LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR

University of South Carolina

POLI 763
Spring, 2006
Office Hours, Monday and Wednesday
9:30 – 11:00 a.m. and by appointment

Professor Brad T. Gomez
Office: Gambrell 345
E-mail: gomezbt@sc.edu
Telephone: 777-2659

This research seminar explores the theoretical and empirical issues that confront scholars of legislative institutions and behavior, with a specific focus on the U.S. Congress. The subject of our exploration is, indeed, dynamic. As a subfield within American politics, the study of legislative institutions and behavior arguably has been the most active and theoretically innovative (the same holds true for its Comparative counterpart). While once dominated by sociological approaches, the study of legislative politics has become the stronghold of the rational actor model. Starting with the assumption that legislative actors are rational, goal-seekers (though the goals are sometimes debated), congressional scholars have addressed a litany of topics using the "rational choice" approach, ranging from electoral behavior, legislative parties, congressional rules and procedures, separation of powers, to the very nature of representation. Methodologically, the work has been formal theoretic (mathematical), empirical, and even historical/narrative. Combined, recent scholarship in this tradition has greatly increased our core knowledge of legislative institutions and behavior.

Our study will be conducted at an advanced theoretical and empirical level. For the student, this means: 1) A basic knowledge of Congress, including how members are assigned to committees, how bills are drafted and referred, the function of the Rules Committee, and how floor voting proceeds, is assumed. (The recommended Oleszek book is an excellent resource for this discrete knowledge). 2) We will read several works that utilize mathematical models and game theory as a means of theoretical exposition. This is bound to be challenging to many students, but it would be abhorrent to exclude this work from our study. Students should give these works their best effort (i.e., attempt to work through the mathematics). 3) Most importantly, students will be asked to think creatively about the literature, share their insights with the group, and examine these insights more closely in their research.

REQUIREMENTS:

The main requirements for this course are simple – READ, THINK CRITICALLY, and DISCUSS! You are expected to read all the assigned books and articles listed on this syllabus, and do it before the class for which they are assigned. Your *full* participation in the seminar (even if you are auditing) is fundamental to its success.

EVALUATION:

Your seminar evaluation will be based upon a research paper, a presentation of your research, ten (10) weekly précis, and your class participation:

The *research paper* accounts for 40% of your seminar grade and should be a 20-30 page work of original research, conforming to the *APSA Style Manual*, and of potentially publishable quality. The topic and methodological approach of the paper is your choice, but it would be wise to make these decisions in consultation with me. A two-page research proposal is due in class during Week 6. Beginning in Week 7, we will spend the first five minutes of class time discussing your progress. **Papers are due: April 18th**.

Formal *presentations of your research* (a 10-15 minute presentation, such as those given at a professional conference) will be given during the final two weeks of the semester. Your presentation is worth 10% of your seminar grade. You will be evaluated on your personal presentational style, graphical presentation of the problem, theory, hypotheses and results, and, most of all, clarity. **Presentations: April 24th.**

Students will prepare a 2-to-3-page (assuming it is typed and double-spaced) *précis* on an assigned reading for 10 of the 14 weeks for which we meet. The choice of weeks is the student's. These précis will summarize the main argument of a reading, sketch the model, and summarize the approach of its key proofs. Précis are to be turned in at the class meeting for which readings are assigned. They will be graded for conciseness as well as for evident effort and success in understanding the assigned reading. Your ten précis will comprise 30% of your course grade.

Finally, *seminar participation* will account for 20% of your grade.

Texts: The following texts have been ordered through the Russell House Textbook Store and are *required* for this course:

Binder, Sarah A. 1997. *Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fenno, Richard F. 2002 [1978]. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. New York: Pearson-Longman.

Jacobson, Gary C. 2004. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 6th Edition. New York: Pearson-Longman.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

The following book is highly recommended and also has been ordered through the Russell House Textbook Store.

