Alfred Mele’s Publications

last update: 10-19-05

Books

Author:
Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Motivation and Agency. Oxford University Press, 2003.
Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press, 2001.
Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press, 1995.
Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. Oxford University Press, 1992.
Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press, 1987.
Editor:
The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (co-edited with J. P. Rawling). Oxford University Press, 2004.
The Philosophy of Action (Oxford Readings in Philosophy series; Oxford University Press), 1997.
Mental Causation (co-edited with J. Heil). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Articles

“Causation, Action, and Free Will,” in H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies, eds. Oxford Handbook of Causation (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
“Free Will: Theories, Analysis, and Data,” in W. Banks, S. Pockett, and S. Gallagher, eds. Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition. MIT Press, forthcoming.
“Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Ethics, forthcoming.
“Intention and Intentional Action,” in B. McLaughlin and A. Beckermann, eds. Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” in J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and D. Shier, eds. Explanation and Causation: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy (MIT Press, forthcoming).
“Philosophy of Action,” in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds. Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
“Motivation and Agency: Reply to Davis, Ginet, and Roth,” Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 295-311.
“Motivation and Agency: Précis,” Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 243-247.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 395-421.
“Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (2005): 146-162.
“A Critique of Pereboom’s ‘Four-Case Argument’ for Incompatibilism,” Analysis (2005) 65: 75-80.
“Dennett on Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2005): 36: 414-426.
“Agnostic Autonomism Revisited,” in J. Taylor, ed. Personal Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 109-123.
“Acçao humana par excellence ("Human Agency Par Excellence” in F. Mao de Ferro, ed. A explicaçao da interpretaçao humana (Lisbon: Ediçoes Colibri, 2005).
“Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An Interplanetary Exploration” (with J. Gert) Philosophia, 32 (2005): 275-283.
“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” Philosophy, forthcoming. Reprinted in J. Hyman and H. Steward eds. Agency and Action (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 217-241.
“Action: Volitional Disorder and Addiction,” in J. Radden, ed. The Philosophy of Psychiatry (Oxford University Press, 2004), 78-88.
“Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and Self-Control,” in P. Baumann and M. Betzler, eds. Practical Conflicts (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 262-78.
“Motivated Irrationality,” in A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004), 240-256.
“Introduction: Aspects of Rationality” (with P. Rawling), in A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004), 3-13.
“Velleman on Action and Agency,” Philosophical Studies (2004) 121: 249-61.
“Agents’ Abilities,” Noûs 37 (2003): 447-470.
“Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses,” Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003): 325-340.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” in A. Hatzimoysis, ed. Philosophy and the Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 163-179.
“Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom,” in D. Widerker and M. McKenna, eds. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Ashgate, 2003), 251-264.
“Chisholm on Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2003) 34: 630-648.
“Intending and Trying: Tuomela vs. Bratman at the Video Arcade,” in M. Sintonen, P. Ylikoski, and K. Miller, eds., Realism in Action, (Kluwer, 2003), 129-135.
Philosophy of Action,” in K. Ludwig, ed. Donald Davidson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 64-84.
“BBs, Magnets and Seesaws: The Metaphysics of Frankfurt-Style Cases” (with D. Robb), in D. Widerker and M. McKenna, eds. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Ashgate, 2003), 127-138.
“Akratics and Addicts,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002): 153-167.
“Autonomy and Akrasia,” Philosophical Explorations, 3 (2002): 207-216.
“Humean Compatibilism” (with H. Beebee), Mind, 111 (2002): 201-223.
“Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will,” in R. Kane ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 529-548.
“Reply to Commentators,” Florida Philosophical Review 2 (2002): 98-101.
“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” in B. Malle, L. Moses, and D. Baldwin, eds. Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 27-43.
“Goal-Directed Action: Teleological Explanations, Causal Theories, and Deviance,” Philosophical Perspectives, 14 (2000): 279-300.
“Deciding to Act,” Philosophical Studies 100 (2000): 81-108.
