"Free Will and Neuroscience." Philosophic Exchange (forthcoming).
A. Mele and J. Shepherd, "Situationism and Agency," Journal of Practical Ethics (forthcoming).
“Libet and the Timing of the Will,” in J. Clausen and N. Levy, eds. Handbook of Neuroethics, Springer (forthcoming).
“Kane, Luck, and Control,” in D. Palmer, ed. Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
"Unconscious Decisions and Free Will," Philosophical Psychology, forthcoming.
"Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?" in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Free Will and Responsibility. MIT Press (forthcoming).
“The Single Phenomenon View and Experimental Philosophy,” in M. Vargas and G. Yaffe, eds. Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
“Libertarianism and Human Agency,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
“Actions, Explanations, and Causes,” in G. D’Oro, ed. Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Non-causalism in the Philosophy of Action, Palgrave Macmillan (forthcoming).
"Free Will, Science, and Punishment," in T. Nadelhoffer, ed. The Future of Punishment, Oxford University Press (2013), 177-191.
"Vetoing and Consciousness," in T. Vierkant, J. Kiverstein, and A. Clark, eds. Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press (2013), 73-86.
“Moral Responsibility and the Continuation Problem,” Philosophical Studies 162 (2013): 237-255.
"Free Will and Neuroscience: Revisiting Libet's Studies," in A. Suarez and P. Adams, eds. Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Springer (2013): 195-207.
“Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action,” Philosophical Issues 22 (2012): 281-297.
"Intentional, Unintentional, or Neither? Middle Ground in Theory and Practice," American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2012): 369-379.
"Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding," Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (2012): 387-398.
“Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?” Monist 95 (2012): 422-440.
“Consciousness in Action: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Data, and Inferences,” in J. Larrazabal, ed. Cognition, Reasoning, Emotion, and Action. University of the Basque Country Press (2012), 87-98.
"Autonomy and Neuroscience," in L. Radoilska, ed. Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press (2012), 26-43.
“When Are We Self-Deceived?” Humana Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2012): 1-15.
"“Autonomie, moralische Verantwortung und das Fortsetzungsproblem” (“Autonomy, Moral Responsibility, and the Continuation Problem”), in J. Nida-Rümelin and E. Özmen, eds. Welt der Gründe. Felix Meiner Verlag (2012), 156-178.
"Moral Psychology," in C. Miller, ed. The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum (2011), 98-118.
"Free Will and Science," in R. Kane, ed. Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press (2011), 499-514.
T. Stillman, R. Baumeister, and A. Mele, "Free Will in Everyday Life: Autobiographical Accounts of Free and Unfree Actions," Philosophical Psychology (2011): 381-394.
"Surrounding Free Will: A Response to Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist," Neuroethics 4: (2011): 25-29.
"Self-Control in Action," in S. Gallagher, ed. Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 465-486.
"Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness," in W. Sinnott-Armstrong and L. Nadel, eds. Conscious Will and Responsibility. Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 23-33.
"Approaching Self-Deception: How Robert Audi and I Part Company." Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010): 745-750.
"Teleological Explanations of Actions: Anticausalism vs. Causalism," in J. Aguilar and A. Buckareff, eds. Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. MIT Press (2010), pp. 183-198.
"Scientific Skepticism about Free Will," in T. Nadelhoffer, E. Nahmias, and S. Nichols, eds. Moral Psychology: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Blackwell (2010), pp. 295-305.
"Conscious Intentions," in J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and H. Silverstein, eds. Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press (2010), pp. 85-107.
"Weakness of Will and Akrasia" Philosophical Studies 150 (2010): 391-404.
"Moral Responsibility for Actions: Epistemic and Freedom Conditions,"Philosophical Explorations 13 (2010): 101-111.
"Testing Free Will," Neuroethics 3 (2010): 161-172.
"Conscious Deciding and the Science of Free Will," in R. Baumeister, A. Mele, and K. Vohs, eds. Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? Oxford University Press (2010), pp. 43-65.
"Motivational Strength," in T. O'Connor and C. Sandis, eds. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell (2010), pp. 259-266.
A. Mele, K. Vohs, and R. Baumeister, "Free Will and Consciousness: An Introduction and Overview of Perspectives," in R. Baumeister, A. Mele, and K. Vohs, eds. Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? Oxford University Press (2010), pp. 1-7.
“Causation, Action, and Free Will,” in H. Beebee, C.
Hitchcock, and P. Menzies, eds. Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford
University Press (2009), pp. 554-574.
