Looking Beyond the Voting Constituency: A Study of Campaign Donation Solicitations in the 2008 Presidential Primary and General Election

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In order to overcome collective action problems inherent in campaign fundraising, political campaigns solicit donors through material, solidary, and ideological appeals. Over the course of the campaign, the percentage of donors motivated by these different types of incentives are roughly equal; however, no previous study has differentiated between those who donate during primary elections and those donating during general elections. This study of campaign fundraising solicitations sent out via e-mail during the 2008 presidential campaign by the two major-party candidates finds evidence that the campaigns recognize a difference between the primary election financial constituencies and the general election financial constituencies and that campaigns target the types of appeals that they send to potential donors accordingly.

KEYWORDS political campaigns, political donors, political fundraising, 2008 presidential election

INTRODUCTION

In the 2008 election, the two major party presidential candidates raised and spent more than $1 billion. Republicans and Democrats raised and spent just less than $500 million in 2007 alone in the months before the primary caucuses and elections to determine their respective nominees. These months leading up to the early presidential primaries have come to be known as

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the money primary. In those months, candidates attempt to show their electoral promise through the accumulation of donors and dollars, enabling them to build a formidable campaign infrastructure.

Yet, in spite of the talk of the money primary, we know little about who participates in it and how they differ from the money general election. While scholars have focused debate on the relative representative nature of the voters in primary elections (see Norrander, 1996 for a more complete review), we know little about the difference between donors in general elections and in primary elections. Using data collected from the e-mail fundraising solicitations of the campaigns as well as campaign donor information available from the Federal Election Commission (FEC), I attempt to gain some insight into this previously untouched field of research. Analysis of these sources indicates that campaigns recognize differences in the individuals they are soliciting during each phase of the campaign and adjust their appeals accordingly.

While this data set lends little insight into the demographics or ideological makeup of primary campaign donors, it does reflect the motivations they have for donating and highlights their differences from general election campaign donors. These findings suggest that individuals who donate during primary campaigns are primarily motivated to donate by solidary motives, while those who donate during the general election are more likely to be drawn into the campaign through ideological motives.

I begin with a review of the literature on campaign fundraising, both the techniques and sources of this vital element of the campaign. I argue that while direct mail and e-mail appeals are only one part of a campaign’s fundraising mechanism, they are representative of the different types of appeals that campaigns make to their prospective donors. I next review the literature on primary elections, drawing from past research in this field to better understand the theoretical basis of why there may be differences between participants and nonparticipants in primary elections, and extend that reasoning to primary election fundraising. Next I show, through an analysis of campaign e-mails and donation records collected by the FEC, fundamental differences between primary campaign and general election donors both in the types of appeals that campaigns use and in the dollar amounts donors donate. Last, I attempt to determine the causes of these differences using factors advocated in previous research on primary campaigns. Finally, I conclude by arguing for further study on the differences between primary and general election donors and their possible effects.

CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISING

Money in a campaign ensures the healthy growth of a campaign into a victorious one. It provides the resources that are essential in enabling a candidate to get his or her campaign’s message out to the general public
(Shea and Burton 2006). The amount of money a candidate will raise depends upon the demand that the candidate has for money and the supply of money that potential contributors are willing to give. The candidate’s demand for money is dependent upon his or her need for money in order to be electorally competitive (Jacobson 1980) and upon the office he or she is seeking (Herrnson 2008; Jacobson 2009; Jacobson 1980; Goldenberg and Traugott 1984). An individual’s willingness to supply candidates with money depends upon the policy influence, social acceptance, or intangible benefits they receive in exchange (Francia et al., 2003). The ability of politicians to provide these goods has been measured in terms of the offices the candidate currently holds (Jacobson 1980) or has previously held (Herrnson 2008; Johnson 2007; Canon 1993), the quality of the candidate (Brown 2008; Jacobson and Kernell 1983), and the leadership positions the candidate holds within the party (Jacobson 1980).