“Self-Deception and Emotion,” Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2000): 115-139.
“Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 447-452.
“Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of Frankfurt-Style Cases,” in M. Betzler and B. Guckes, eds., Autonomes Handeln (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), pp. 25-38.
“Twisted Self-Deception,” Philosophical Psychology 12 (1999): 117-137.
“Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck,” Social Philosophy & Policy 16 (1999): 274-293. Reprinted in E. Paul, F. Miller, and J. Paul, eds. Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
“Motivation, Self-Control, and the Agglomeration of Desires,” Facta Philosophica 1 (1999): 77-86.
“Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will,” Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999): 96-104.
“Is There a Place for Intention in an Analysis of Intentional Action?” Philosophia 27 (1999): 419-432.
“Autoinganno e Controllo Delle Ipotesi” (Self-Deception and Hypothesis Testing; translated by Massimo Marraffa), Sistemi Intelligenti 11 (1999): 503-519.
“L’autoinganno Deflazionato: Risposte a Bermudez e Graham” (Deflated Self-Deception: Reply to Bermudez and Graham; translated by Massimo Marraffa), Sistemi Intelligenti 11 (1999): 541-545.
“Motivational Strength,” Noûs 32 (1998): 23-36.
“Noninstrumental Rationalizing,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998): 236-250.
“Motivated Belief and Agency,” Philosophical Psychology 11 (1998): 353-369.
“Synchronic Self-Control Revisited: Frog and Toad Shape Up,” Analysis 58 (1998): 305-310.
“Flickers of Freedom,” Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1998): 144-156.
“Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception,” in J. Dupuy, ed., Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1998), pp. 37-58.
“Practical Irrationality: Two Kinds of Akratic Action,” Cadernos de Filosofia 4 (1998): 9-37.
“Probing Akrasia: Reply to Ricardo Santos,” Cadernos de Filosofia 4 (1998): 45-49.
“Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases” (with D. Robb), Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 97-112. Reprinted in L. Ekstrom, ed. Agency and Responsibility (Boulder: Westview, 2001).
“Real Self-Deception,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1997): 91-102.
“Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception” (response to commentaries), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1997): 127-134.
“Strength of Motivation and Being in Control: Learning from Libet,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 319-332.
“Agency and Mental Action,” Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997): 231-249.
“Passive Action,” in G. Holmström-Hintikka and R. Tuomela, eds., Contemporary Action Theory, vol. 1 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), pp. 135-143.
“Underestimating Self-Control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad,” Analysis 57 (1997): 119-123.
“Introduction,” in A. Mele, ed., The Philosophy of Action (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 1-26.
“Evaluating Emotional Responses to Fiction” (with P. Livingston), in M. Hjort and S. Laver, eds., Emotion and the Arts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 157-176.
“Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness,” Ethics 106 (1996): 727-753.
“Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios,” Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 123-141.
“Socratic Akratic Action,” Philosophical Papers 25 (1996): 149-159.
“Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle,” Proto Sociology 8/9 (1996): 39-52 (special issue on rationality). Reprinted in G. Preyer and G. Peter, eds. The Contextualization of Rationality (Mentis: Paderborn, 2000).
“Addiction and Self-Control,” Behavior and Philosophy 24 (1996): 99-117.
“Motivation and Intention,” Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (1996): 51-67.
“Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility” (with S. Sverdlik), Philosophical Studies (1996) 82: 265-287.
“Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes,” Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 387-423.
“Effective Deliberation About What to Intend: Or Striking it Rich in a Toxin-Free Environment,” Philosophical Studies 79 (1995): 85-93.
“Conceptualizing Self-Control,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1995): 136-137.
“Self-Control and Belief,” Philosophical Psychology 7 (1994): 419-435.
“Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1994): 627-636.
“Intentional Action” (with P. Moser), Noûs 28 (1994): 39-68. Reprinted in A. Mele, ed., The Philosophy of Action (Oxford University Press, 1997).