"Moral Responsibility and History Revisited" Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2009) 12: 463-475.
"Mental Action: A Case Study," in L. O'Brien and M. Soteriou, eds. Mental Actions and Agency Oxford: Clarendon Press (2009), pp. 17-37.
"Delusional Confabulations and Self-Deception," in W. Hirstein, ed. Confabulation: Views from Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology, and Philosophy. Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 139-157.
"Have I Unmasked Self-Deception or Am I Self-Deceived?," in C. Martin, ed. The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 260-276.
"Action and Mind," in P. Calvo and J. Symons, eds. Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge (2009) pp. 609-620.
"Moral Responsibility and Agents' Histories," Philosophical Studies (2009) 142: 161-181.
“Intention and Intentional Action,” in B. McLaughlin and A.
Beckermann, eds. Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University
Press, (2009), pp. 691-710.
"Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility" Journal of Ethics (2008) 12: 263-286.
F. Cushman and A. Mele, "Intentional Action: Two-and-a-half Folk Concepts," in J. Knobe and S. Nichols, eds. Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press (2008), pp. 171-188.
"Recent Work on Free Will and Science," American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2008): 107-129.
"Proximal Intentions, Intention-Reports, and Vetoing," Philosophical Psychology 21 (2008): 1-14.
“A Libertarian View of Akratic Action,” Studies in
Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 49 (2008): 252-275.
"Psychology and Free Will: a Commentary," in J. Baer, J.C. Kaufman, and R. Baumeister, eds. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2008), 325-346.
"Persisting Intentions," Noûs 41 (2007): 735-757.
A. Mele and F. Cushman, "Intentional Action, Folk Judgments, and Stories: Sorting Things Out." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (2007): 184-201.
“Self-Deception and Three Psychiatric Delusions: On Robert Audi's Transition from Self-Deception to Delusion,” in M.Timmons, J. Greco, & A. Mele, eds. Rationality and the Good (Oxford University Press, 2007), 163-175.
"Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics," Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 195-210.
"Free Will and Luck: Précis," Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 153-155.
"Reasonology and False Beliefs," Philosophical Papers 36 (2007): 91-118.
"Self-Deception and Hypothesis Testing," in M. Marraffa, M. De Caro, and F. Ferreti, eds. Cartographies of the Mind (Kluwer, 2007), 159-167.
"Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: Frankfurt-style Cases Revisited," in F. Castellani and J. Quitterer, eds. Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences (Mentis Verlag, 2007), 125-140.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” in J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and D. Shier, eds. Explanation and Causation: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy (MIT Press, 2007), 241-263.
"Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience," in C. Lumer, ed. Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy (Ashgate, 2007), 257-272.
“Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility,” Journal of
Ethics 10 (2006): 283-294.
"Practical Mistakes and Intentional Actions," American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2006): 249-260.
“Free Will: Theories, Analysis, and Data,” in S.Pockett, W. Banks, and S. Gallagher, eds. Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition (MIT Press, 2006), 187-205.
“The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: A Commentary,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (2006): 277-290.
"Self-Deception and Delusions," European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2006): 109-124. Also in J. Fernandez and T. Bayne, eds. Delusions, Self-Deception, and Affective Influences on Belief-Formation (Psychology Press, forthcoming).
“Action,” in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds. Oxford
Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2005), 334-57.
“Motivation and Agency: Reply to Davis, Ginet, and Roth,”
Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 295-311.
“Motivation and Agency: Précis,” Philosophical
Studies 123 (2005): 243-247.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 395-421.
“Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will,” Midwest Studies
in Philosophy 24 (2005): 146-162.
“A Critique of Pereboom’s ‘Four-Case Argument’ for
Incompatibilism,” Analysis (2005) 65: 75-80.
“Dennett on Freedom,”
Metaphilosophy (2005): 36:
414-426.
“Agnostic Autonomism Revisited,” in J. Taylor, ed.
Personal Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 109-123.
“Acçao humana par excellence (“Human Agency Par
Excellence” in F. Mao de Ferro, ed. A explicaçao da interpretaçao humana
(Lisbon: Ediçoes Colibri, 2005).
J. Gert and A. Mele, “Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An Interplanetary
Exploration.” Philosophia, 32 (2005): 275-283.
“The Illusion of Conscious Will and the Causation of Intentional Actions,” Philosophical Topics 32 (2004): 193-213.
“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” in J. Hyman and H. Steward
eds. Agency and Action (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 217-241.
