Alfred Mele’s Publications

last update: 10/20/2014

Books

Author:
Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will. Oxford University Press, 2014.
A Dialogue on Free Will and Science. Oxford University Press, 2014.
Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will. Oxford University Press, 2012.
Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Oxford University Press, 2009.
Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Motivation and Agency. Oxford University Press, 2003.
Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press, 2001.
Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press, 1995.
Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. Oxford University Press, 1992.
Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press, 1987.
Editor:
Surrounding Free Will. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? (co-edited with R. Baumeister & K. Vohs). Oxford University Press, 2010.
Rationality and the Good (co-edited with M. Timmons and J. Greco) . Oxford University Press, 2007.
The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (co-edited with J. P. Rawling). Oxford University Press, 2004.
The Philosophy of Action (Oxford Readings in Philosophy series; Oxford University Press), 1997.
Mental Causation (co-edited with J. Heil). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Articles

"Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Does Either Require the Other?" Philosophical Explorations (forthcoming).
"Introduction" in A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Free Will. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
P. Haggard, A. Mele, T. O'Connor, and K. Vohs, "Free Will Lexicon," in A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Free Will. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
“Libet and the Timing of the Will,” in J. Clausen and N. Levy, eds. Handbook of Neuroethics, Springer (forthcoming).
"Luck and Free Will," Metaphilosophy (2014) 45: 543:557.
“Kane, Luck, and Control,” in D. Palmer, ed. Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press (2014) 37-51.
"Self-Control, Motivational Strength, and Exposure Therapy," Philosophical Studies (2014) 170: 359-375.
S. Kearns and A. Mele, "Have Compatibilists Solved the Luck Problem for Libertarians?" Philosophical Inquiries (2014) 2: 9-36.
“The Single Phenomenon View and Experimental Philosophy,” in M. Vargas and G. Yaffe, eds. Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman, Oxford University Press (2014), 38-55.
"Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?" in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. MIT Press (2014), 195-207.
“Reply to Nadelhoffer and Vargas,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. MIT Press (2014), 227-233.
"Is What You Decide Ever up to You?" in I. Haji and J. Cauoette, eds. Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2013), 74-97.
"Unconscious Decisions and Free Will," Philosophical Psychology 26 (2013): 777-789.
"Free Will and Neuroscience." Philosophic Exchange 43 (2013): 1-17.
“Libertarianism and Human Agency,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2013): 72-92.
“Actions, Explanations, and Causes,” in G. D’Oro and C. Sandis, eds. Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action, Palgrave Macmillan (2013), 160-174.
"Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting," Journal of Ethics (2013): 167-184.
"Moral Responsibility, Manipulation, and Minutelings," Journal of Ethics (2013): 153-166.
A. Mele and J. Shepherd, "Situationism and Agency," Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (2013): 62-83.
"Free Will, Science, and Punishment," in T. Nadelhoffer, ed. The Future of Punishment, Oxford University Press (2013), 177-191.
"Vetoing and Consciousness," in T. Vierkant, J. Kiverstein, and A. Clark, eds. Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press (2013), 73-86.
“Moral Responsibility and the Continuation Problem,” Philosophical Studies 162 (2013): 237-255.
"Free Will and Neuroscience: Revisiting Libet's Studies," in A. Suarez and P. Adams, eds. Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Springer (2013): 195-207.
“Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action,” Philosophical Issues 22 (2012): 281-297.
"Intentional, Unintentional, or Neither? Middle Ground in Theory and Practice," American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2012): 369-379.
"Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding," Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (2012): 387-398.
“Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?” Monist 95 (2012): 422-440.
“Consciousness in Action: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Data, and Inferences,” in J. Larrazabal, ed. Cognition, Reasoning, Emotion, and Action. University of the Basque Country Press (2012), 87-98.
"Autonomy and Neuroscience," in L. Radoilska, ed. Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press (2012), 26-43.
“When Are We Self-Deceived?” Humana Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2012): 1-15.
"“Autonomie, moralische Verantwortung und das Fortsetzungsproblem” (“Autonomy, Moral Responsibility, and the Continuation Problem”), in J. Nida-Rümelin and E. Özmen, eds. Welt der Gründe. Felix Meiner Verlag (2012), 156-178.
"Moral Psychology," in C. Miller, ed. The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum (2011), 98-118.
"Free Will and Science," in R. Kane, ed. Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press (2011), 499-514.
T. Stillman, R. Baumeister, and A. Mele, "Free Will in Everyday Life: Autobiographical Accounts of Free and Unfree Actions," Philosophical Psychology (2011): 381-394.
"Surrounding Free Will: A Response to Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist," Neuroethics 4: (2011): 25-29.
"Self-Control in Action," in S. Gallagher, ed. Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 465-486.
"Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness," in W. Sinnott-Armstrong and L. Nadel, eds. Conscious Will and Responsibility. Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 23-33.
"Approaching Self-Deception: How Robert Audi and I Part Company." Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010): 745-750.
"Teleological Explanations of Actions: Anticausalism vs. Causalism," in J. Aguilar and A. Buckareff, eds. Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. MIT Press (2010), pp. 183-198.
"Scientific Skepticism about Free Will," in T. Nadelhoffer, E. Nahmias, and S. Nichols, eds. Moral Psychology: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Blackwell (2010), pp. 295-305.
"Conscious Intentions," in J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and H. Silverstein, eds. Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press (2010), pp. 85-107.
"Weakness of Will and Akrasia" Philosophical Studies 150 (2010): 391-404.
"Moral Responsibility for Actions: Epistemic and Freedom Conditions,"Philosophical Explorations 13 (2010): 101-111.
"Testing Free Will," Neuroethics 3 (2010): 161-172.
"Conscious Deciding and the Science of Free Will," in R. Baumeister, A. Mele, and K. Vohs, eds. Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? Oxford University Press (2010), pp. 43-65.
"Motivational Strength," in T. O'Connor and C. Sandis, eds. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell (2010), pp. 259-266.
A. Mele, K. Vohs, and R. Baumeister, "Free Will and Consciousness: An Introduction and Overview of Perspectives," in R. Baumeister, A. Mele, and K. Vohs, eds. Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? Oxford University Press (2010), pp. 1-7.
“Causation, Action, and Free Will,” in H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies, eds. Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 554-574.
"Moral Responsibility and History Revisited" Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2009) 12: 463-475.
"Mental Action: A Case Study," in L. O'Brien and M. Soteriou, eds. Mental Actions and Agency Oxford: Clarendon Press (2009), pp. 17-37.
"Delusional Confabulations and Self-Deception," in W. Hirstein, ed. Confabulation: Views from Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology, and Philosophy. Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 139-157.
"Have I Unmasked Self-Deception or Am I Self-Deceived?," in C. Martin, ed. The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 260-276.
"Action and Mind," in P. Calvo and J. Symons, eds. Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge (2009) pp. 609-620.
"Moral Responsibility and Agents' Histories," Philosophical Studies (2009) 142: 161-181.
“Intention and Intentional Action,” in B. McLaughlin and A. Beckermann, eds. Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press, (2009), pp. 691-710.
"Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility" Journal of Ethics (2008) 12: 263-286.
F. Cushman and A. Mele, "Intentional Action: Two-and-a-half Folk Concepts," in J. Knobe and S. Nichols, eds. Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press (2008), pp. 171-188.
"Recent Work on Free Will and Science," American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2008): 107-129.
"Proximal Intentions, Intention-Reports, and Vetoing," Philosophical Psychology 21 (2008): 1-14.
“A Libertarian View of Akratic Action,” Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 49 (2008): 252-275.
"Psychology and Free Will: a Commentary," in J. Baer, J.C. Kaufman, and R. Baumeister, eds. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2008), 325-346.
"Persisting Intentions," Noûs 41 (2007): 735-757.
A. Mele and F. Cushman, "Intentional Action, Folk Judgments, and Stories: Sorting Things Out." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (2007): 184-201.
“Self-Deception and Three Psychiatric Delusions: On Robert Audi's Transition from Self-Deception to Delusion,” in M.Timmons, J. Greco, & A. Mele, eds. Rationality and the Good (Oxford University Press, 2007), 163-175.
"Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics," Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 195-210.
"Free Will and Luck: Précis," Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 153-155.
"Reasonology and False Beliefs," Philosophical Papers 36 (2007): 91-118.
"Self-Deception and Hypothesis Testing," in M. Marraffa, M. De Caro, and F. Ferreti, eds. Cartographies of the Mind (Kluwer, 2007), 159-167.
"Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: Frankfurt-style Cases Revisited," in F. Castellani and J. Quitterer, eds. Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences (Mentis Verlag, 2007), 125-140.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” in J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and D. Shier, eds. Explanation and Causation: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy (MIT Press, 2007), 241-263.
"Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience," in C. Lumer, ed. Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy (Ashgate, 2007), 257-272.
“Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Ethics 10 (2006): 283-294.
"Practical Mistakes and Intentional Actions," American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2006): 249-260.
“Free Will: Theories, Analysis, and Data,” in S.Pockett, W. Banks, and S. Gallagher, eds. Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition (MIT Press, 2006), 187-205.
“The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: A Commentary,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (2006): 277-290.
"Self-Deception and Delusions," European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2006): 109-124. Also in J. Fernandez and T. Bayne, eds. Delusions, Self-Deception, and Affective Influences on Belief-Formation (Psychology Press, forthcoming).