Oleszek, Walter J. 2001. *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*, 6th Edition. Washington, D.C: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Additional required readings (articles and book chapters) can be obtained for copying directly from the professor. Many readings are available electronically on JSTOR.

COURSE SCHEDULE

Week 1: The Historical Congress and an Overview

Required:

Gamm, Gerald, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. "Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 14:39-66.

Munger, Michael, and Douglas Hart. 1989. "Declining Electoral Competitiveness in the House of Representatives: the Differential Impact of Improved Transportation Technology." *Public Choice* 61:217-231.

Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 62:144-68.

Wilson, Rick K. And Calvin Jillson. 1987. "A Social Choice Model of Factional Conflict in the Continental Congresses." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 12:5-32.

Wilson, Rick K. 1999. "Transitional Governance in the United States: Lessons from the First Federal Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24:543-568.

Wilson, Woodrow.1973 [1885]. *Congressional Government*. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith. Chapter 2.

Young, James Sterling. 1966. *The Washington Community, 1800-1828*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Chapters 1, 6, and 7.

Recommended:

Jenkins, Jeffery A. 1998. "Property Rights and the Emergence of Standing Committee Dominance in the Nineteenth-Century House." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23:493-519.

Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Timothy P. Nokken. 2000. "The Institutional Origins of the Republican Party: Spatial Voting and the House Speakership Election of 1855–56." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25:101-130.

Madison, James. 1788. "Federalist, No. 57: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation." *The Federalist Papers*

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Schickler, Eric. 2001. *Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Week 2: Constituencies and Representation

Required:

Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Do Majority-Minority District Maximize Black Substantive Representation in Congress?" *American Political Science Review* 90:794-823.

Canon, David T., Matthew M. Schousen, and Patrick J. Sellers. 1996. "The Supply Side of Congressional Redistricting: Race and Strategic Politicians, 1972-1992." *Journal of Politics* 58:846-62.

Eulau, Heinz, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson. 1959. "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke." *American Political Science Review* 53:742-56.

Fenno, Richard F. 2002 [1978]. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. New York: Pearson-Longman. Chapters 1– 5, and 7.

Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 57:45-56.

Swain, Carol M. 1993. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapter 10.

Recommended:

Achen, Christopher H. 1978. "Measuring Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 22:457-510.

Bianco, William T. 1994. *Trust: Representation and Constituents*. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.

Canon, David T. 1999. "Electoral Systems and the Representation of Minority Interests in Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24:331–85.

Cox, Gary, and Jonathan Katz. 2001. *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Erikson, Robert S. 1978. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Representation Data." *American Journal of Political Science* 22:511-35.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1974. *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company.

Hill, Kim Quaile, and Patricia A. Hurley. 1999. "Dyadic Representation Reappraised." *American Journal of Political Science* 43:109-37.

Lublin, David. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Maass, Arthur. 1983. *Congress and the Common Good*. New York: Basic Books.

Pitkin, Hanna F. 1978. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Tate, Katherine. 2001. "The Political Representation of Blacks in Congress: Does Race Matter?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26:623-38.

Weissberg, Robert. 1978. "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 72:535-47.

Week 3: Congressional Elections: Incumbency Advantage

Required:

Cox, Gary C., and Jonathan N. Katz. 1996. "Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections Grow?" *American Journal of Political Science* 40:478-97.

Erikson, Robert, and Thomas Palfrey. 2000. "Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data." *American Political Science Review* 94:595-609.

Jacobson, Gary C. 2004. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 6th Edition. New York: Longman.

Recommended:

Cain, Bruce E., John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It." *American Political Science Review* 71:177-81.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1987. "The Marginals Never Vanished." *American Journal of Political Science* 31:126-141.

Krasno, Jonathan, and Donald Green. 1988. "Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 32:884-907.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals." *Polity* 6:295-317.

Week 4: Congressional Elections: Aggregate Outcomes

Required:

Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal. 1989. "Partisan Cycles and Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy." *American Political Science Review* 83:373-98.

Campbell, James E. 1987. "The Revised Theory of Surge and Decline." *American Journal of Political Science* 31:965-79.