Past research also details extensively the sociodemographics of the donating class. We know that donors are on the whole wealthier, more educated (Francia et al., 2003; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), older than the average American, predominantly male (Francia et al., 2003), and more extreme in their ideological views (Pangopoulous and Bergan 2006). Francia and colleagues also observe that Democratic and Republican candidates receive their funding from slightly different groups. While donors to both groups are wealthy, Republican donors tend to be slightly wealthier but hold fewer advanced degrees than do Democratic donors.

In addition to performing this sociodemographic research, scholars have also detailed the motivations donors have for giving to a campaign. Because the victory of any one individual in an election for public office generally only results in public goods, campaigns must provide other incentives to individuals to encourage them to contribute financially to the campaign (Olson 1965). Especially in the case of small donations, the contribution of any one individual will not drastically affect the fate of any candidate, and so it is not rational to make such a contribution (Jacobson 1980). Instead, it has been shown that donors give on the basis of other material, ideological, or solidary incentives provided by campaigns (Francia et al., 2003; Zinser and Dawson 1977; Welch 1976; Thayer 1974; Wilson 1974).

Individuals who donate on the basis of material incentives are donors who give to a campaign because they wish to gain influence with congressional leaders for purposes of material gain. They donate to a campaign because of the material returns they receive as part of the exchange, above and beyond the public goods associated with the election of a candidate.

Individuals who donate on the basis of solidary incentives are donors who enjoy being associated with the campaign and the politicians for social reasons. They wish to be able to socialize and be associated with the candidate or other prominent individuals connected to the campaign. The solidary
motivation may also be associated with a desire for access to the politician at a later date, often for personal business reasons. The close association between solidary benefits and material benefits makes it difficult to distinguish between individuals who are motivated to donate by solidary appeals and those who donate for material benefits.

Ideologically motivated donors are donors who give for purposive reasons. They invest in the campaign because they see a particular candidate as an advocate for a cause they wish to promote. These donors may also wish to voice their approval and support for an ideological stance that the candidate has made. They become part of the campaign because they see the candidate as an advocate for the cause they wish to advance. Zinser and Dawson (1977) call this form of motivation a consumption motive. It is based on the intrinsic benefits that the individual receives for the act of contributing to a cause he or she believes is important. Francia and others (2003) find that while an individual often gives to a campaign for a mixture of these reasons, the percentage of donors that fall into each of these three categories of donors is roughly the same.

Because campaign donors fall equally into each of these three categories, campaigns appeal to donors using all of these various appeals (Hassell 2007). To solicit donors, campaigns use a variety of methods, from direct candidate contact to impersonal direct mailings and e-mails (Francia et al., 2003). While direct mail is considered to be a solicitation method that relies more upon ideological appeals (Goodwin 1998a, 1998b) and the candidates that spend the most money on direct mailings are also the most ideologically extreme members of their parties (Fritz and Morris 1992), more recent research has suggested that direct mail fundraising contains many of the other types of appeals as well (Hassell 2007). Francia and colleagues (2003) also find that donors who donate to a campaign as the result of a friend’s request are also more likely to be solicited via direct mail. While no systematic analysis of the appeals made in all forms of campaign solicitations is available, this recent research suggests that direct mail should contain appeals to all types of donors.

THE UNIQUENESS OF THE PRIMARY ELECTORATE

In spite of this, all this past research about the sociodemographics of donors and their motivations for donating, there is no work that systematically studies the differences in donors who give in primary campaigns and those who donate to general election campaigns. The lack of such a study is surprising in light of the vast literature available about primary elections and the electorate that participates in them. Past research has indicated that primary voters and general election voters differ in age and level of political involvement (Norrander 1991). Primary election voters favor candidates that
hold more extreme policy positions than nonvoters (Ranney 1972; Bartels 1988), but the biggest difference is their interest in the campaign (Kennamer 1990) and their older age (Hagen 1989; Geer 1988; Norrander 1996). Primary elections do, however, favor different candidates than those favored in the general election, as the primary procedure separates Democrats and Republicans, thus shifting the median voters in each group away from the median voter in the general election (Aldrich 1980). Gerber and Morton (1998) show that states with closed primary elections have candidates with more extreme ideological voting records, which they argue are a result of the more ideological voters in primary elections. Richard Fenno (1978) also observes that members of Congress can generally separate their supporters into different groups consisting of their “primary constituency,” their “reelection constituency,” and their “intimates.” Each of these different nests of supporters differs on the level of support that the member of Congress believes he or she can expect from such voters. While this idea is not explicitly stated, past research suggests that just as the primary electorate constituency is different from the electorate constituency in general elections, donors in primary elections are also different from those who donate in general elections.