“Action,” in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds. Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2005), 334-57.
“Motivation and Agency: Reply to Davis, Ginet, and Roth,” Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 295-311.
“Motivation and Agency: Précis,” Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 243-247.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 395-421.
“Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (2005): 146-162.
“A Critique of Pereboom’s ‘Four-Case Argument’ for Incompatibilism,” Analysis (2005) 65: 75-80.
“Dennett on Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2005): 36: 414-426.
“Agnostic Autonomism Revisited,” in J. Taylor, ed. Personal Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 109-123.
“Acçao humana par excellence (“Human Agency Par Excellence” in F. Mao de Ferro, ed. A explicaçao da interpretaçao humana (Lisbon: Ediçoes Colibri, 2005).
J. Gert and A. Mele, “Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An Interplanetary Exploration.” Philosophia, 32 (2005): 275-283.
“The Illusion of Conscious Will and the Causation of Intentional Actions,” Philosophical Topics 32 (2004): 193-213.
“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” in J. Hyman and H. Steward eds. Agency and Action (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 217-241.
“Action: Volitional Disorder and Addiction,” in J. Radden, ed. The Philosophy of Psychiatry (Oxford University Press, 2004), 78-88.
“Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and Self-Control,” in P. Baumann and M. Betzler, eds. Practical Conflicts (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 262-78.
“Motivated Irrationality,” in A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004), 240-256.
A. Mele and P. Rawling, “Introduction: Aspects of Rationality,” in A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004), 3-13.
“Velleman on Action and Agency,” Philosophical Studies (2004) 121: 249-61.
“Agents’ Abilities,” Noûs 37 (2003): 447-470.
“Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses,” Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003): 325-340.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” in A. Hatzimoysis, ed. Philosophy and the Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 163-179.
“Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom,” in D. Widerker and M. McKenna, eds. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Ashgate, 2003), 251-264.
“Chisholm on Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2003) 34: 630-648.
“Intending and Trying: Tuomela vs. Bratman at the Video Arcade,” in M. Sintonen, P. Ylikoski, and K. Miller, eds., Realism in Action, (Kluwer, 2003), 129-135.
“Philosophy of Action,” in K. Ludwig, ed. Donald Davidson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 64-84.
A. Mele and D. Robb, “BBs, Magnets and Seesaws: The Metaphysics of Frankfurt-Style Cases,” in D. Widerker and M. McKenna, eds. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Ashgate, 2003), 127-138.
“Akratics and Addicts,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002): 153-167.
“Autonomy and Akrasia,” Philosophical Explorations, 3 (2002): 207-216.
H. Beebee and A. Mele, “Humean Compatibilism.” Mind, 111 (2002): 201-223.
“Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will,” in R. Kane ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 529-548.
“Reply to Commentators,” Florida Philosophical Review 2 (2002): 98-101.
“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” in B. Malle, L. Moses, and D. Baldwin, eds. Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 27-43.
“Goal-Directed Action: Teleological Explanations, Causal Theories, and Deviance,” Philosophical Perspectives, 14 (2000): 279-300.
“Deciding to Act,” Philosophical Studies 100 (2000): 81-108.
“Self-Deception and Emotion,” Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2000): 115-139.
“Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 447-452.
“Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of Frankfurt-Style Cases,” in M. Betzler and B. Guckes, eds., Autonomes Handeln (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), pp. 25-38.
“Twisted Self-Deception,” Philosophical Psychology 12 (1999): 117-137.
“Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck,” Social Philosophy & Policy 16 (1999): 274-293. Reprinted in E. Paul, F. Miller, and J. Paul, eds. Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
“Motivation, Self-Control, and the Agglomeration of Desires,” Facta Philosophica 1 (1999): 77-86.
“Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will,” Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999): 96-104.
“Is There a Place for Intention in an Analysis of Intentional Action?” Philosophia 27 (1999): 419-432.
“Autoinganno e Controllo Delle Ipotesi” (Self-Deception and Hypothesis Testing; translated by Massimo Marraffa), Sistemi Intelligenti 11 (1999): 503-519.
“L’autoinganno Deflazionato: Risposte a Bermudez e Graham” (Deflated Self-Deception: Reply to Bermudez and Graham; translated by Massimo Marraffa), Sistemi Intelligenti 11 (1999): 541-545.
“Motivational Strength,” Noûs 32 (1998): 23-36.
“Noninstrumental Rationalizing,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998): 236-250.
“Motivated Belief and Agency,” Philosophical Psychology 11 (1998): 353-369.
“Synchronic Self-Control Revisited: Frog and Toad Shape Up,” Analysis 58 (1998): 305-310.
“Flickers of Freedom,” Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1998): 144-156.
“Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception,” in J. Dupuy, ed., Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1998), pp. 37-58.