“Justifying Intentions,” Mind 102 (1993): 335-337.
“History and Personal Autonomy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (1993): 271-280.
“Motivated Belief,” Behavior and Philosophy 21 (1993): 19-27.
“Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 61.
Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires,” Noûs 26 (1992): 281-302.
“Intending for Reasons,” Mind 101 (1992): 327-333.
“Intentions, Reasons, and Beliefs: Morals of the Toxin Puzzle,” Philosophical Studies 68 (1992): 171-194.
“Recent Work on Intentional Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1992): 199-217.
“Acting for Reasons and Acting Intentionally,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1992): 355-374.
“The Intention/Volition Debate” (with F. Adams), Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 323-338.
“Intentions and Interpretations” (with P. Livingston), MLN 107 (1992): 931-949.
“Intention and Literature” (with P. Livingston), Stanford French Review 16 (1992): 173-196.
“He Wants to Try Again: A Rejoinder,” Analysis 51 (1991): 225-228.
“Akratic Action and the Practical Role of Better Judgment,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991): 33-47.
“Incontinent Belief: A Rejoinder,” Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991): 197-212.
“Dretske’s Intricate Behavior,” Philosophical Papers 20 (1991): 1-10.
“Motivational Ties,” Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991): 431-442. (Proceedings of conference honoring the memory of Mark Overvold).
“Mental Causes” (with J. Heil), American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991): 49-59.
“Irresistible Desires,” Noûs 24 (1990): 455-472.
“Exciting Intentions,” Philosophical Studies 59 (1990): 289-312.
“He Wants to Try,” Analysis 50 (1990): 251-253.
“Intending and Motivation: A Rejoinder,” Analysis 50 (1990): 194-197.
“Errant Self-Control and the Self-Controlled Person,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1990): 47-59.
“Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989): 19-30.
“She Intends to Try,” Philosophical Studies 55 (1989): 101-106.
“Intentions by Default,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989): 155-166.
“Akratic Feelings,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1989): 277-288.
“Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning,” Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-436.
Reprinted in R. J. Wallace, ed. Reason, Emotion, and Will (Ashgate, 1999).
“The Role of Intention in Intentional Action” (with F. Adams), Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1989): 511-531.
“Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1988): 723-731.
“Against a Belief/Desire Analysis of Intention,” Philosophia 18 (1988): 239-242.
“Self-Deception and Akratic Belief: A Rejoinder,” Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988): 203-208.
Irrationality: A Précis,” Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988): 173-177.
“The New Paradox of the Stone” (with M. Smith), Faith and Philosophy 5 (1988): 283-290.
“Recent Work on Self-Deception,” American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 1-17.
“Are Intentions Self-Referential?” Philosophical Studies 52 (1987): 309-329.
“Intentional Action and Wayward Causal Chains: The Problem of Tertiary Waywardness,” Philosophical Studies 51 (1987): 55-60.
“Incontinent Believing,” Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 212-222. Reprinted in L. Stevenson et al., eds., Mind, Causation, and Action (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 102-112.
“Is Akratic Action Unfree?” Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 46 (1986): 673-679.
(Review article) “Self-Deception and Akrasia: A Review of David Pears’s Motivated Irrationality,” Behaviorism 14 (1986): 183-191.
“Self-Control, Action, and Belief,” American PhilosophicalQuarterly 22 (1985): 169-175.
“Aristotle on Akrasia, Eudaimonia, and the Psychology of Action,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1985): 375-393. Reprinted in N. Sherman, ed. Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).
“How to Represent Aristotelian Deliberation Syllogistically,” TheNew Scholasticism 59 (1985): 484-492.
“Aristotle on the Roles of Reason in Motivation and Justification,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 66 (1984): 124-147.
“Aristotle’s Wish,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 139-156.
“Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Vol. X (1984): 133-155.
“Intending and the Balance of Motivation,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1984): 370-376.