THE UNIQUENESS OF THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTORS

If financial constituencies at the primary election level are different than those at the general election level, we should expect candidates to focus fundraising efforts on those within the “primary constituency” circle during the primary election, then on their “reelection constituency” during the general election. I theorize that donors who give to a candidate in the early stages of the campaign are more likely to be interested in political access because of the strategic timing of their donations. Donors who want something specific from the member of Congress, either the ability to socialize with upper-class society or the ability to influence policy once the candidate is elected to Congress, may benefit from making a donation early in the election cycle, where it will be most appreciated and noticed. By this reasoning, donors who want to maximize their accessibility to the candidate should donate to the candidate earlier in the election campaign. If donors during the primary election are motivated by the potential of material and access benefits, we should expect two things: first, that campaigns will adjust their appeals for financial assistance accordingly and, second, that donors in the primary election will give larger donations because they are motivated to obtain access to the candidate.

If, as I suspect, individuals who give during the primary election period are motivated by solidary and material or access incentives rather than intrinsic ideological benefits, candidates should use solidary and material appeals to appeal to those types of donors. As such, during the primary election season we should expect election campaigns to rely more upon solidary or
material appeals as opposed to ideological appeals. Knowing that potential donors are less interested, or already well-informed (Kennamer 1990), about a candidate’s ideological leanings, campaigns should expect that donors are more likely to respond to appeals that focus on solidary or access-based appeals. If campaigns recognize differences between their financial constituencies at different points in the campaign, we should see different types of appeals at those various points. If donors during the primary election are motivated not by ideological motives, but by access, we should see campaigns offering more solidary incentives as a means of appealing to potential voters.

Similarly, if donors in the primary election period have material or access motives to their donations we should expect those donors to also, on average, give larger donations. As fundraiser Michael Lux explained,

“The people who get serious access are the ones who are the [fundraisers], the ones who can bundle 10 or 20 or 30 different $1,000 or $2,000 checks. Those are the ones who get real access. And for the folks who are doing it because they work for a particular industry, that’s what they want. They want to be able to influence members of Congress or people running for president. And the only way to have influence is to have access. The ideological donors care less about that.” (Lux 2007)

The way to obtain political access is to donate large sums to a campaign and to collect large donations for the campaign. Donors interested in access will, on average, give a larger donation than those who are interested only in intrinsic benefits. If primary election donors are motivated by access motives, the average donation during the primary election period should be larger than its general election counterpart.

METHODS AND DATA

To identify the types of donors that campaigns expect to contribute at various points in the campaign, I collected e-mails sent by the major presidential campaigns in 2008 soliciting donations from donors who had not previously given to the campaign. To do so, I visited each candidate’s Web site soon after he or she announced his or her candidacy and entered a name and an e-mail address to receive updates on the campaign. These e-mail lists are used to update supporters about the activities of the campaign over the course of the election cycle, to provide information about the campaign and, most important for this study, to solicit donations from potential supporters. Over the course of 14 months, the two major campaigns sent out 600 emails: 288 from the Obama campaign and 312 from McCain campaign. From those e-mails, I eliminated ones that the campaign sent to only a select group of supporters. Those included about 50 e-mails from each campaign’s state
and regional directors that were generally targeted at a local or state group to encourage them to become involved in volunteerism. I also eliminated 70 McCain campaign e-mails called “The McCain Update,” a weekly e-mail that appeared to come from the public relations department of the campaign and detailed top stories in the news about John McCain, usually highlighting the positive news stories about his campaign. While these undoubtedly may have had an effect on fundraising, they were not aimed at encouraging fundraising and often did not contain a link to a secure donation page. After these reductions, there remained 425 e-mails, of which 237 were from the Obama campaign and 188 were from the McCain campaign.