Erikson, Robert S. 1990. "Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel Evidence." *American Journal of Political Science* 34:373-399.

Gerber, Alan. 1998. "Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables." *American Political Science Review* 92:401-11.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-86." *American Political Science Review* 83:773-93.

Recommended:

Brady, David. 1988. *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Campbell, Angus. 1960. "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 24:397-418.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. "Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior." *American Political Science Review* 65:131-143

Lynch, G. Patrick. 2002. "Midterm Elections and Economic Fluctuations: The Response of Voters Over Time." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 27:265-94.

Newman, Brian, and Charles Ostrom, Jr. 2002. "Explaining Seat Changes in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1950–98." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 27:383-405.

Tufte, Edward R. 1973. "The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems." *American Political Science Review* 67: 540-54.

Tufte, Edward R. 1975. "Determinants of Electoral Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 69:812-826.

Week 5: Theoretical Perspectives: Institutions and Equilibrium

Required:

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

McKelvey, Richard D. 1976. "Intransitives in Multi-Dimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control." *Journal of Economic Theory* 18:472-82.

Polsby, Nelson W., Miriam Gallagher, and Barry S. Rundquist. 1969. "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 63:787-807.

Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. "Structural-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice." *Public Choice* 37:503-519.

Weingast, Barry R., and William Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress." *Journal of Political Economy* 96:132-63

Weingast, Barry R. 1979. "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms." *American Journal of Political Science* 23:245-62.

Recommended:

Axelrod, Robert. 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms." *American Political Science Review* 80:1095-111.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1988. "Spatial Models of Legislative Choice." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13:259-319.

Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1995. *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Riker, William H. 1962. *A Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Riker, William H. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 74:432-46.

Week 6: The Committee System

Required:

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." *American Political Science Review* 81:85-104.

Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Charles Stewart, III. 1999. "Order from Chaos: The Transformation of the Committee System in the House, 1810-1822. Manuscript.

Recommended:

Adler, E. Scott, and John S. Lapinski. 1997. "Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:895-918.

Fenno, Richard F. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees*. Boston: Little Brown.

Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. "Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations* 3:287-335.

Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogenous Committee." *American Journal of Political Science* 33:459-90.

Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. "Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature." *American Journal of Political Science* 34:531-64.

Groseclose, Timothy, and Charles Stewart, III. 1998. "The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-91. *American Journal of Political Science* 42:453-74.

Hall, Richard L. 1996. *Participation in Congress*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Hall, Richard L., and Bernard Grofman. 1990. "The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias." *American Political Science Review* 84:1149-66.

King, David C. 1997. *Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1978. *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Week 7: Congressional Parties

Required:

Aldrich, John H., Brad T. Gomez, and Jennifer Merolla. 2005. "Follow the Money: Models of Congressional Governance and the Appropriations Process." Manuscript.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party? *British Journal of Political Science* 23:235-66.

Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1 and 6.

Recommended:

Aldrich, John H. 1994. "A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a Committee System.: *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 9:313-40.

Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 1997. "The Transition to Republican Rule in the House." *Political Science Quarterly* 112:541-67.

Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 2000. "The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee." *Journal of Politics* 62:1-33.

Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. “Congressional Party Leadership: Utilitarian Versus Majoritarian Incentives.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23:219-43.

Bianco, William T. 2000. “Party Campaign Committees and the Distribution of Tally Program Funds.” *Legislative Studes Quarterly* 24:451-69.

Cooper, Joseph, and David W. Brady. 1981. “Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Canon to Rayburn.” *American Political Science Review* 75:411-25.

Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sinclair, Barbara. 2000. “Transformational Leader or Faithful Agent? Principal-Agent Theory and House Majority Party Leadership.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24:421-49.

Smith, Steven S. 2000. “Positive Theories of Congressional Parties.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25:193-215.

Week 8: Agenda Control

Required:

Austen-Smith, David, and William H. Riker. 1987. “Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation.” *American Political Science Review* 81:897-918.