“Practical Irrationality: Two Kinds of Akratic Action,” Cadernos de Filosofia 4 (1998): 9-37.
“Probing Akrasia: Reply to Ricardo Santos,” Cadernos de Filosofia 4 (1998): 45-49.
A. Mele and D. Robb, “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases.” Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 97-112. Reprinted in L. Ekstrom, ed. Agency and Responsibility (Boulder: Westview, 2001).
“Real Self-Deception,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1997): 91-102.
“Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception” (response to commentaries), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1997): 127-134.
“Strength of Motivation and Being in Control: Learning from Libet,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 319-332.
“Agency and Mental Action,” Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 231-249.
“Passive Action,” in G. Holmström-Hintikka and R. Tuomela, eds., Contemporary Action Theory, vol. 1 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), pp. 135-143.
“Underestimating Self-Control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad,” Analysis 57 (1997): 119-123.
“Introduction,” in A. Mele, ed., The Philosophy of Action (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 1-26.
P. Livingston and A. Mele, “Evaluating Emotional Responses to Fiction,” in M. Hjort and S. Laver, eds., Emotion and the Arts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 157-176.
“Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness,” Ethics 106 (1996): 727-753.
“Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios,” Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 123-141.
“Socratic Akratic Action,” Philosophical Papers 25 (1996): 149-159.
“Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle,” Proto Sociology 8/9 (1996): 39-52 (special issue on rationality). Reprinted in G. Preyer and G. Peter, eds. The Contextualization of Rationality (Mentis: Paderborn, 2000).
“Addiction and Self-Control,” Behavior and Philosophy 24 (1996): 99-117.
“Motivation and Intention,” Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (1996): 51-67.
A. Mele and S. Sverdlik, “Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies (1996) 82: 265-287.
“Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes,” Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 387-423.
“Effective Deliberation About What to Intend: Or Striking it Rich in a Toxin-Free Environment,” Philosophical Studies 79 (1995): 85-93.
“Conceptualizing Self-Control,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1995): 136-137.
“Self-Control and Belief,” Philosophical Psychology 7 (1994): 419-435.
“Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1994): 627-636.
A. Mele and P. Moser, “Intentional Action.” Noûs 28 (1994): 39-68. Reprinted in A. Mele, ed., The Philosophy of Action (Oxford University Press, 1997).
“Justifying Intentions,” Mind 102 (1993): 335-337.
“History and Personal Autonomy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (1993): 271-280.
“Motivated Belief,” Behavior and Philosophy 21 (1993): 19-27.
“Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 61.
Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires,” Noûs 26 (1992): 281-302.
“Intending for Reasons,” Mind 101 (1992): 327-333.
“Intentions, Reasons, and Beliefs: Morals of the Toxin Puzzle,” Philosophical Studies 68 (1992): 171-194.
“Recent Work on Intentional Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1992): 199-217.
“Acting for Reasons and Acting Intentionally,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1992): 355-374.
F. Adams and A. Mele, “The Intention/Volition Debate.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 323-338.
A. Mele and P. Livingston, “Intentions and Interpretations.” MLN 107 (1992): 931-949.
P. Livingston and A. Mele, “Intention and Literature.” Stanford French Review 16 (1992): 173-196.
“He Wants to Try Again: A Rejoinder,” Analysis 51 (1991): 225-228.
“Akratic Action and the Practical Role of Better Judgment,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991): 33-47.
“Incontinent Belief: A Rejoinder,” Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991): 197-212.
“Dretske’s Intricate Behavior,” Philosophical Papers 20 (1991): 1-10.
“Motivational Ties,” Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991): 431-442. (Proceedings of conference honoring the memory of Mark Overvold).
J. Heil and A. Mele, “Mental Causes.” American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991): 49-59.
“Irresistible Desires,” Noûs 24 (1990): 455-472.
“Exciting Intentions,” Philosophical Studies 59 (1990): 289-312.
“He Wants to Try,” Analysis 50 (1990): 251-253.
“Intending and Motivation: A Rejoinder,” Analysis 50 (1990): 194-197.
“Errant Self-Control and the Self-Controlled Person,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1990): 47-59.
“Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989): 19-30.
“She Intends to Try,” Philosophical Studies 55 (1989): 101-106.
“Intentions by Default,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989): 155-166.
“Akratic Feelings,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1989): 277-288.
“Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning,” Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-436.
Reprinted in R. J. Wallace, ed. Reason, Emotion, and Will (Ashgate, 1999).
F. Adams and A. Mele, “The Role of Intention in Intentional Action.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1989): 511-531.
“Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1988): 723-731.
“Against a Belief/Desire Analysis of Intention,” Philosophia 18 (1988): 239-242.
“Self-Deception and Akratic Belief: A Rejoinder,” Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988): 203-208.
Irrationality: A Précis,” Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988): 173-177.