“Action: Volitional Disorder and Addiction,” in J. Radden,
ed. The Philosophy of Psychiatry (Oxford University Press, 2004), 78-88.
“Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and
Self-Control,” in P. Baumann and M. Betzler, eds. Practical Conflicts
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), 262-78.
“Motivated Irrationality,” in A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds.
The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004),
240-256.
A. Mele and P. Rawling, “Introduction: Aspects of Rationality,” in
A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford
University Press, 2004), 3-13.
“Velleman on Action and Agency,” Philosophical
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“Agents’ Abilities,” Noûs 37 (2003): 447-470.
“Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core
Hypotheses,” Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003): 325-340.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” in A. Hatzimoysis,
ed. Philosophy and the Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 2003),
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“Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom,” in D.
Widerker and M. McKenna, eds. Moral Responsibility and Alternative
Possibilities (Ashgate, 2003), 251-264.
“Chisholm on Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2003) 34:
630-648.
“Intending and Trying: Tuomela vs. Bratman at the Video
Arcade,” in M. Sintonen, P. Ylikoski, and K. Miller, eds., Realism in
Action, (Kluwer, 2003), 129-135.
“Philosophy of Action,” in K. Ludwig, ed. Donald
Davidson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 64-84.
A. Mele and D. Robb, “BBs, Magnets and Seesaws: The Metaphysics of
Frankfurt-Style Cases,” in D. Widerker and M. McKenna, eds.
Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Ashgate, 2003),
127-138.
“Akratics and Addicts,” American Philosophical
Quarterly 39 (2002): 153-167.
“Autonomy and Akrasia,” Philosophical Explorations, 3
(2002): 207-216.
H. Beebee and A. Mele, “Humean Compatibilism.” Mind, 111
(2002): 201-223.
“Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will,” in R. Kane
ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002), pp. 529-548.
“Reply to Commentators,” Florida Philosophical Review
2 (2002): 98-101.
“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” in B. Malle,
L. Moses, and D. Baldwin, eds. Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of
Social Cognition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 27-43.
“Goal-Directed Action: Teleological Explanations, Causal
Theories, and Deviance,” Philosophical Perspectives, 14 (2000): 279-300.
“Deciding to Act,” Philosophical Studies 100 (2000):
81-108.
“Self-Deception and Emotion,” Consciousness and
Emotion 1 (2000): 115-139.
“Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 447-452.
“Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of
Frankfurt-Style Cases,” in M. Betzler and B. Guckes, eds., Autonomes
Handeln (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), pp. 25-38.
“Twisted Self-Deception,” Philosophical Psychology 12
(1999): 117-137.
“Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck,” Social
Philosophy & Policy 16 (1999): 274-293. Reprinted in E. Paul, F. Miller,
and J. Paul, eds. Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999).
“Motivation, Self-Control, and the Agglomeration of
Desires,” Facta Philosophica 1 (1999): 77-86.
“Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will,”
Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999): 96-104.
“Is There a Place for Intention in an Analysis of
Intentional Action?” Philosophia 27 (1999): 419-432.
“Autoinganno e Controllo Delle Ipotesi” (Self-Deception and
Hypothesis Testing; translated by Massimo Marraffa), Sistemi Intelligenti
11 (1999): 503-519.
“L’autoinganno Deflazionato: Risposte a Bermudez e Graham”
(Deflated Self-Deception: Reply to Bermudez and Graham; translated by Massimo
Marraffa), Sistemi Intelligenti 11 (1999): 541-545.
“Motivational Strength,” Noûs 32 (1998): 23-36.
“Noninstrumental Rationalizing,” Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 79 (1998): 236-250.
“Motivated Belief and Agency,” Philosophical
Psychology 11 (1998): 353-369.
“Synchronic Self-Control Revisited: Frog and Toad Shape Up,”
Analysis 58 (1998): 305-310.
“Flickers of Freedom,” Journal of Social Philosophy
29 (1998): 144-156.
“Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception,” in J. Dupuy, ed.,
Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality (Stanford: CSLI
Publications, 1998), pp. 37-58.
“Practical Irrationality: Two Kinds of Akratic Action,”
Cadernos de Filosofia 4 (1998): 9-37.
“Probing Akrasia: Reply to Ricardo Santos,” Cadernos de
Filosofia 4 (1998): 45-49.
A. Mele and D. Robb, “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases.” Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 97-112. Reprinted in L. Ekstrom, ed.
Agency and Responsibility (Boulder: Westview, 2001).
