

## POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS

University of South Carolina

GINT 765  
Fall, 2000  
Office Hours, Monday and Wednesday  
3:00 – 4:00 p.m. and by appointment

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This seminar seeks to understand the origin, importance, and consequences of political parties and interest groups in the United States. The typical kinds of questions we will investigate include, “Why are there political parties and interest groups?” “When and how might they ‘matter,’ and, if they do, to whom?” and “How, if at all, are they related to the workings of democracy?” As intermediary agents, parties and interest groups have attracted and continue to attract as much normative as scientific questioning (to the extent these are separable domains). Parties and interest groups are not – at least in the U.S. – institutions separate from the politics of this republican democracy. In rational choice parlance, political parties and interest groups are “endogenous” to democracy, that is to the citizens and politicians. To ask normative questions about parties and interest groups, therefore, is actually to ask normative questions about democracy. Yet, to attach normative values to these intermediary agents, per se, requires a “scientific” understanding of their role in democracy. As a result, whether your interest is normative or scientific or both, you must understand political parties and interest groups scientifically and you must do so first before you can judge them normatively.

There are two methods by which to study the major American political parties. The first is from a comparative perspective, and the second is historically. Both ways are valuable, and, therefore, we will utilize both. We employ a cross-national comparative perspective that examines different kinds of “party systems” (in quotes, because that phrase has several meanings) and their relationship to the larger governmental and electoral settings. We then will assess the major U.S. parties in historical perspective (which is, after all, a “longitudinal” rather than “cross-sectional” version of comparative politics). This is done because the historical sequencing (a.k.a. “path dependence” or “political development”) is important – especially so in the case of political parties.

We then turn our attention to the classic and contemporary professional research on the activities and strategies of interests groups in American politics. We will study the democratic attributes of interest groups, the organization and maintenance of groups, congressional lobbying, political action committees and the role of money on elections and legislation, and interest group access to and influence over the federal bureaucracy.

### **REQUIREMENTS:**

The main requirements for this course are simple – READ, THINK, and DISCUSS! You are expected to read all of the assigned books and articles listed on this syllabus, and do it before the class for which they are assigned. Your *full* participation in the seminar (even if you are auditing) is fundamental to its success.

The noted political scientist William Riker believed that graduate learning occurs in thirds: students learn one-third from their professors, one-third on their own, and one-third from their graduate student colleagues. I believe this formula to be correct. I will make every attempt to do my part; I expect you to do the same.

## EVALUATION:

Your seminar evaluation will be based upon a research paper, one report and presentation on an outside book, and your class participation. The *research paper* accounts for 50% of your seminar grade and should be a 20-30 page work of original research, conforming to the *APSA Style Manual*, and of potentially publishable quality. The topic and methodological approach of the paper is your choice, but it would be wise to make these decisions in consultation with me. A two-page proposal is due in class during Week 7. Each student also will present an *analytical report* on one book chosen from the list of recommended readings (marked with an \*). Copies of your four to five page report should be distributed to all seminar participants on the corresponding date indicated in the syllabus. The analytical report accounts for 20% of your course grade. Finally, your *seminar participation* accounts for the remaining 30% of your grade.

**Texts:** The following texts have been ordered through the Russell House Textbook Store and are required for this course:

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in The World's Electoral Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 1994. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Addison-Wesley-Longman.

Hansen, John Mark. 1991. *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hofstadter, Richard. 1969. *The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Olson, Mancur. 1974. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Additional readings can be found on reserve in the International Studies Library, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor Gambrell

**Some readings are available electronically on the course webpage:**

<http://www.cla.sc.edu/gint/faculty/gomezbt/gint756.htm>  
(simply click on the electronic version of the course syllabus)

## REQUIRED READINGS

### *Political Parties*

#### Week 1: **Introduction: Why Parties?**

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1-3.

LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner. 1966 [1990]. "The Origin of Political Parties." in Peter Mair, ed. *The West European Party System*. pp. 25-30.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1968 [1990] "The Sociology of Parties: A Critical Review." in Peter Mair, ed. *The West European Party System*. pp. 150-183.

Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1984. "On the Theory of Party Organization." *Journal of Politics* 46: 369-400.

#### Week 2: **The Downsian Model**

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Addison-Wesley-Longman.

#### **Recommendation:**

\* Black, Duncan. 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

\* Hinich, Melvin and Michael C. Munger. 1997. *Analytical Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

#### Week 3: **Advanced Spatial and Directional Models**

Aldrich, John H. 1983. "A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism." *American Political Science Review* 77:974-990.

Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. 1996. "Spatial Theories of Electoral Competition." Chapter 7 in *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Ronald N. Cohen. 1990. "Multiparty Competition, Entry, and Entry Deterrence in Spatial Models of Elections." in James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, eds. *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rabinowitz, George and Stuart Elaine Macdonald. 1989. "A Directional Theory of Issue Voting." *American Political Science Review* 83: 93-121.

Macdonald, Stuart Elaine, Ola Listhaug and George Rabinowitz. 1991. "Issues and Party Support in Multiparty Systems." *American Political Science Review* 85:1107-1132.

Iversen, Torben. 1994. "The Logics of Electoral Politics: Spatial, Directional, and Mobilizational Effects." *Comparative Political Studies* 27:155-189.

**Recommendation:**

\* Enelow, James and Melvin Hinich. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week 4:

**Electoral Institutions and Party Systems**

Duverger, Maurice. 1954 [1990]. "The Two-Party System and the Multiparty System" in Peter Mair, ed. *The West European Party System*. pp. 285-295.

Lijphart, Arend. 1990. "The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85." *American Political Science Review* 84:481-496.

Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in The World's Electoral Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

**Recommendation:**

Riker, William. 1982. "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law." *American Political Science Review* 76:753-66.

Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken W. Kollman. 1998. "Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92:329-42.

Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93:609-24

Week 5:

**Parties and American Political Development**

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 4-5.

Hofstadter, Richard. 1969. *The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

**Recommendation:**

\* Ladd, Everett Carll, Jr. and Charles D. Hadley. 1975. *Transformation of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.

\* Epstein, Leon. 1986. *Political Parties in the American Mold*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Week 6: **Time's Arrow: Periods, Cycles, Discontinuities**

Key, V. O., Jr. 1955. "A Theory of Critical Elections." *Journal of Politics* 17:3-18

Key, V. O., Jr. 1959. "Secular Realignment and the Party System" *Journal of Politics* 21:198-210

Burnham, Walter Dean. 1965. "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe." *American Political Science Review* 59:7-28.

Brady, David. 1988. *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chapters 1, 5, 6, and 7.

Nardulli, Peter. 1995. "The Concept of a Critical Realignment, Electoral Behavior, and Political Change." *American Political Science Review* 89:10-22.

**Recommendation:**

Beck, Paul Allen. 1974. "A Socialization Theory of Partisan Realignment." In *The Politics of Future Citizens*. Richard G. Niemi, et al. eds. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

\* Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Week 7: **Parties-in-Elections** (Note: Proposals Due)

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 6.

Niemi, Richard G. and Herbert F. Weisberg. 1993. *Classics in Voting Behavior*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. Part V. Party Identification

Lodge, Milton and Ruth Hamill. 1986. "A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing." *American Political Science Review* 80:505-520.

MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1989. "Macropartisanship." *American Political Science Review* 83:1125-1142.

Bartels, Larry M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 44:35-50.

**Recommendation:**

\* Campbell, Angus, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.

Week 8: **Parties-in-Government I**

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 7.

Cox, Gary and Matthew McCubbins. 1994. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*.

Week 9: **Parties-in-Government II**

Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1-2

Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23:235-66.

Schickler, Eric. 2000. "Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867–1998: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models" *American Political Science Review* 94:268-288.

Schickler, Eric and Andrew Rich. 1997. "Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:269-288.

Cox, Gary W. and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1997. "Toward a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes: Assessing Schickler and Rich's Evidence." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:1376-1386.

Cox, Gary and Eric Magar. 1999. "How Much is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?" *American Political Science Review* 93:299-310.

Snyder, James M., Jr. and Tim Groseclose. 2000. "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 44:193-211.

Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. "Party Discipline and Measure of Partisanship." *American Journal of Political Science* 44:212-227.

**Recommended:**

Binder, Sarah A., Eric D. Lawrence, and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. "Uncovering the Hidden Effect of Party." *Journal of Politics* 61:815-31

Krehbiel, Keith. 1999. "The Party Effect from A to Z and Beyond." *Journal of Politics* 61:832-40.

\* Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

\* Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Binder, Sarah A. 1999. "The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96." *American Political Science Review* 93:519-533.

\* Fiorina, Morris P. 1992. *Divided Government*. New York: Macmillan.

Week 10: **Parties-as-Organizations**

Michels, Robert. 1962. *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York: The Free Press, Introduction by Seymour Martin Lipset and pp. 333-356.