Binder, Sarah A. 1997. *Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dion, Douglas, and John Huber. 1996. “Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules.” *Journal of Politics* 58:25-53.

Schickler, Eric, and Andrew Rich. 1997. “Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House.” *American Journal of Political Science* 41:1340-75.

Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 1997. “Toward a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes: Assessing Schickler and Rich’s Evidence.” *American Journal of Political Science* 41:1376-86.

Schickler, Eric, and Andrew Rich. 1997. “Party Government in the House Reconsidered: A Response to Cox and McCubbins.” *American Journal of Political Science* 41:1387-94

Recommended:

Bach, Stanley, and Steven M. Smith. 1988. *Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Cox, Gary W. 2000. “On the Effects of Legislative Rules.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25:169-192.

Cox, Gary W. 2001. "Agenda Setting in the U.S. House: A Majority-Party Monopoly?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26:185-210.

Huber, John D. 1992. "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States." *American Political Science Review* 86:675-687.

Krehbiel, Keith, and Adam Meirowitz. 2002. "Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the Motion to Recommit." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 27:191-217.

Ordeshook, Peter, and Thomas Schwartz. 1987. "Agendas and Control of Political Outcomes." *American Political Science Review* 81:179-199.

Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo." *Public Choice* 33:27-43.

Sinclair, Barbara. 1997. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Smith, Steven S. 1989. *Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Week 9: Inside the Senate and Bicameralism

Required:

Binder, Sarah A., and Steven Smith. 1997. *Politics or Principle*? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Chapters 1, 4, 5, and 6.

Miller, Gary J., Thomas H. Hammond, and Charles Kile. 1996. "Bicameralism and the Core: An Experimental Test." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 21:83-103.

Tsebelis, George, and Jeanette Money. 1997. *Bicameralism*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1– 5.

Recommended:

Fenno, Richard F. Jr., 1982. *The United States Senate: A Bicameral Perspective*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Heller, William B. 1998. "Bicameralism and Budget Deficits: The Effect of Parliamentary Structure on Government Spending." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22:485-516.

Lee, Frances E., and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. 1999. *Sizing Up the Senate*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Matthews, Donald. 1960. *U.S. Senators and Their World*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Riker, William H. 1992. "The Justification of Bicameralism." *International Political Science Review* 13:101-116.

Sinclair, Barbara. 1989. *The Transformation of the U.S. Senate*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Week 10: Congressional Decision-Making, Roll Call Voting, and Ideology

Required:

Asher, Herbert B., and Herbert F. Weisberg. 1978. "Voting Change in Congress: Some Dynamic Perspectives on an Evolutionary Process." *American Journal of Political Science* 22:391-425.

Denzau, Arthur, William H. Riker, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1985. "Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style." *American Political Science Review* 79:1117-1134.

Groseclose, Timothy, Steven Levitt, and James Snyder. 1999. "Comparing Interest Group Scores Across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress." *American Political Science Review* 93:33-50.

Kingdon, John W. 1977. "Models of Legislative Voting." *Journal of Politics* 39:563-95.

Krehbiel, Keith, and Douglas Rivers. 1990. "Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration." *Journal o f Politics* 52:548-578.

Poole, Keith, and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress." *American Political Science Review* 85:955-976.

Poole, Keith, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. "D-Nominate after 10 Years: A Comparative Update to *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting*." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26:5-29.

Snyder, James, and Tim Groseclose. 2000. "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 44:193-211.

Van Doren, Peter M. 1990. "Can We Learn the Causes of Congressional Decisions from Roll Call Data?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 15:311-340.

Recommended:

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. W. Zorn. 1997. "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement." *American Political Science Review* 91:324-338.

Burden, Barry C., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Tim Groseclose. 2000. "Measuring the Ideologies of U.S. Senators: The Song Remains the Same." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25:237-58.

Clausen, Aage. 1973. *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Gomez, Brad T. N.d. "The Dynamics of Information Exchange: Reevaluating the Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress." Manuscript.