“Real Self-Deception,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences
20 (1997): 91-102.
“Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception” (response
to commentaries), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1997): 127-134.
“Strength of Motivation and Being in Control: Learning from
Libet,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 319-332.
“Agency and Mental Action,” Philosophical
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“Passive Action,” in G. Holmström-Hintikka and R. Tuomela,
eds., Contemporary Action Theory, vol. 1 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), pp.
135-143.
“Underestimating Self-Control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and
Toad,” Analysis 57 (1997): 119-123.
“Introduction,” in A. Mele, ed., The Philosophy of
Action (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 1-26.
P. Livingston and A. Mele, “Evaluating Emotional Responses to Fiction,” in M. Hjort and S. Laver, eds., Emotion and the Arts (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 157-176.
“Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness,”
Ethics 106 (1996): 727-753.
“Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios,”
Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 123-141.
“Socratic Akratic Action,” Philosophical Papers 25
(1996): 149-159.
“Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle,” Proto
Sociology 8/9 (1996): 39-52 (special issue on rationality). Reprinted in G.
Preyer and G. Peter, eds. The Contextualization of Rationality (Mentis:
Paderborn, 2000).
“Addiction and Self-Control,” Behavior and Philosophy
24 (1996): 99-117.
“Motivation and Intention,” Journal of Philosophical
Research 21 (1996): 51-67.
A. Mele and S. Sverdlik, “Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies (1996) 82: 265-287.
“Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes,”
Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 387-423.
“Effective Deliberation About What to Intend: Or Striking it
Rich in a Toxin-Free Environment,” Philosophical Studies 79 (1995):
85-93.
“Conceptualizing Self-Control,” Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 18 (1995): 136-137.
“Self-Control and Belief,” Philosophical Psychology 7
(1994): 419-435.
“Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams,” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 24 (1994): 627-636.
A. Mele and P. Moser, “Intentional Action.” Noûs 28 (1994):
39-68. Reprinted in A. Mele, ed., The Philosophy of Action (Oxford
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“Justifying Intentions,” Mind 102 (1993): 335-337.
“History and Personal Autonomy,” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 23 (1993): 271-280.
“Motivated Belief,” Behavior and Philosophy 21
(1993): 19-27.
“Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires,
and Intentions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 61.
“Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires,”
Noûs 26 (1992): 281-302.
“Intending for Reasons,” Mind 101 (1992): 327-333.
“Intentions, Reasons, and Beliefs: Morals of the Toxin
Puzzle,” Philosophical Studies 68 (1992): 171-194.
“Recent Work on Intentional Action,” American
Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1992): 199-217.
“Acting for Reasons and Acting Intentionally,” Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1992): 355-374.
F. Adams and A. Mele, “The Intention/Volition Debate.” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 323-338.
A. Mele and P. Livingston, “Intentions and Interpretations.”
MLN 107 (1992): 931-949.
P. Livingston and A. Mele, “Intention and Literature.” Stanford
French Review 16 (1992): 173-196.
“He Wants to Try Again: A Rejoinder,” Analysis 51
(1991): 225-228.
“Akratic Action and the Practical Role of Better Judgment,”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991): 33-47.
“Incontinent Belief: A Rejoinder,” Journal of
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“Dretske’s Intricate Behavior,” Philosophical Papers
20 (1991): 1-10.
“Motivational Ties,” Journal of Philosophical
Research 16 (1991): 431-442. (Proceedings of conference honoring the memory
of Mark Overvold).
J. Heil and A. Mele, “Mental Causes.” American Philosophical
Quarterly 28 (1991): 49-59.
“Irresistible Desires,” Noûs 24 (1990): 455-472.
“Exciting Intentions,” Philosophical Studies 59
(1990): 289-312.
“He Wants to Try,” Analysis 50 (1990): 251-253.
“Intending and Motivation: A Rejoinder,” Analysis 50
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“Errant Self-Control and the Self-Controlled Person,”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1990): 47-59.
“Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action,” American
Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989): 19-30.
“She Intends to Try,” Philosophical Studies 55
(1989): 101-106.
“Intentions by Default,” Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 70 (1989): 155-166.
“Akratic Feelings,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 50 (1989): 277-288.
“Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of
Practical Reasoning,” Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-436.
Reprinted in R. J. Wallace, ed. Reason, Emotion, and
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F. Adams and A. Mele, “The Role of Intention in Intentional Action.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1989): 511-531.
“Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1988): 723-731.
“Against a Belief/Desire Analysis of Intention,”
Philosophia 18 (1988): 239-242.