Miller, Warren E., and M. Kent Jennings. 1986. *Parties in Transition: A Longitudinal Study of Party Elites and Party Supporters*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Chapter 9 ("Linkages Between Party Elites and Party Followers"), pp. 189-219.

Bruce, John M., John A. Clark, and John H. Kessel. 1991. "Advocacy Politics in Presidential Parties." *American Political Science Review* 85:1089-1105.

Brady, Henry E., Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 1999. "Prospecting for Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activists." *American Political Science Review* 93:153-68.

Gibson, James L., Cornelius P. Cotter, John F. Bibby, and Robert J. Huckshorn. 1985. "Whither the Local Parties?" *American Journal of Political Science* 29:139-60.

Herrnson, Paul. 1986. "Do Parties Make a Difference? The Role of Party Organizations in Congressional Elections." *Journal of Politics* 48:589-615.

Beck, Paul Allen, Russell J. Dalton, Audrey Haynes, and Robert Huckfeldt. 1997. "Presidential Campaigning at the Grass Roots." *Journal of Politics* 59:1264-75.

**Interest Groups**

Week 11: **Classics of Pluralism**

Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Chapters. 1, 3-7, 16

Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semi-Sovereign People*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Chapters. 1-4, 8

Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *Who Governs?* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Chapters. 1, 8, 12, 19, 24-28

Walker, Jack L., Jr. 1966. "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 60:285-95

Dahl, Robert A. 1966. "Further Reflections on the Elitist Theory of Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 60:296-305.

Walker, Jack L., Jr. 1966. "A Reply to 'Further Reflections on the Elitist Theory of Democracy.'" *American Political Science Review* 60:391-2.

**Recommended:**

\* Dahl, Robert A. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Week 12: **Organization and Membership**

Olson, Mancur. 1974. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Salisbury, Robert H. 1969. "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13:1-32.

Moe, Terry M. 1981. "Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups." *Journal of Politics* 43:531-43.

**Recommended:**

Clark, Peter B., and James Q. Wilson. 1961. "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6:129-166.

Walker, Jack L. 1983. "The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America." *American Political Science Review* 77:390-406.

Hansen, John Mark. 1985. "The Political Economy of Group Membership." *American Political Science Review* 79:79-96.

\* Rothenberg, Lawrence. 1992. *Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at Common Cause*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-7.

\* Moe, Terry M. 1980. *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.



Week 13: **Interest Groups and Congress I**

Denzau, Arthur T. and Michael C. Munger. 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented." *American Political Science Review* 80:89-106.

Hansen, John Mark. 1991. *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Austen-Smith, David and John R. Wright. 1992. "Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote." *Social Choice and Welfare* 9:229-57.

**Recommended:**

\* Goldstein, Kenneth M. 1999. *Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

\* Kollman, Ken. 1998. *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mitchell, William, and Michael C. Munger. 1991. "Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey." *American Journal of Political Science* 35: 512-546.

Week 14: **Interest Groups and Congress II**

Wright, John R. 1985. "PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 79:400-414.

Hall, Richard L. and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." *American Political Science Review* 84:797-820.

Austen-Smith, David and John R. Wright. 1992. "Counteractive Lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science* 38:25-44.

Romer, Thomas and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions." *American Journal of Political Science* 38:745-69.

McCarty, Nolan and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 1996. "Commitment and the Campaign Contribution Contract." *American Journal of Political Science* 40:872-904.

Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 1998. "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 92:775-790.

**Recommended:**

Smith, Richard A. 1984. "Advocacy, Interpretation, and Influence in the U.S. Congress." *American Political Science Review* 78:44-63.

Rothenberg, Lawrence. 1992. *Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at Common Cause*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 8, 9.

Caldeira, Gregory A. and John R. Wright. 1998. "Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate." *American Journal of Political Science* 42:499-523.

Week 15: **Interest Groups, Bureaucracy, and Representation**

Stigler, George. 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation." *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 2:3-21.

McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28:165-179.

McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3:243-277.

Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1995. "A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 11:227-255.

Gais, Thomas L., Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker. 1984. "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions in American National Government." *British Journal of Political Science* 14:161-185.

Gray, Virginia and David Lowery. 1996. "A Niche Theory of Interest Representation." *Journal of Politics* 58:91-111.

**Recommended:**

\* Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury. 1993. *The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policymaking*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Krause, George A. 1997. "Policy Preference Formation and Subsystem Behaviour: The Case of Commercial Bank Regulation." *British Journal of Political Science* 27:525-550.