Herron, Michael C. 1999. "Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings and the Preferences Versus Party Debate." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24:525-42.

Kingdon, John W. 1989. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1995. "Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z." *American Journal of Political Science* 39:906-923.

Matthews, Donald R., and James A. Stimson. 1975. *Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York: Wiley.

Poole, Keith, and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Weisberg, Herbert F. 1978. "Evaluating Theories of Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 22:554-577.

Week 11: Congressional Policy-Making: Pass the Pork

Required:

Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapters 1, 4, 5, and 6.

Baron, David P. 1990. "Distributive Politics and the Persistence of Amtrak." *Journal of Politics* 52:883-913.

Bickers, Kenneth N., and Robert M. Stein. 1996. "The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel." *American Journal of Political Science* 40:1300-1326.

Cain, Bruce E., John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1984. "The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament." *American Political Science Review* 78:110-125.

Carrubba, Clifford J., and Craig Volden. 2000. "Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science 44:261-277.*

Groseclose, Tim, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1996. "Buying Supermajorities." *American Political Science Review* 90:303-315.

Recommended:

Baron, David P. 1991. "Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control." *American Journal of Political Science* 35:57-90.

Baron, David P. 1996. “A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs.” *American Political Science Review* 90:316-330.

Evans, Diana. 1994. “Policy and Pork: The Use of Pork Barrel Projects to Build Policy Coalitions in the House of Representatives.” *American Journal of Political Science* 38:894-917.

Niou, Emerson M.S., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1985. “Universalism in Congress.” *American Journal of Political Science* 29:246-258.

Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. “Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization.” *American Journal of Political Science* 25:96-111.

Stein, Robert M., and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1995. *Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week 12: Lobbying

Required:

Austen-Smith, David, and Jack R. Wright. 1994. “Counteractive Lobbying.” *American Journal of Political Science* 38:25-44.

Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1998. “Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate.” *American Journal of Political Science* 42:499-523.

Cox, Gary, and E. Mager. 1999. “How Much is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?” *American Political Science Review* 93:299-308.

Denzau, Arthur T., and Michael C. Munger. 1986. “Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented.” *American Political Science Review* 80:89-106.

Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and Mobilization of bias in Congressional Committees.” *American Political Science Review* 84:797-820.

Hojnacki, Marie., and David C. Kimball. 1988. “Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress.” *American Political Science Review* 92:775-790.

McCarty, Nolan, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 1996. “Commitment and the Campaign Contribution Contract.” *American Journal of Political Science* 40:872-904.

Recommended:

Ainsworth, Scott H. 1997. “The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22:517-33.

Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1992. "Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote." *Social Choice and Welfare* 9:229-57.

Baumgartner, Frank M., and Beth L. Leech. 1995. "The Multiple Ambiguities of 'Counteractive Lobbying.'" *American Journal of Political Science* 40:521-542.

Hansen, John Mark. 1991. *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Romer, Thomas, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions." *American Journal of Political Science* 38:745-769.

Wright, John R. 1985. "PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 79:400-414.

Week 13: Causes and Consequences of Divided Government

Required:

Binder, Sarah A. 1999. "The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96." *American Political Science Review* 93:519-533.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gomez, Brad T. 2002. "Reexamining Gridlock in the Legislative Process: A Transaction Cost Approach." Manuscript.

Howell, William, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron, and Charles Riemann. 2000. "Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945–94." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25:285-312.

Recommended:

Edwards, George C., III., Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake. 1997. "Legislative Impact of Divided Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:545-563.

Mayhew, David R.1991. *Divided We Govern*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Week 14: Oversight of the Executive Branch

Required:

Calvert, Randall, Mathew McCubbins, and Barry Weingast. 1989. "A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion." *American Journal of Political Science* 33:588-611.

Ferejohn, John, and Charles Shipan. 1990. "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy." *Journal of*

Law, Economics, and Organization 6:1-21.

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