I coded the e-mails by the date they were sent and also whether the e-mail contained solidary appeals, ideological appeals, or material appeals. E-mails were coded as having solidary appeals if they appealed to the sense of belonging to a team or implied that a donation would link the donor to the candidate or another large group of supporters. Such e-mails often included phrases such as “Will you stand beside me today as one of my core supporters?” or included nonideological appeals from high-profile individuals such as Roberta McCain (John McCain’s mother) or other celebrities such as former Dallas Cowboys’ quarterback Roger Staubach. E-mails were coded as having material appeals if they appealed to possible material benefits that would result from donating. Both campaigns sent out e-mails advertising their campaign stores, where individuals could receive clothing or other items in exchange for donations. E-mails that were coded as containing material appeals also included e-mails that discussed lower taxes or lowering the price of education, as these were seen as immediate impacts on ones pocketbook. Last, e-mails were coded as containing ideological appeals if they talked about politics or policy. These e-mails frequently invoked hot-button policy items such as the Iraq war, the economic crisis, or other critiques of policy actions of the other party. These e-mails also often referred pointedly to the candidate’s party affiliation or derided the other candidate as being too extreme in his views.

E-mails were also coded based on whether they were sent before or the party’s presidential nomination had been won. For the Obama campaign, that date was June 7, 2008, when Hillary Clinton officially withdrew from the presidential race and endorsed Barack Obama. For the McCain campaign, that date was February 7, 2008, when Mitt Romney announced at the Conservative Political Action Committee meeting that he was suspending his campaign indefinitely. While Mike Huckabee and Ron Paul remained in the race at the time, their delegate totals at the time made it virtually impossible for either one of them to mount a serious challenge for the nomination.

To get a better picture of primary election donors, I supplemented the e-mail data with data available from the FEC’s Web site reporting transactions exceeding $200 between candidates and donors. From this information, I generated a list of donors for each campaign including the amount they
gave and the date that amount was given. For the Obama campaign, the list comprised all donors who gave to his fundraising committee “Obama for America.” For McCain, the list comprised all donors who gave to “John McCain 2008 Inc.” and “McCain-Palin 2008 Inc.” as well as the “McCain-Palin Compliance Fund,” which was the McCain campaign’s fundraising vehicle used to comply with FEC regulations after they had accepted public money. I also included donations to the “McCain Victory Committee,” which was a joint committee run by the Republican National Committee (RNC) and the McCain campaign. The first $2,300 of any donation to this committee was redirected to the McCain campaign, and all the remaining money, up to FEC limits, was directed to the RNC. To ensure accuracy, I recoded all amounts greater than $2,300 to the McCain Victory Committee as equal to $2,300, which was the portion of the donation directed to McCain’s campaign.

Because I am interested in the amount donors tried to give and the influence they sought to have over the campaign, not the actual influence they did have over the campaign, I also dropped from the data all the campaign contributions that were returned to their original contributors. The date each contribution was made was noted. The lists of donations were again sorted according to the date of the contribution and coded as donations given to the candidate either before or after the nomination was secured.