A. Mele and M. Smith, “The New Paradox of the Stone.” Faith and Philosophy 5 (1988): 283-290.
“Recent Work on Self-Deception,” American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 1-17.
“Are Intentions Self-Referential?” Philosophical Studies 52 (1987): 309-329.
“Intentional Action and Wayward Causal Chains: The Problem of Tertiary Waywardness,” Philosophical Studies 51 (1987): 55-60.
“Incontinent Believing,” Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 212-222. Reprinted in L. Stevenson et al., eds., Mind, Causation, and Action (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 102-112.
“Is Akratic Action Unfree?” Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 46 (1986): 673-679.
(Review article) “Self-Deception and Akrasia: A Review of David Pears’s Motivated Irrationality,” Behaviorism 14 (1986): 183-191.
“Self-Control, Action, and Belief,” American PhilosophicalQuarterly 22 (1985): 169-175.
“Aristotle on Akrasia, Eudaimonia, and the Psychology of Action,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1985): 375-393. Reprinted in N. Sherman, ed. Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).
“How to Represent Aristotelian Deliberation Syllogistically,” TheNew Scholasticism 59 (1985): 484-492.
“Aristotle on the Roles of Reason in Motivation and Justification,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 66 (1984): 124-147.
“Aristotle’s Wish,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 139-156.
“Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Vol. X (1984): 133-155.
“Intending and the Balance of Motivation,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1984): 370-376.
“Pears on Akrasia, and Defeated Intentions,” Philosophia 14 (1984): 145-152.
Akrasia, Reasons, and Causes,” Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 345-368.
“Self-Deception,” Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1983): 365-377.
“Aristotle on the Justification of Ends,” Proceedings ofthe American Catholic Philosophical Association 56 (1982): 79-86.
“Self-Deception, Action, and Will: Comments,” Erkenntnis 18 (1982): 159-164.
“Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Journalof the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 405-423.
“The Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle’s Causal Theory of Action,” The New Scholasticism 55 (1981): 281-316.
“Aristotle on Akrasia and Knowledge,” The Modern Schoolman 58 (1981): 137-157.
“On ‘Happiness and the Good Life’,” Southwestern Journalof Philosophy 10 (1979): 181-187.
Encyclopedia and Dictionary Entries, etc.

“Action Theory,” Encyclopedia Americana (forthcoming).
"Free Will: A Modest Proposal," Slate, October, 2014. http://www.slate.com/bigideas/are-we-free/essays-and-opinions/alfred-mele-opinion
Interviews with Interesting People, Fall, 2014. http://www.interviewswithinterestingpeople.com/dr-alfred-mele-philosophy-professor/
Free Will and Science; discussion with Eddy Nahmias; Philosophy TV (Summer 2014) http://www.philostv.com/al-mele-and-eddy-nahmias/
"Discussion Summary: What Are the Implications of the Free Will Debate for Individuals and Society?" Big Questions Online. June, 2014. https://www.bigquestionsonline.com/node/282/comment/summary/all
"What Are the Implications of the Free Will Debate for Individuals and Society?" Big Questions Online. May, 2014. https://www.bigquestionsonline.com/content/what-are-implications-free-will-debate-individuals-and-society
"Kitty Genovese and the Bystander Effect: 50 years on." OUPblog, March, 2014. http://blog.oup.com/2014/03/kitty-genovese-bystander-effect/
Interview on Philosophy of Action in C. Mauro, S. Miguens, and S. Cadilha, eds. Conversations on Human Action and Practical Rationality. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, 29-49.
Interview on Free Will, Methode 2 (2013): 112-116.
"Agency," Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, in B. Kaldis, ed. Sage, 2013, 11-14.
Author Q & A: Alfred Mele Explains How We Act Against Our Better Judgements, The Philosophers’ Magazine (2013, 1st Quarter) 60: 125-26.
"Free Will," International Encyclopedia of Ethics, H. LaFolette, ed. Blackwell, 2013, 2027-37.
Backsliding” podcast, June, 2012.
"The Case Against the Case Against Free Will." The Chronicle of Higher Education, The Chronical Review, 3-18-2012.
"Premium, Mid-Grade and Regular Free Will Fuel Accountability," Phi Kappa Phi Forum 92. 1 2012, 11-12.
"Chance, Choice, and Freedom," The Philosophers' Magazine (2011, 4th quarter) 55: 61-65.
"Who Makes Our Decisions? Taking Aim at Free Will," podcast with John-Dylan Haynes. Nature, 9-1-2011. Kerri Smith, interviewer.
Chats with Remarkable People Series with Alfred Mele,” Mind, Brain & Body; 6-3-11.
"The Puzzle of Free Will." Voice America Health and Wellness (Internet Talk Radio). 9-17-10.
