuben

“Restoring Fairness in Heirarchies: An Experimental Study of Individual and Organizational Mechanisms,”
with Peter Kriss, and Roberto Weber

“Social Preferences in Coordination”


Last modified 08/2016