**E-MAIL EVIDENCE FOR PRIMARY DONOR UNIQUENESS**

As recent research has indicated, the e-mails sent by the campaigns contained all of the different types of appeals. As outlined in Table 1, ideological appeals were in 259, or 61 percent, of the emails; solidary appeals were in 295, or 69 percent of the e-mails; and material appeals appeared in 93, or 21 percent of the e-mail appeals that solicited recipients to donate to the campaign. This finding supports previous findings that direct mailings contain all three types of appeals as campaigns seek to maximize their incoming receipts by soliciting all possible types of campaign donors (Hassell 2007). These results vary across party with ideological, solidary, and material appeals appearing in 67, 61, and 24 percent of John McCain’s fundraising e-mails, respectively, and in 55, 76, and 20 percent of Barack Obama’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Fundraising Appeals Contained in Fundraising E-mails by Party</th>
<th>John McCain</th>
<th>Barack Obama</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>67% (127)</td>
<td>55% (132)</td>
<td>61% (259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary</td>
<td>61% (115)</td>
<td>76% (180)</td>
<td>69% (295)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>24% (46)</td>
<td>20% (47)</td>
<td>21% (93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of e-mails</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
fundraising e-mails, respectively. The differences between the Republicans’ and Democrats’ use of solidary and ideological appeals are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level from each other using a two-tailed difference of means test, suggesting that the party of the campaign has an effect on the types of donors to whom campaigns choose to appeals.

While the differences between parties are strong, the differences between primary and general elections are even stronger. When controlling for election cycle, there is only a significant difference in the respective campaigns’ use of solidary appeals in the general election. As outlined in Table 2, campaigns use both ideological and solidary appeals in both the primary and general elections; however, they rely more upon ideological appeals during the general election and more upon solidary appeals during the primary election. In the general election, ideological appeals were present in 154 of 218 e-mails, or 71 percent of the total e-mails sent out by both campaigns. Solidary appeals, however, were only present in 122 of the 218 general election e-mails, or 56 percent. During the primary election, however, these trends are reversed. Ideological appeals appear in 105 of the 207 e-mails, or 51 percent of the primary election e-mails, whereas solidary appeals appear in 173 of these, or 84 percent of the primary election e-mails. The differences in the percentage of solidary and ideological appeals in the general election and the primary election are both significant at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed difference of means test.

These results show that candidates appeal to donors motivated by solidary appeals more during the primary election and to ideologically motivated donors more during the general election. These findings indicate that political campaigns make systematic adjustments according to the type of donor they expect to attract at different periods of time. During the primary election, campaigns recognize the potential of solidary or access-motivated donors and appeal to them accordingly. During the general election campaign, however, campaigns recognize a shift in the types of donors interested in giving to the campaign and shift accordingly. While campaigns use both types of appeals throughout the entire campaign, there is a definitive shift in the focus of fundraising appeals from the primary election to the general election.

The results are similar also for material appeals, with 26 of the 207 e-mails, or 13 percent, in the primary containing material appeals, while 67
of the 218 e-mails, or 31 percent, contained material appeals in the general election. This result, however, must be downplayed because of the difficulty in finding and coding material appeals. The crossover between material appeals in the forms of lower taxes or lower costs of education often are similar in their makeup as ideological appeals meant to drive uncertain partisans into supporting their candidate. The other, more direct material benefits of campaign merchandise appeared in a grand total of 12 e-mails. Thus, while there is a significant difference in the number of material appeals made during the two different types of elections, the motivating factor in that difference appears more related to the shift in ideological motivations as opposed to a direct shift in material motivations.

**EVIDENCE FROM DONATIONS FOR PRIMARY DONOR UNIQUENESS**

As with the e-mails, there are significant differences between the average donation during the primary election and the average donation during general election. During the primary election, donors gave an average donation of $743.55, while during the general election that amount decreased to an average of $632.32, as shown in Table 3. These differences are significant at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tailed difference of means test.

There are also significant differences between the Democratic donors and Republican donors. Republican donors gave an average of $982.90 during the primary election and $845.67 during the general election. Democratic donors, perhaps led by Barack Obama’s push for more low-dollar donors, averaged only $700.64 during the primary election and $534.65 during the general election. All of these differences are significant at the 99 percent significance levels on a two-tailed difference of means test. While the amount raised during the primary election is less than the amount campaigns raise during the general election, each individual donor is more likely to give a larger amount than those who give during the general election.