“Self-Deception and Akratic Belief: A Rejoinder,”
Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988): 203-208.
“Irrationality: A Précis,” Philosophical
Psychology 1 (1988): 173-177.
A. Mele and M. Smith, “The New Paradox of the Stone.” Faith and
Philosophy 5 (1988): 283-290.
“Recent Work on Self-Deception,” American Philosophical
Quarterly 24 (1987): 1-17.
“Are Intentions Self-Referential?” Philosophical
Studies 52 (1987): 309-329.
“Intentional Action and Wayward Causal Chains: The Problem
of Tertiary Waywardness,” Philosophical Studies 51 (1987): 55-60.
“Incontinent Believing,” Philosophical
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al., eds., Mind, Causation, and Action (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1986), pp. 102-112.
“Is Akratic Action Unfree?” Philosophy and
PhenomenologicalResearch 46 (1986): 673-679.
(Review article) “Self-Deception and Akrasia: A
Review of David Pears’s Motivated Irrationality,” Behaviorism 14
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“Self-Control, Action, and Belief,” American
PhilosophicalQuarterly 22 (1985): 169-175.
“Aristotle on Akrasia, Eudaimonia, and the
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“How to Represent Aristotelian Deliberation
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“Aristotle on the Roles of Reason in Motivation and
Justification,” Archiv für Geschichte der
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“Aristotle’s Wish,” Journal of the
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“Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action,”
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Vol. X
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“Intending and the Balance of Motivation,” Pacific
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“Pears on Akrasia, and Defeated Intentions,”
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“Akrasia, Reasons, and Causes,” Philosophical
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“Self-Deception,” Philosophical Quarterly 33
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“Aristotle on the Justification of Ends,” Proceedings
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“Self-Deception, Action, and Will: Comments,”
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“Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,”
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“The Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle’s
Causal Theory of Action,” The New Scholasticism 55 (1981):
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“Aristotle on Akrasia and Knowledge,” The
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“On ‘Happiness and the Good Life’,” Southwestern
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Author Q & A: Alfred Mele Explains How We Act Against Our Better Judgements, The Philosophers’ Magazine (2013, 1st Quarter) 60: 125-26.
"Free Will," International Encyclopedia of Ethics, H. LaFolette, ed. Blackwell, 2013, 2027-37.
"The Case Against the Case Against Free Will."
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"Chance, Choice, and Freedom," The Philosophers' Magazine (2011, 4th quarter) 55: 61-65.
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“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Central European University, Budapest; January, 2013.
“Consciousness in Action: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Data, and Inferences,” International Workshop on Cognitive Science, San Sebastian, Spain, November, 2012.
“Autonomy and Beliefs,” Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics, University of Münster, October, 2012.
"Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting," Central European University, Budapest; June, 2012
"Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?" Institute of Philosophy, London; May, 2012.
"Free Will and Neuroscience: Three Techniques and Two Common Problems," University of Padua; May, 2012
"Unconscious Decisions, Conscious Reasoning, and Free Will," Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milano; May, 2012
"Free Will and Neuroscience: Back to the Drawing Board," University College Dublin; November, 2011
"Autonomy, Moral Responsibility, and the Continuation Problem," Ludwig - Maximilians - Universität; Munich; September, 2011.
“A Model of Conscious Deciding.” Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness; Kyoto University; June, 2011.
"Free Will, Science, and Law." Peking University, Beijing, September, 2010.
"Free Will and Neuroscience." Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, September, 2010.
"Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action." University of Potsdam, July, 2010.
"Is Free Will an Illusion?" Royal Institution of Great Britain, London, September, 2009.
"Weakness of Will and Akrasia," Utrecht University, September, 2009.
“Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge,” Delmenhorst, Germany, June, 2009.
"Vetoing and Awareness," University of Edinburgh, June, 2008.
"Moral Responsibility and Agents' Histories," VU University, Amsterdam, March 2008.
"Moral Responsibility and Agents' Histories," Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, November 2007.
"Fundamental Problems in the Theory of Action," Cargèse School on Consciousness: Consciousness & Action, Cargèse, France, June, 2007.
"Free Will and Neuroscience," University of Cologne, February, 2007
"Free Will and Neuroscience," Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, February, 2007
"Conscious Intentions and 'the Illusion of Conscious Will'," University of Birmingham, January, 2007
"Conscious Intentions," University of Potsdam, September, 2006
“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Oxford, Jowett
Philosophical Society, November, 2005
“Reasonology and False Beliefs,” University of Birmingham,
November, 2005
“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Birmingham,
November, 2005
"Free Will and Neuroscience,” keynote address, Australasian
Association of Philosophy, Sydney, Australia, July, 2005.
"Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative
Possibilities: Frankfurt-Style Cases Revisited,” University of Trento (Italy),
June, 2005.
“Free Will: The Current State of the Debate,” University of
Bucharest (Philosophy Dept.), April, 2005.
“Free Will and Luck,” University of Bucharest (Philosophy
Dept.) April, 2005.
“Action Theory: Some Puzzles,” University of Bucharest (Law
School), April, 2005.
“Action Theory, Free Will, and Neuroscience,” University of
Zurich, Ethics Center, April, 2005.
“Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience,” University of
Siena, March, 2005.
“Self-Deception and Delusion,” Macquarie Centre for
Cognitive Science, Sydney, Australia, November, 2004.
“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Helsinki, June,
2004.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University College
London, June, 2003.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,”University of
Hertfordshire, June, 2003.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University of Dundee,
June, 2003.
“Why Are Decisions Intentional?” University of Glasgow,
June, 2003.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has
Not Shown What He Says He Has,” University of Edinburgh, June, 2003.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has
Not Shown What He Says He Has,” University of Manchester, June, 2003.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University of Stirling,
June, 2003.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has
Not Shown What He Says He Has,” Munich Philosophical Lecture Series: On the
Nature and Culture of Volition, Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research,
February, 2003.
“Autonomy and Akrasia,” University of Helsinki, September,
2002.
“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” Royal Institute of
Philosophy Conference, Action and Agency, University of Oxford, September, 2002.
“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” Jean Nicod Institute,
Paris, May, 2002.
“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” Bielefeld
University, May, 2002.
“Explaining Negative Actions,” International Congress:
Causation and Explanation in Natural and Social Sciences,” Ghent University,
Belgium, May, 2002.
“Akratics and Addicts,” Tilburg University, Netherlands,
May, 2002.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” Royal Institute of
Philosophy Conference, Philosophy and the Emotions, Manchester, July, 2001.
“Human Action Par Excellence,” Mind and Action III,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal), May, 2001.
“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of
Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2001.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” University of
Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2001.
“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” University of
Konstanz, Intentionality Center, May, 2001.
“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of
Keele, May, 2001.
“Weakness of Will,” University of Birmingham Law School,
May, 2001.
“Free Will,” University of Manchester, May, 2001.
“Human Agency Par Excellence,” Australian National
University, November, 2000.
“Humean Compatibilism” (with H. Beebee), Australian National
University, November, 2000.
“Disappearing Agents and Master Desires,” University of
Manchester, May, 2000.
“Causal Theories of Action and Deviant Causal Chains,”
University of Edinburgh, May, 2000.
“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of
Glasgow, May, 2000.
“Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of
Frankfurt-Style Cases,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.
“Executive States,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center,
May, 2000.
“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” University of
Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.
“Moral Motivation: Internalism vs. Externalism,” University
of Sheffield, February, 2000.
“Deciding,” University of Manchester, February, 2000.
“Self-Deception and Emotion,” University of Stirling,
February, 2000.
“Deciding,” University of Durham, February, 2000.
“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” University
of Keele, February, 2000.
“Human Agency Par Excellence,” Birkbeck College, University
of London, February, 2000.
“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” University
of Reading, February, 2000.
“Goal-Directed Action,” University of Auckland, August,
1999.
“Motivational Strength and Control,” University of Otago,
August, 1999.
“Motivated Belief Without Agency,” University of Canterbury,
August, 1999.
“Goal-Directed Action,” Monash University, August, 1999.
“Weakness of Will,” LaTrobe University, August, 1999.
“Motivated Belief Without Agency,” University of Western
Australia, August 1999.
“Self-Deception and Emotion,” Australian National
University, August, 1999.
“Goal-Directed Action,” Australian National University,
August, 1999.
“Weakness of Will,” Australian National University, July,
1999.
“Practical Irrationality: Two Kinds of Akratic Action,”
Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal), July, 1998.
“Ultimate Responsibility,” Uppsala University (Sweden), May,
1998.
“Motivated Belief and Agency,” University of Helsinki, May,
1998.
“Freedom and Alternative Possibilities,” University of
Helsinki, May, 1998.
“Addiction and Self-Control,” Oslo, Norway, May, 1995.