"Self-Deception," Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig, ed. Routledge, 2010.
"Free Will," The Philosophers' Magazine 50 (2010, 3rd quarter), 86-87.
“Decision/Action, Philosophical Issues About,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science (2010), vol. 1, issue 2, pp. 184-90.
“Freedom of Will,” Encyclopedia of Neuroscience, M. Binder, N. Hirokawa, and U. Windhorst, eds. (Springer, 2009), 1631-34.
“Free Will,” in W. Banks, ed. Encyclopedia of Consciousness (Elsevier, 2009), 265-277.
"Interview," in J. Aguilar and A. Buckareff, eds. Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. (VIP/Automatic Press, 2009), pp. 183-194.
“Action,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Second Edition, D. Borchert, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 2006), vol. 1, pp. 14-22.
“Intention,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Second Edition, D. Borchert, ed. (Macmillan, 2006), vol. 4, pp. 700-704. Reprinted in T. O'Connor and C. Sandis, eds. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell (2010), 108-113.
“Weakness of the Will,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Second Edition, D. Borchert, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 2006), vol. 9, pp. 728-732.
“Agent Causation” (p. 18); “Belief and Desire” (pp. 85-86); “Counterexample, Philosophy By” (p.181); “Moral Motivation” (p. 622); “Practical Syllogism,” (p. 747), and entries from first edition, Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd ed., (Clarendon Press,2005), T. Honderich, ed.
“Rational Irrationality,” The Philosophers' Magazine 26 (2004, 2nd Quarter): 31-32.
“Bad News for Free Will,” New Humanist (Jan. 2004): 24-25.
“Action, Philosophical Issues About,” Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Nature Publishing Group, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 20-23, L. Nadel, ed.
“Free Will and Determinism,” in L. McHenry & T. Yagisawa, eds. Reflections on Philosophy 2nd. ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), pp. 57-79.
Agnostic Autonomism.” 2002. At Ted Honderich, ed. The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website.
“Self-Control” (pp. 1548-51) and “Temperance” (pp. 1693-96; update of 1992 entry), Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2001), L. Becker & C. Becker, eds.
“Accidie” (p. 6), “Control” (p. 184), “Motivation” (pp. 591-92), “Socratic Paradoxes” (p. 861), and “Toxin Puzzle” (pp. 924-25), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), R. Audi, ed.
“The Philosophy of Action: An Interview with Alfred R. Mele,” Cadernos de Filosofia 4 (1998): 53-84.
“Self-Deception,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), vol. 8, pp. 626-629, E. Craig, ed.
“Intentionality,” Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 339-340, P. Werhane & R. Freeman, eds.
Reply to Lee Overton and Michael Smith,” Brown Electronic Article Review Service, J. Dreier & D. Estlund, eds., posted May 13, 1997.
“Action Theory,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement (New York: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 3-4, D. Borchert, ed.
“Basic Action,” A Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 44-46, J. Kim & E. Sosa, eds.
“Acts, Mental” (p. 6), “Attitude” (p. 64), “Deviance, Causal” (p. 197), “Parallelism, Psychophysical” (p. 645), “Ratiocination” (p. 741), “Self-Control” (p. 818), Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), T. Honderich, ed.
Akrasia” (pp. 14-15), “Extrinsic Desire” (p. 259), “Rationalization” (p. 675), “Theoretical Reason” (p. 796), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), R. Audi, ed.
“Temperance,” Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 1238-41; L. Becker & C. Becker, eds.
“Philosophy, a Bus Ride, and Dumb Luck,” in R. Karnos & D. Shoemaker, eds., Falling in Love with Wisdom (New York: Oxford UP, 1993).
Reviews

B. Enç, How We Act (Clarendon Press, 2002), The Times Literary Supplement, forthcoming.
"Responsibility Without Free Will? Review of M. Gazzaniga, Who's in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain (HarperCollins, 2011), BioScience 62 (2012): 313-14.
J. Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology (Columbia University Press, 2007), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2007).
R. Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2003), Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 142-144
J. Adler, Belief's Own Ethics (MIT Press, 2002), Ethics 114 (2003), 156-158.
S. Buss and L. Overton, eds. Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (MIT Press, 2002), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 292-95.
D. Pereboom, Living Without Free Will (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Mind 112 (2003): 375-78.
J. Searle, Rationality in Action (MIT Press, 2001), Mind 111 (2002): 905-909.
R. Audi, The Architecture of Reason (Oxford University Press, 2001), The Times Literary Supplement, Aug. 9, 2002: 24.
M. Bratman, Faces of Intention (Cambridge University Press, 1999), Ethics 111 (2001): 400-403.
A. Barnes, Seeing Through Self-Deception (Cambridge University Press, 1997), Philosophical Psychology 12 (1999): 104-107.
P. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (University of Chicago Press, 1997), Philosophical Books 40 (1999): 49-51.
R. Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 1996), Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998): 581-584.
T. Pink, The Psychology of Freedom (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Mind 107 (1998): 242-246.
B. Berofsky, Liberation from Self (Cambridge University Press, 1995), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 995-996.
K. Lehrer, Self-Trust (Clarendon Press, 1997) and B. Berofsky, Liberation from Self (Cambridge University Press, 1995), The Times Literary Supplement, Jan. 9, 1998: 29.
G. Schueler, Desire (MIT Press, 1995), Minds and Machines 6 (1996): 253-56.
W. Child, Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind (Clarendon Press, 1994), Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 637-39.
“Teleological Behaviorism: A Review of Howard Rachlin’s Behavior and Mind: The Roots of Modern Psychology” (Oxford University Press, 1994), Behavior and Philosophy 23 (1995): 71-73.
R. Audi, Action, Intention, and Reason (Cornell University Press, 1993), Mind 104 (1995): 145-48.
R. Dasenbrock, ed. Literary Theory After Davidson (Penn State University Press, 1993), Philosophy and Literature 18 (1994): 165-67.
J. Segal, Agency and Alienation (Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), Ethics 10 (1993): 410.
R. Dunn, The Possibility of Weakness of Will (Hackett, 1987), Noûs 27 (1993): 384-85.
C. Ginet, On Action (Cambridge, 1990), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 488-91.
D. Walton, Practical Reasoning (Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), Mind 100 (1991): 417-18.
T. Honderich, A Theory of Determinism (Clarendon Press, 1988), Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1990): 85-87.
J. Marks, ed., The Ways of Desire (Precedent, 1986), Noûs 24 (1990): 611-13.
R. DeSousa, The Rationality of Emotion (MIT Press, 1987), Philosophical Books 30 (1989): 39-40.
M. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, 1987), Mind 97 (1988): 632-34.
R. Gordon, The Structure of Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 1987), Philosophical Books 29 (1988): 224-25.
D. Walton, Courage: A Philosophical Investigation (University of California Press, 1986), Philosophy of Religion 23 (1988): 117-18.
D. Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (Cornell University Press, 1984), Noûs 20 (1986): 562-65.
B. Hubbard & E. Karnofsky, Plato’s Protagoras (University of Chicago Press, 1982), Noûs 20 (1986): 269-71.
T. Engberg-Pedersen, Aristotle’s Theory of MoralInsight (Clarendon Press, 1983), Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 273-75.
D. O’Meara, ed., Studies in Aristotle (Catholic University of America Press, 1981), The Thomist 48 (1984): 318-22.
M. Simon, Understanding Human Action: SocialExplanation of the Vision of SocialScience (SUNY Press, 1981), The Thomist 48 (1984): 121-25.
Recent Talks Given Outside North America

"Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Does Either Require the Other?" The Queen's College, Oxford University; March, 2014.
"Synchronic Self-Control," King's College London; March, 2014.
"On a Compatibilist Attempt to Solve a Problem About Luck for Libertarians," University of Manchester; July, 2013.
"Free Will and Neuroscience: What Do Old-School and New-Wave Studies Show?" keynote address, Graduate Student Conference, "Open Minds," University of Manchester; July, 2013.
"Free Will and Neuroscience: What Do Old-School and New-Wave Studies Show?" London School of Economics; June, 2013.
“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Central European University, Budapest; January, 2013.
“Consciousness in Action: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Data, and Inferences,” International Workshop on Cognitive Science, San Sebastian, Spain, November, 2012.
“Autonomy and Beliefs,” Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics, University of Münster, October, 2012.
"Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting," Central European University, Budapest; June, 2012
"Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?" Institute of Philosophy, London; May, 2012.
"Free Will and Neuroscience: Three Techniques and Two Common Problems," University of Padua; May, 2012
"Unconscious Decisions, Conscious Reasoning, and Free Will," Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milano; May, 2012
"Free Will and Neuroscience: Back to the Drawing Board," University College Dublin; November, 2011
"Autonomy, Moral Responsibility, and the Continuation Problem," Ludwig - Maximilians - Universität; Munich; September, 2011.
“A Model of Conscious Deciding.” Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness; Kyoto University; June, 2011.
"Free Will and Neuroscience: Revisiting Libet's Studies." IESE Business School, Barcelona, October, 2010.
"Free Will, Science, and Law." Peking University, Beijing, September, 2010.
"Free Will and Neuroscience." Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, September, 2010.
"Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action." University of Potsdam, July, 2010.
"Is Free Will an Illusion?" Royal Institution of Great Britain, London, September, 2009.
"Weakness of Will and Akrasia," Utrecht University, September, 2009.
“Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge,” Delmenhorst, Germany, June, 2009.
"Vetoing and Awareness," University of Edinburgh, June, 2008.
"Moral Responsibility and Agents' Histories," VU University, Amsterdam, March 2008.
"Moral Responsibility and Agents' Histories," Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, November 2007.
"Fundamental Problems in the Theory of Action," Cargèse School on Consciousness: Consciousness & Action, Cargèse, France, June, 2007.
"Free Will and Neuroscience," University of Cologne, February, 2007
"Free Will and Neuroscience," Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, February, 2007
"Conscious Intentions and 'the Illusion of Conscious Will'," University of Birmingham, January, 2007
"Conscious Intentions," University of Potsdam, September, 2006
“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Oxford, Jowett Philosophical Society, November, 2005
“Reasonology and False Beliefs,” University of Birmingham, November, 2005
“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Birmingham, November, 2005
"Free Will and Neuroscience,” keynote address, Australasian Association of Philosophy, Sydney, Australia, July, 2005.
"Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: Frankfurt-Style Cases Revisited,” University of Trento (Italy), June, 2005.
“Free Will: The Current State of the Debate,” University of Bucharest (Philosophy Dept.), April, 2005.
“Free Will and Luck,” University of Bucharest (Philosophy Dept.) April, 2005.
“Action Theory: Some Puzzles,” University of Bucharest (Law School), April, 2005.
“Action Theory, Free Will, and Neuroscience,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, April, 2005.
“Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience,” University of Siena, March, 2005.
“Self-Deception and Delusion,” Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Sydney, Australia, November, 2004.
“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Helsinki, June, 2004.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University College London, June, 2003.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,”University of Hertfordshire, June, 2003.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University of Dundee, June, 2003.
“Why Are Decisions Intentional?” University of Glasgow, June, 2003.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” University of Edinburgh, June, 2003.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” University of Manchester, June, 2003.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University of Stirling, June, 2003.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” Munich Philosophical Lecture Series: On the Nature and Culture of Volition, Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, February, 2003.
“Autonomy and Akrasia,” University of Helsinki, September, 2002.
“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference, Action and Agency, University of Oxford, September, 2002.
“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, May, 2002.
“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” Bielefeld University, May, 2002.
“Explaining Negative Actions,” International Congress: Causation and Explanation in Natural and Social Sciences,” Ghent University, Belgium, May, 2002.
“Akratics and Addicts,” Tilburg University, Netherlands, May, 2002.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference, Philosophy and the Emotions, Manchester, July, 2001.
“Human Action Par Excellence,” Mind and Action III, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal), May, 2001.
“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2001.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2001.
“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” University of Konstanz, Intentionality Center, May, 2001.
“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of Keele, May, 2001.
“Weakness of Will,” University of Birmingham Law School, May, 2001.
“Free Will,” University of Manchester, May, 2001.
“Human Agency Par Excellence,” Australian National University, November, 2000.
“Humean Compatibilism” (with H. Beebee), Australian National University, November, 2000.
“Disappearing Agents and Master Desires,” University of Manchester, May, 2000.
“Causal Theories of Action and Deviant Causal Chains,” University of Edinburgh, May, 2000.
“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of Glasgow, May, 2000.
“Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of Frankfurt-Style Cases,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.
“Executive States,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.
“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.
“Moral Motivation: Internalism vs. Externalism,” University of Sheffield, February, 2000.
“Deciding,” University of Manchester, February, 2000.
“Self-Deception and Emotion,” University of Stirling, February, 2000.
“Deciding,” University of Durham, February, 2000.
“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” University of Keele, February, 2000.
“Human Agency Par Excellence,” Birkbeck College, University of London, February, 2000.
“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” University of Reading, February, 2000.
“Goal-Directed Action,” University of Auckland, August, 1999.
“Motivational Strength and Control,” University of Otago, August, 1999.
“Motivated Belief Without Agency,” University of Canterbury, August, 1999.
“Goal-Directed Action,” Monash University, August, 1999.
“Weakness of Will,” LaTrobe University, August, 1999.
“Motivated Belief Without Agency,” University of Western Australia, August 1999.
“Self-Deception and Emotion,” Australian National University, August, 1999.
“Goal-Directed Action,” Australian National University, August, 1999.
“Weakness of Will,” Australian National University, July, 1999.
“Practical Irrationality: Two Kinds of Akratic Action,” Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal), July, 1998.
“Ultimate Responsibility,” Uppsala University (Sweden), May, 1998.
“Motivated Belief and Agency,” University of Helsinki, May, 1998.
“Freedom and Alternative Possibilities,” University of Helsinki, May, 1998.
“Addiction and Self-Control,” Oslo, Norway, May, 1995.
Back to Alfred Mele’s Homepage