These results support the hypothesis that there are key differences between primary election donors and general election donors. Those who give during the primary election are more likely to donate larger amounts, suggesting that a larger percentage of them are motivated by the promise of material or access incentives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3</th>
<th>Average Donation Size by Election Type</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary election</td>
<td>$743.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General election</td>
<td>$632.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CAUSES OF DONOR DIFFERENCES

While this paper has argued that primary election donors and general election donors are different, the results to this point have not explained why donors motivated by solidarity reasons dominate the primary election, while more ideologically motivated donors play a bigger role in general election fundraising.

Past research has argued that candidates are unable to make ideological appeals for votes because their ideological space is crowded with candidates, making such appeals ineffective (Morton and Cameron 1992; Hinich and Munger 1989). Other studies have also indicated that how a candidate fares in the polls affects his or her fundraising capabilities (Hinckley and Green 1996; Adkins and Dowdle 2004). Knowing these things, a candidate may realize that invitations to buy access through solidarity and material incentives in fundraising letters may have more of an appeal when it appears more likely that he or she will win the upcoming election, whether a primary or general election.

To test these hypotheses, I created two regression models. The first is a model that attempts to explain a campaign’s use of ideological appeals in its fundraising e-mails. The second is similar model that attempts to explain the average size of a donation given to a candidate on a specific day during the primary election.

To test the effects of multiple candidates on a campaign’s decision to use solidarity appeals and ideological appeals, I created two probit models: one with a dummy dependent variable coded 1 if an ideological appeal was present and the other with a similar dummy dependent variable coded 1 if a solidarity appeal was present; each had various possible influences as independent variables. As the results in Table 4 indicate, the preliminary results suggest that the decision of a campaign to appeal to its potential donors through either solidarity appeals or ideological appeals is dependent upon the number of candidates in the race and how well the candidates

### Table 4
Probit Analysis of the Appearance of Types of Fundraising Appeals in Fundraising E-mails

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideological appeal</th>
<th>Solidary appeal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of two-party vote</td>
<td>-0.061 (0.025)*</td>
<td>0.095 (0.026)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of primary candidates remaining</td>
<td>-0.045 (0.019)*</td>
<td>0.089 (0.021)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.51 (1.27)**</td>
<td>-4.5 (1.317)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
*Significant at the 95% confidence level.
**Significant at the 99% confidence level.
are doing in the polls. As a candidate sinks in the polls relative to the other nominee, he or she is more likely to use ideological appeals. Realizing that donors who give out of a desire for access to the candidate are less likely to donate because of a candidate’s poorer electoral potential, candidates turn to ideological incentives and appeal to donors who are more likely to give to a candidate regardless of his or her electoral prospects. In the same way, as the ideological space around the candidate begins to open up as other contenders drop out of the race, candidates are more inclined to begin to appeal to ideological donors who now have less viable options from which to choose. As primary candidates drop out, remaining candidates attempt to reach out to the supporters of those who have withdrawn through ideological appeals, reminding them that while their first choice has dropped out, the remaining candidates are still a more favorable option than those of the opposing party.

In a similar way, campaigns choose to use solidary appeals when they are more effective. As a candidate’s prospects of winning the election increase, measured by the head-to-head polls against the opposing party’s candidate, the likelihood of the campaign’s use of solidary appeals in campaign fundraising e-mails also increases. The results suggest that campaigns recognize that donors looking for access will be more susceptible to appeals at this time, and so they rely more upon those types of appeals. Similarly, candidates also rely more upon solidary appeals when the field is more crowded with similar candidates. As the number of candidates decreases, candidates move away from solidary appeals, most likely recognizing that with fewer competitors those looking for political access will have nowhere else to turn. As there are fewer competitors within the party, candidates no longer need to remind potential donors of the rewards of access given to those who donate richly to the campaign. At this point in the campaign, those who are seeking access begin to recognize who will win and as such know which campaign they must donate to maximize that access. Instead of wasting effort on those who are assured to find their way to the campaign for lack of other alternatives, campaigns focus on reaching out in other ways to potential donors.