“Pears on Akrasia, and Defeated Intentions,” Philosophia 14 (1984): 145-152.
Akrasia, Reasons, and Causes,” Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 345-368.
“Self-Deception,” Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1983): 365-377.
“Aristotle on the Justification of Ends,” Proceedings ofthe American Catholic Philosophical Association 56 (1982): 79-86.
“Self-Deception, Action, and Will: Comments,” Erkenntnis 18 (1982): 159-164.
“Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Journalof the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 405-423.
“The Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle’s Causal Theory of Action,” The New Scholasticism 55 (1981): 281-316.
“Aristotle on Akrasia and Knowledge,” The Modern Schoolman 58 (1981): 137-157.
“On ‘Happiness and the Good Life’,” Southwestern Journalof Philosophy 10 (1979): 181-187.
Encyclopedia and Dictionary Entries, etc.

“Freedom of Will,” Encyclopedic Reference of Neuroscience (forthcoming).
“Action,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Second Edition, D. Borchert, ed. New York: Macmillan (forthcoming).
“Intention,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Second Edition, D. Borchert, ed. New York: Macmillan (forthcoming).
“Weakness of the Will,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Second Edition, D. Borchert, ed. New York: Macmillan (forthcoming).
“Agent Causation” (p. 18); “Belief and Desire” (pp. 85-86); “Counterexample, Philosophy By” (p.181); “Moral Motivation” (p. 622); “Practical Syllogism,” (p. 747), and entries from first edition, Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd ed., (Clarendon Press,2005), T. Honderich, ed.
“Action Theory,” Encyclopedia Americana (forthcoming).
“Rational Irrationality,” The Philosophers' Magazine 26 (2004, 2nd Quarter): 31-32.
“Bad News for Free Will,” New Humanist (Jan. 2004): 24-25.
“Action, Philosophical Issues About,” Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Nature Publishing Group, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 20-23, L. Nadel, ed.
“Free Will and Determinism,” in L. McHenry & T. Yagisawa, eds. Reflections on Philosophy 2nd. ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), pp. 57-79.
“Agnostic Autonomism.” 2002. At Ted Honderich, ed. The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm.
“Self-Control” (pp. 1548-51) and “Temperance” (pp. 1693-96; update of 1992 entry), Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2001), L. Becker & C. Becker, eds.
“Accidie” (p. 6), “Control” (p. 184), “Motivation” (pp. 591-92), “Socratic Paradoxes” (p. 861), and “Toxin Puzzle” (pp. 924-25), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), R. Audi, ed.
“The Philosophy of Action: An Interview with Alfred R. Mele,” Cadernos de Filosofia 4 (1998): 53-84.
“Self-Deception,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), vol. 8, pp. 626-629, E. Craig, ed.
“Intentionality,” Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 339-340, P. Werhane & R. Freeman, eds.
“Reply to Lee Overton and Michael Smith,” Brown Electronic Article Review Service, J. Dreier & D. Estlund, eds. World Wide Web (www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/homepage.html), posted May 13, 1997.
“Action Theory,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement (New York: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 3-4, D. Borchert, ed.
“Basic Action,” A Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 44-46, J. Kim & E. Sosa, eds.
“Acts, Mental” (p. 6), “Attitude” (p. 64), “Deviance, Causal” (p. 197), “Parallelism, Psychophysical” (p. 645), “Ratiocination” (p. 741), “Self-Control” (p. 818), Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), T. Honderich, ed.
Akrasia” (pp. 14-15), “Extrinsic Desire” (p. 259), “Rationalization” (p. 675), “Theoretical Reason” (p. 796), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), R. Audi, ed.
“Temperance,” Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 1238-41; L. Becker & C. Becker, eds.
“Philosophy, a Bus Ride, and Dumb Luck,” in R. Karnos & D. Shoemaker, eds., Falling in Love with Wisdom (New York: Oxford UP, 1993).