The results are similar in regard to the average size of donations during the primary election season. As evident by regression results in Table 5, as the number of primary candidates decreases, the average donation also decreases for both Democrats and Republicans, suggesting that when campaigns move away from solidary and material appeals to ideological appeals, ideological donors respond accordingly, thus lowering the average donation size. With fewer candidates taking up the ideological space, the remaining candidates are able to appeal more easily to partisan donors.

Again, the results also support the findings that as polls increase, the average donation size increases, suggesting that donors who give to a candidate at that time are more likely to be donors looking to maximize their accessibility to the candidate in order to gain material benefits or solidary
connections. As the vote percentages of both candidates in both primary polls and general election polls increase during the primary election season, donors are more likely to give larger amounts, suggesting that they are motivated by material or solidary appeals. The results, however, suggest that Republican and Democratic donors looking to determine candidate viability look at different aspects of the campaign, which is in line with previous research on the subject (Adkins and Dowdle 2004). Potential Republican donors were more likely to give a larger average donation based on the candidate’s performance in Republican primary polls and head-to-head general election polls had no effect on the average donation size. Democratic donors, however, gave more, not because of primary election polls, which actually had a negative impact, but based on the likelihood that the potential candidate would succeed against the eventual Republican nominee based on head-to-head polls.

These results are in line with our expectations about what types of donors candidates appeal to at different times during a campaign. When poll numbers are higher, candidates are more likely to appeal to material and solidary motivated donors, and this evidence indicates that those donor types respond accordingly. When a candidate’s poll numbers are lower, candidates are more likely to use ideological appeals, and the evidence of lower average donation amounts suggests that more ideological donors respond accordingly.

CONCLUSION

The results of this study have shown that there are fundamental differences between the types of campaign donors a campaign appeals to at different stages of the campaign. While not delving into the demographic or ideological differences between these individuals, the results indicate that campaign donors during primary elections have different motivations for giving to the campaign than those who give during general elections. Evidence from
donation records indicates that donors during the primary election stage of the campaign are more likely to give a larger donation, implying the motivation of obtaining access to the politician who they believe will become an elected official. The contributors during the general election campaign, however, are more likely to donate in smaller amounts and be more motivated by the ideological appeals of the candidates. Donors in this phase are more likely to be interested in the intrinsic benefits associated with supporting a cause they believe in or opposing a cause they fear, and as a result, the amounts they give are smaller on average in comparison with donations given during the primary election phase.

The results also provide evidence that campaigns are aware of these differences between donors at different points of the campaign and target their fundraising appeals accordingly. During the primary election, campaigns base their fundraising message on solidary appeals, while during the general election, these same campaigns rely upon ideological appeals, indicating that just as their electoral constituencies are different at different points of the campaign, so also are their fundraising constituencies.

This research, however, has only scratched the surface of the causes and the effects of these fundamental differences. The analysis here suggests that donors are responding to campaign stimuli, both in the messages that the campaign sends out as well as polls and candidate withdrawals. The results indicate that as a candidate rises in the polls relative to the other candidate, he or she is more likely to rely upon solidary appeals and attract support from donors who are seeking access in exchange for their donations. At the same time, as opposing primary candidates begin to withdraw from the race, candidates turn more to ideological appeals as a way of attracting donors.

Just as primary election voters have significant effects on the outcome of the general election, we also have reason to suspect that campaign donors during the primary election will have a significant effect on the ultimate selection of a candidate during the general election. This paper has demonstrated the need for a more detailed study of primary election donors and their effects on the actions of candidates on the campaign trail and after the election. While more extreme voters during primary elections may lead to more extreme public policy, donors during the primary election seeking access may result in more personalistic or pork-barrel politics aimed at pleasing the primary election financial constituency. While this paper has shown evidence that primary election donors are different from general election donors, the effects of those differences remain to be studied in more detail.

REFERENCES