Reviews

B. Enç, How We Act (Clarendon Press, 2002), The Times Literary Supplement, forthcoming.
R. Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2003), Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (2005): 142-144
R. Clarke Libertarian Accouns of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2003), Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005):142-44.
J. Adler, Belief's Own Ethics (MIT Press, 2002), Ethics 114 (2003), 156-158.
S. Buss and L. Overton, eds. Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (MIT Press, 2002), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 292-95.
D. Pereboom, Living Without Free Will (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Mind 112 (2003): 375-78.
J. Searle, Rationality in Action (MIT Press, 2001), Mind 111 (2002): 905-909.
R. Audi, The Architecture of Reason (Oxford University Press, 2001), The Times Literary Supplement, Aug. 9, 2002: 24.
M. Bratman, Faces of Intention (Cambridge University Press, 1999), Ethics 111 (2001): 400-403.
A. Barnes, Seeing Through Self-Deception (Cambridge University Press, 1997), Philosophical Psychology 12 (1999): 104-107.
P. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (University of Chicago Press, 1997), Philosophical Books 40 (1999): 49-51.
R. Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 1996), Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998): 581-584.
T. Pink, The Psychology of Freedom (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Mind 107 (1998): 242-246.
B. Berofsky, Liberation from Self (Cambridge University Press, 1995), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 995-996.
K. Lehrer, Self-Trust (Clarendon Press, 1997) and B. Berofsky, Liberation from Self (Cambridge University Press, 1995), The Times Literary Supplement, Jan. 9, 1998: 29.
G. Schueler, Desire (MIT Press, 1995), Minds and Machines 6 (1996): 253-56.
W. Child, Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind (Clarendon Press, 1994), Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 637-39.
“Teleological Behaviorism: A Review of Howard Rachlin’s Behavior and Mind: The Roots of Modern Psychology” (Oxford University Press, 1994), Behavior and Philosophy 23 (1995): 71-73.
R. Audi, Action, Intention, and Reason (Cornell University Press, 1993), Mind 104 (1995): 145-48.
R. Dasenbrock, ed. Literary Theory After Davidson (Penn State University Press, 1993), Philosophy and Literature 18 (1994): 165-67.
J. Segal, Agency and Alienation (Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), Ethics 10 (1993): 410.
R. Dunn, The Possibility of Weakness of Will (Hackett, 1987), Noûs 27 (1993): 384-85.
C. Ginet, On Action (Cambridge, 1990), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 488-91.
D. Walton, Practical Reasoning (Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), Mind 100 (1991): 417-18.
T. Honderich, A Theory of Determinism (Clarendon Press, 1988), Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1990): 85-87.
J. Marks, ed., The Ways of Desire (Precedent, 1986), Noûs 24 (1990): 611-13.
R. DeSousa, The Rationality of Emotion (MIT Press, 1987), Philosophical Books 30 (1989): 39-40.
M. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, 1987), Mind 97 (1988): 632-34.
R. Gordon, The Structure of Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 1987), Philosophical Books 29 (1988): 224-25.
D. Walton, Courage: A Philosophical Investigation (University of California Press, 1986), Philosophy of Religion 23 (1988): 117-18.
D. Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (Cornell University Press, 1984), Noûs 20 (1986): 562-65.
B. Hubbard & E. Karnofsky, Plato’s Protagoras (University of Chicago Press, 1982), Noûs 20 (1986): 269-71.
T. Engberg-Pedersen, Aristotle’s Theory of MoralInsight (Clarendon Press, 1983), Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 273-75.
D. O’Meara, ed., Studies in Aristotle (Catholic University of America Press, 1981), The Thomist 48 (1984): 318-22.
M. Simon, Understanding Human Action: SocialExplanation of the Vision of SocialScience (SUNY Press, 1981), The Thomist 48 (1984): 121-25.
Recent Talks Given Outside North America

"Free Will and Neuroscience," keynote address, Australasian Association of Philosophy, Sydney, July, 2005.
"Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: Frankfurt-Style Cases Revisited," University of Trento (Italy), June, 2005.
“Free Will: The Current State of the Debate," University of Bucharest (Philosophy Dept.), April, 2005.
“Free Will and Luck,” University of Bucharest (Philosophy Dept.) April, 2005.
“Action Theory: Some Puzzles,” University of Bucharest (Law School), April, 2005.
“Action Theory, Free Will, and Neuroscience,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, April, 2005.
“Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience,” University of Siena, March, 2005.
“Self-Deception and Delusion,” Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Sydney, Australia, November, 2004.
“Free Will and Neuroscience,” University of Helsinki, June, 2004.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University College London, June, 2003.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,”University of Hertfordshire, June, 2003.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University of Dundee, June, 2003.
“Why Are Decisions Intentional?” University of Glasgow, June, 2003.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” University of Edinburgh, June, 2003.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” University of Manchester, June, 2003.
“Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” University of Stirling, June, 2003.
“Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has,” Munich Philosophical Lecture Series: On the Nature and Culture of Volition, Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, February, 2003.
“Autonomy and Akrasia,” University of Helsinki, September, 2002.
“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference, Action and Agency, University of Oxford, September, 2002.
“Can Libertarians Make Promises?” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, May, 2002.
“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” Bielefeld University, May, 2002.
“Explaining Negative Actions,” International Congress: Causation and Explanation in Natural and Social Sciences,” Ghent University, Belgium, May, 2002.
“Akratics and Addicts,” Tilburg University, Netherlands, May, 2002.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference, Philosophy and the Emotions, Manchester, July, 2001.
“Human Action Par Excellence,” Mind and Action III, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal), May, 2001.
“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2001.
“Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2001.
“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” University of Konstanz, Intentionality Center, May, 2001.
“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of Keele, May, 2001.
“Weakness of Will,” University of Birmingham Law School, May, 2001.
“Free Will,” University of Manchester, May, 2001.
“Human Agency Par Excellence,” Australian National University, November, 2000.
“Humean Compatibilism” (with H. Beebee), Australian National University, November, 2000.
“Disappearing Agents and Master Desires,” University of Manchester, May, 2000.
“Causal Theories of Action and Deviant Causal Chains,” University of Edinburgh, May, 2000.
“Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons,” University of Glasgow, May, 2000.
“Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of Frankfurt-Style Cases,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.
“Executive States,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.
“Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions,” University of Zurich, Ethics Center, May, 2000.
“Moral Motivation: Internalism vs. Externalism,” University of Sheffield, February, 2000.
“Deciding,” University of Manchester, February, 2000.
“Self-Deception and Emotion,” University of Stirling, February, 2000.
“Deciding,” University of Durham, February, 2000.
“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” University of Keele, February, 2000.
“Human Agency Par Excellence,” Birkbeck College, University of London, February, 2000.
“The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning,” University of Reading, February, 2000.
“Goal-Directed Action,” University of Auckland, August, 1999.
“Motivational Strength and Control,” University of Otago, August, 1999.
“Motivated Belief Without Agency,” University of Canterbury, August, 1999.
“Goal-Directed Action,” Monash University, August, 1999.
“Weakness of Will,” LaTrobe University, August, 1999.
“Motivated Belief Without Agency,” University of Western Australia, August 1999.
“Self-Deception and Emotion,” Australian National University, August, 1999.
“Goal-Directed Action,” Australian National University, August, 1999.
“Weakness of Will,” Australian National University, July, 1999.
“Practical Irrationality: Two Kinds of Akratic Action,” Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal), July, 1998.
“Ultimate Responsibility,” Uppsala University (Sweden), May, 1998.
“Motivated Belief and Agency,” University of Helsinki, May, 1998.
“Freedom and Alternative Possibilities,” University of Helsinki, May, 1998.
“Addiction and Self-Control,” Oslo, Norway, May, 1995.
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